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1.  tlhab dltls an lloonomic and Monetary Union include ?
,lnIIE!|-I a-1
What does an economic and monetar union include?
Themonetaryaspectofaneconomicandmonetaryunioncanbe
more easrly defrned than the economic aspect. According to the werner-
a monetary union implies ful|  and irrevocable internal  ccn-  repPorE
vertrbilrty  of the currencies at fixed definite  rates of ex-
change and full  liberalization  of capital -povements '  Because
thenoney-supplyortheliquidityofamenber-statecaninthat
slruatiori no longer be controlled by the national central banks '
monetary policy at least in  j-ts main decifions must shift  from
rhese authorities to authorities at the communi'ty leve1 '  What
monetary policy implies is  also clear:  discount policy,  open-
market-policyrliquidi-tyratiosrceilJ-ngstobanklending'
exchange-rate-policy (of the community towards the outer world) '
Notonlythefinalsituationisratherclear,itisalsopos.
sible to suggest stages in which co-ordination between central
banks will  be gradually replaced by a common system of central
banks, which could be based on the European Fund of Monetary
co-operation" The narrowing of  the margins of fluctuation  of
the European currencies also follows logically  from the cte-
f rnition .
The authorities who should combine their  efforts  and ultima*
teilr must form a new body, are also clearly  to define. They
are the central banks -under a certain general authority  fr:om
che Government. The ultimate relation  between the Federal
Reserve system of the community and the Political  Authority
of that community witl  not be easy to find  as this  relation
ncw changes from country to country but the negotiations  cn
uhrs point wilI  not differ  fundamentally from the negot-L'::ror's
ccncerning the political  organs of the cOmmunity such as a
Government and a Parliament
That the monetary aspect is  in  more precise terms to cleii1'r]
ls  proven by the werner-rePort and also by the report "European
Economic Integration and Monetary'Uni-fication"of the Study
Group on Economic and Monetary Union'
Thcugh the ultimate transfer of power in  the monetary field
ro a supra-natural organ will  be a very decrsive but alsoA-1
drffrcurt  step in  the process towards a European union, from
che technlcal pornt of view the obstacles wrl1 be smaller than
rn the frerds of socral and economj-c poricy. The authorj-ties
(cencral bank people and ministry of finance people) know each
other and often meet. They have a great expertise that is  shared
cnly by a few people outside their  offices.  The onry important.
economl-c group that is  directly  influenced- by the decisj_ons
of the monetary authorities is  the banking system that is  ge-
nerarly well organized and with which contacts are relatively
easy. There also seems to be a general tendenqr that the banking
system as a rule  followsreconmendations of central banks. of
course the structure of the banking systems is  rather different
rn the various mem,ber-states,  but that points to the conclusion
r:'hat thelnplemontation of thebroad d.ecisions of  the European mone-
E.ary authority should be decentralized and for  the tj_me beinq
rematn in  the hands of the central banks.
rn the broad fierd  of economic and sociar policy far  more pres-
sure groups are involved afrd parlj_amentary control is  much
strr-cter than in  the case of monetary policy.  These issues are
more debated in press, t.v.  and radio than j-n the case of mone-
E,ary policy.  wage policy for  instance has a di.rect bearing on
the income and welfare of the people; the same applies to tax
policy.  A budget policy that is  restrictive  for  macro-ecoiromic
reasons, will  always hurt some groups and interests  and where-
as within the natj-on-state it  is  already difficult  to formulate
and implement a souyrd poricyr €.9" to stabilise  the business-
cycre, it  will  be far  more difficult  to harmonize those poli-
c:es between nation-states.  Moreover to reach a certarn r:hjec-
t.lve there are many possible instruments.
one instrument can from an economic, social and porit.ical  point
cf vrew be better applied in  country A and another instri-lm€l:rr
rn country B but implementing  both in  their  respecti,r" .r,ri-rrrr-es  may
threaten eguiLibrlum  between these states. The same can ha.ppen
of course in the fierd  of monetary poricy but as pointec our:
before, fewer and less broad interests are involved and a com-
promrse that prevents a conflict  can be more easily reached.
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The werner-report rigbtly  stresses that in the final  stage two community
organs should. be established. ! a ffcentre of d'ecision for economic policyrr
and a ncommunity system for the central ba.nksrr. I{hen it  comes to lay d'own
what should happen during the first  stage the report, besides recomnending
smaller margins between currencies than follows from the margin toward's the
U.S. d.ollar, d.oes not mention precise measures of economic poliCy but relies
on i consultations,  meetings, big lines of economic policyr recommendationst
harmonization.  Iiore precise is the itLea of a survey at cornnnunity levcl
bcfone governments  draw up their butlgptary proposals. Most of these propo-
sals have been taken over by the Council of ldinisters, but the experience
of the past few years taught us that these prooedures  have proved to be
failures.  Ore can safely assert that these procedures and the cleLiberations
within the Council have never been effective in influcncing national decisions.
For that reason, S  power should be given to Community authoritiest even
if  it  were only a right of approval or veto a"nct it  should' be rather precisely
laid down in what fieltts this power may be executed' and' how d'etailett this
power will  be.
In ord.er to reach agtreenent between the present member-states this power
can not be too tl"etailed. but it  shorLct be effective r not to harmonize eco-
nonic policy in all  its  aspects - but to prevent effectively tend'encies
that would separate the d,evelopnent of the economies still  more than is
now alreaqr the case. This collrlcl. bring us to an action of the community
authorities to na.rrow the discrepa.ncies tha,t exist at present between
member-states.
The report of the Study Group say" (p. 4)  :
rrAutonomy of national- economic policy objectives and the laok of homogeneity
of attitudes in particular towards the tracte-off between unemployment ancl
inflation are at the origin of the familiar adJustment problem which has been
plaguing the flnotioning of the international  monetary system for more than
a decade now. It  is also the central issue in ths process of creatlng a
monetary unionrr.
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It  shoultl bc thc ain of thc. Connunity supra-national bo{y of rhich thc
Connisslon of thc European Comnunities is thc logi.cal prcdcccgBo?' to Juilgc
nhcthcr measurcs proposcd by thc national authorltics rcuLd' strcngthcn thc
d.iifcrences in attituclce towarde thc traclc-off. In that casc onc could' inagl.rn
that e.g. a wagefreczer or othcr ncasurcs of income pollcy, proposals pointing
to a broaclening of thc buctgct clcficit  (according to natlonal eocounte fol'Io-
r.ring thc O.E.C.D. pattern)r rith  norc than say 10 %, tu  mGasurcB  whlch anount
to morc tha^n certain pcrccntages, ehoultl bc juilgecl bcforc by thc Connigglon.
In caee a rlght of approval or of vcto wboulcl bc thouglrt to 8o too fer for
the noncnt, a rlgtrt to postpone thc ncasu:rc or Just thc rlgtrt to gi'vc thc
'rBuropea,nt' opinion woulcl alrcady bc intercsting. In thc lattcr  casc thc opinion
would have to be publishccL in ordcr to influcncc public opillion. Thc prcscnt
tllfficulty  is that it  is not lceown whcthcr a concrctc lteaEurG of ccononic
policy is against the broad. cornmrnity intcrcst. Follorlng ny proposal tbc
E\gopean authonlty nmet gradually forrn a wealth of natcrlal a^nd' clcrcises on
which later to basc an coononic policy of their owrr I  havc linltctt  nysclf
to what coultl be donc ln thc tine to conc a,nd what shouLcl bc thc nirduun
ncasurcs to bc ta.lcsn in the fielcl of procedurcs. Tlhe efforts to reach firnctancntaL
eolutione for problens likc  a coronurrity  tnrd.gat, a Europsalr corporationr  harmo-
nization of social security etc. shoutct of course go one Wc oa,nnotr howcvcrt
wait for thosc iseues to bc solvcd. to gain somc cxpGriencc in clcaling with
a Europeaxr social a.nd econonic polloy.
J.W.J. Bosma,n
Tilburgr 4th lrlarch 1974
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l)  La crise que traverse actuellement la Commrnaut6 europ6enne est plus
grave et plus vaste que les pr6c6d.entes.  Par le pass6, des obstacles sp6ci-
fiqges on, naintes fois freind le d.6veloppement de la Corunrnaut6r mais un
effort cc..jr::.r.lirl it le plus souvent permis de les surmonter. Cette fois-cit
cependant, son 'ru:it6 encore inachev6e est nenac6e par un maLaise plus g6n6ral
qui 6prouve d.avantage sa force d.e r6sistance et partant sa coh6sion. Ce
nalaiee trouve son origine dans un ensemble de causes.
,ne citug,i: r6cente et importa,nte est la crise de lf 6nergie. Celle-ci
a provoqu,ltiarls une s6rie d.fEtats membres un d6ficit  de Ia balance des
paiements q'ui f,, profond6ment perturb6 leur 6quilibre 6conomique.  En outre,
coincid"arri;  avec u:.1r., p6nurie exceptionnelle sur le march6 des matidres
premibres, elle a. port6 ttinflation  en Europe, qui 6tait d6ji. vive, i  un
niveau JaL:.;.i,: atteint. Aussi Srave soit-elle en elle-mdmer la crise d.e
lr6nergie nra, siri,rne toute fait  cnre mener i  son apog6e un mouvement en cours
depgis qu,,lquer finn6es. Par dfimportants mouvements de capitarx sp6culatifsr
l-e d6sord-,: n'rn6"fai.re international a non seulement ronpu 1a stabilit6 rela-
tive qui cai"acL6ri.$ait  les rapports rnon6taires en [\rope rnais a 6galement
contrecar i, ., r' tentatives timides visant i  une politique conjoncturelle
corumrnaut rii  ,r sap6 Ia r6sistance ir ltinflation.
..,,6.na,iche  encore fragile de ltunit6 mon6taire de Ia Corun-rnaut6 nra
pa,s pu r6i:j.;:r-iei. i  de.telles pressions. Les pays de Ia Communaut6 connaissent
actuellen,"nt  une inflation d6mesur6e et un ch6rrrge accru. qui affaiblissent
sa force ie croiepance d6ji att6nu6e par des causes internes.'Ces  tensions
6cononiqu,)t] provoquent des tensions politicrues. Ensernble' elles ccnduisent
les gouve.r'nenents  des Etats membres i  se concentrer davan*"age sur leurs
problbmes strictement nationa'"rx.
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2)  I1 ne sragit paq seulement pour les Etats membres  d.e sauvegard.er I
court terne leurs int6r6ts personnels inn6d.iats. Lrimpuissa^nce  d.e Ia Connu-
paut6 drinfluer sur le cours des 6v6nenents accr6clite d.e plus en plus la
thdse que, en adoptant le rythme Eri 6tait le sien, la Comnnrnaut6 a surestin6
ses possibilit6s pratiques et que les disparit6s nationales sont encore
trop grandes pour €tre surmont6es par d.es sp6culations  technocratiguee.
Avant guron puisse songer d une relance de la Comruunaut6, il  conviend.rait
d.raborrl d.e trionpher d.es difficult€s  concrdtes sur Ie plan national, ftt-ce
par la concertation  ou Ia coop6ratl.on.  Dans une telle  optigue, la Cornrsunaut6
nta d.e chances r6elLes d.e rdussir clue si le climat est favorable, crest-]-dire,
si leg problEnes nationaux sont en bonne partie r6solug.
Toutefoie, frreculer pour mieux sauterfr est un principe cnri ne
convient pas da.ns la eituation actuelle. Reculer nra un sens gtre si lton
dispose d.lune assise sorid.e sur laguelle on peut se repiier. or, Itaesise
nationale est auJourdthui devenue trop 6troite pour La solution d.es problbnes
auxguels les Etats menbres de Ia Conrunaut6 sont confrontds. Afin de sortir
de lrinpasser i.l est donc inilispensable de renforcer la Conmunaut6 ptut6t
que d.e la figer pour un tenps d.a^ns lrimnobillsne. Sur le pla^n national on
peut tout au plus encore essayet d.e se prot6ger ta^nt bien que mal des effets
des lnfluences perturbatrices. Tenter d.e se naintenir pendant longtenps eur
Irassise trop 6troite cle ltdconomie nationale serait retourner vers un pass6
d.ont les legons nous* ont amen6s iI  y a un quart d.e sidcle i nou-s jnga€er
r6solument dans la voie d.rune,coop6ration nouvelle.
3)  Il  est dtailleurs ilLusoire de vouloir revenir temporairenent  ir des
solutions nationales. Non seulement parce que, en raison de lfint6gration
de fait  de-lt6cononie  europ6enne, les problbmes ne seront r6solus qge sur Ie national
planfet donc de n:anibre partielle seulement et que leur solution d.enandera
par cone€quent un ternps de plus en plus long, rnais augsi parce quron se heur-
tera sang cesse i  d.e nouveaux problEmes  auxquels srappliquera  ce quri vient
df6tre d.it a propos des probldmes actuels. Le monde ne sfarr6te ni  6conomi-
quement ni politiquement. Dans 1es nmltiples d.iscussions sur le choix de la
soci6t6 de demain, ctest i  peine si lron mentionne encore ltid6e de lrunit6F1
europdenner  alors que tout ce que nous avons appris au cours d.e ce sidcle
d6montre que cette unit6'est bien Ie fondement lndispensable i  lt6guilibre
politiEre et dconornique  tte notre continent. Si la Comrmrnaut6  narque le pas,
Ja soci6t6 de clemain se fera sans elle.
II  serait dvidennent foncibrement errond d.e croire gutune Couutrnaut6
mieux cimentde serait en tlegure d.e surmonter I  court terne les difficult6s
d'ont souffrent actuellement les Etats europ6ens. Cela vaut tout particuli6-
rement pour lrinflation.  ta persista^nce et Itacc6l6ration  croissante d.e celle-
cir  problEme 6cononigue I  Irorigine, en ont faii  un problbne politique dont
les donndes sont de plus en plus li6es i, Ia question, d"e politique sociale,
d.e La r6partition d.es revenus. rr  nrenpGche que, gr6ce b une action plus
efficace face i  lrensenble  de, nos problEnes dcononiques,  une Comnqnaut6
consolid.6e sera nieux en nesure qtrrun Etat isol6 drapporter i  ce problbne
crucial une rdpolse 6conomlquement_-et  socialement justifi6e.  Il  est 6vident
que lee bases d.e cl6part d.tune Comnunautd plus solid.e devront Otre dtablies
d'tun conmun accord. par d.es mssures pr6lininaires  concernant les problbmes
qui se posent avec acuit6, tels gue les d6ficlts particuliers d.es balances
d.es paienents r6sultant d.e ra orise de lr6nergie, rr\yper-infration due en
partie Er' cette nGme criee et les rapports d"e parit6s entre les Etats membres.
Mais les neilleures techniques sont vou6es b, lt6chec si on sravise une fois
de plus i  vouloir lee appliquer par la voie qui srest r6v6l6e tant de fois
infmctueuse de la coord.ination  non obligatoire.
4)  Le narasne actuel d.e la Corynrnaut6  ne vient pas de ce qurelle aurait
surestim6 son inportance. La cl,,.se profonde en est que les Etats membres
ont bien trop h6sit6 D, tirer  les cons6quences politiques concrbtes  des
principes politiques qui ont prdsid6 i  sa.cr6ation. Ctest cette faiblesse
organigue qui a enp€ch6 la Corunrnaut6  de jouer un r61e positif  face aux
probldmes des derniEreis ann6es.
Alors qrra lr6poque du pla.n Schurnan, Itaspect politiqge et lfaspect
6cononique  de lrint€gration europ6enne 6taient 6quivalents, Ia valeur attach6e
au premier nra cess6 de se d.6pr6cier au fil  des ans,
Aujourdthui, Ia Commrnaut6 en est arriv6e au point que pour poursuivre
eon int6gration 6conomique et 6viter que les Etats membres ne reviennent i
des politiques exclusivenent nationales, iI  faut d.es mesures concrbtes,
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d.rord.re politique, par-14 entendez 6galement drordre institutionnel. Lfobjet
d.e Ia prdsente introducti-on est drillustrer  bridveneni Ia thbse d6velopp6e
ci-dessus en prenant pour poini; de d.6part Ie d'6veloppenent politique et
6cononique  de La Corucunaut$ et de d.6gager ainsi lrorientation principale des
propositions  prdclses, h, court et i  plus long .termer {ui  sont expos6es  dans
les chapitres suivants.
Le$ d6buts Ce i?int6firation europ6enne
,)  ta volont6 dr6carter i  tout ja"nais les divisions politiques et
6conomiqr:es des ann6es trente a 6t6 Ie point d.e d6part de lrint6gration
europ6enne.  Da,ns pn premier temps, les efforts ont avant tcut port6 sur lrin-
t6gration politi-que; les menaces d.e Ia €lrerre froide opposant trbs rapidement
IrEst et lrouest nty Staient pas entibrement 6trarrg6res. Ces efforts ont
abouti & une d.ouble initiative  I la cr6ation de la Cowmnaut6 du charbon et
d.e ltacier, drune partr et d,e Ia Corurunautd  ouropdenne de d6fense, d.e lrautre.
Dans les deux cas, Itobjectif  6tait d.e cr6er des gara.nties contre une renais-
sance de la rivalit6  fra.nco-allerna.nde, rivalitS  qui avait 6:6 si longtenps  au
centre des divisions en EuroPe.
La premiEre initiative  avait pour but de d6nationaliser lrassise
industrielle  d.e la guene en int6grant lrindustrie europ6enne du charbon et de
lfacier dans une Communaut6 supra-nationale. ta second.e visait i, d6nationaliser
ltappareil rnilitaire en ltint6grant dans une communaut6 suplsa-nationale  de
delfense. La premibre fut  couronn6e de succbe, la second.e 6choua. Un systbme
militaire int6gr6 apparaissait pr6matur6 et Iton cherchar dbs lors, i  mettre
sur pied une co6p6ration militaire dans le cadre atlantique.
6)  Si le succbs rencontr€ par la CECA constituait une premi bre €preuve
importante d.e Ia force des tendances A, Itint6gration europt5enne, ce succbs
restait limit6 }. la "petite'r E\rope des Six. Le reste de lfBurope occidentale
ne semblait pas encore d.ispos6 l  franchir Ie pas d6clsif de Ia-supra-nationalit6
m6me si celle-ci nrdtait pr6sente dans Ia CECA qurl un d.egr6 relativernent
nodeste. Cette supra-nationalit€  apparaissait d.arrs les pouvoirs de la Haute
Autorit6 gui lui  perrnettaient a) rnoye'nnant  un budget propre obtenu grdce d des
pr6lbvenents mis i  charge de lrindustrie  comrmnautaire du charbon et de Iraciert
d.e promouvoir  1a modernisation des secteurs consid6r6s et de faire face anrx
6ventuelles cons6guences sociales drune telIe modernisation; b) dtemp6cher
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La fornation d.tententes et d.onc cle positions doninantes dans cee lndustries.
La Haute Autorltd 6tait d,irectenent responsable deva,nt ItAssemblde pour tout
ce qui a\ralt trait  l  ses cornp{te4ces propres. Lorsqqe des probl}nes plus graves
se sont pos6s, cotuDe Ia crise charbonnibre d.e L957, il  eEt appam que Ies
porvoirs tte la llaute Autorit6 6talont insuffisantee et eIIe a dt ee eounettre
a'r d.6clei-ons du Conseil des ninistres of les interats. nationaur dtaient
encore pr6Pontldrants.
?)  A lroriginef on oeuvrait avant tout d.ans Ie sens dtune int6gration
nfonctionnellefr de la vie politlque et 6cononiqu€r  crest-e}-dire dtune int6gra-
tion d.fobJectifs  sp6cifiques tels qurincarn6s dans Ia CECA et Ia CED' Ortre
Iraspect trbs lnportant de la s6curit6 dans ces deux d.onainesl lriclee qui
prdsidait e ges efforts €talt qurune int6gration de falt  des economies des
Etatg europ$ens ne constituait  pas une base suffisante pour appliquer A une
plus gfantle.6che11e le principe de Ia supra-nationalit6'  AprEs lrdchec d'e
la cED en l))Q et la stag3ration relative cle lroEcEr Ia force des tendances i
lrint6gration europeenne stest cepend.ant  r6v616e suffisannent grand'e pour faire
acconplir i  lrE\gope des progrbs beaucoup plus consdcl6rables clans Ie d'onaine
€cononigue.
g)  &r nettant en oeuvre le pLan Marshall, IIOECE - clont lt€ventail d'es
tacheg sr€l-argira ult6rieurement - avait acconpli pour lrEurope r:n trarrail
inportant clans Ie d.onaine d.e Ia,lib6ration des echanges dcononigues' Elle avait
nis fin aux restrictions quantitatives i  lrinportation et i  ltexportation et
mrltilat6ralie6 les op6rations de paienent entre les Etats europeens.  Ces deuJc
tnesures avaient favoris6 au plus haut point le red'ressement et }a croissance
de lf6cononie europ6erure. I1 €tait appanr cepend.ant irnpossible de poursuivre
clans Ie cadre d.e lroECE Ie processus de libdralisation et dtaboutir ir un
ctdnantdlenent syet€natique  d.es tarifs douaniers. Il  fallait  pour cela des
impulsions politigues plus fortes qrii, en d.6finitive, nront pu €tre trouv€es
cnrra Irint6rieur cle lrgqrope des Six d.6sireuse.d.rr:ne  int6gration totale. Ainsi
est n6e la Connunaut6  €cononigue europ6enne'
il  ta CEE a €t6 congnre en tant qurunion €cononique i  caractdre supra-
national provisoirement limit6. Si on excepte les comp€tences  propres de La





counercialer cfest au niveau du Conseil d.es ministres, composd d.es repr6sentants
des gouvernements d'es Etats menbres, gue se sltue le centre d.e ddcislon concer
nant la politique soclo-6conomigue.  Sur la base d.es objectifs d.6finis dans
le Traj't6r Ia conntssion europdenne a pour iSche d.e sournettre des propositions
au Conseil qui, d.a,ns certaj,ns cas, d6cid.e )  la najorltd qualifide. Ces d.dcisions
auraient d'fi concluire,  aprbs une p6riod.e de transition d.e 12 ans; Fr une union
compldte avec lib:e circulation des narchandises, des personnes, d.es ervices
et d.es capitar:x &,/*r.  politique corumrne dans Ia mesure or), d.rapr6s Ie Trait6,
celle-ci 6tait ind.ispensable au bon fonctionnement  d.e ltunion consid.6r6e. pour
cela, le bud.get conrnrnautaire,  1imit6 b, Irorigine, serait dot6 d.es moyens
ndcessaires seron des roodelitds qui 6taient 6galement d.6termin6es par re Trait6,
La politique  conunrne couvre 6galement les cinq d.omaines  suiva.nts ;
Lrr:nion d'ouanibre et la politiclrre commerciale commune qui sry rattache;
la politiqtre agricore conuune;
Itharnonisation  d'es pol:-ticrues 6conomiques et la poritique conunule en inatibre
de concu*ence e' vue d.rassurer  un march6 totarement ribre;
a) ra politique structurelle, y compris Ia politiqge r6gionale, afin drasgurer i,
Ia communaut6 une structure 6cononrique 6guilibrde et efficace;
e) ta politiEre conjoncturelle  et mon6taire"
r0) Le succEs d.es d.6buts fut prometteur. L'union d.ouanidre fut  r6aris6e
pend'a,nt la p6riod.e de tra.nsitioq pr6we pour son achbvement. 11 en fut  de
name pour Ia politique agrico}e conunrne. Lragriculture sr6tait rnre attribuer
une place toute particulibre  d.ans re Trait6 parce quta lrimage d.e la politique
nen6e dans lee diff6rents Etats membres on la consid.drait  comme un secteur
oir la formation des prix ne pouvait 6tre abandonn6e  au libre  jeu de lroffre  et
d'e la d'ema.nd'e. Le fond'ement d.e Ia politigue agricole fut  la mise en place d.run
necanisne de formation de prix aussi uniformes que possibre et, sry rattachant,
une politique d.timportation et d-rexportation vis-i.-vis d.es pays tiers,  qul
seule t  pouvaient garantir une libre circulation d.es produits a6ricores. Aussi,
cet 6r6ment de ltr'mion 6conornique 6tait-ir  d.6fini avec prticision dals le Trait6.
cette d6finition pr6cise et le fait  que les Etats menbres, ffit-ce i  d.es d.egr6s
d'ivers, avaient particuliErement int6r6t d, ce que la politique agricole conmrne
se fasse ont gra.ndement contribu6 i, ce succbs.
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rr) En rnre d.e r6aliser la circulation totalement libre des rnarchand.iaes,
des eervices, d.es personnes .et des capitaux, la Communaut6 a d.6p1oy6 pend.ant
Ia p6rj.ode de transition une trds grand.e activit6 pour harmoniser les dispo-
sitions l6gislatives nationales et notarnment Ies r6gimes fiscaux. Mais, les
progrbs furent lents parce cmron se heurtait i  d.e nombreuses traditions et
particularit6s  nationales amxouelles les Etats nembres se raccrochaient souvent
avec acharnement, parfoie sous Itinfluence de groupes de pression. Ctest
pourquoi ce chapitre lrunion ticonomj.gue nrest pas encore achev6.
L2) Cela vaut dans une plus forte mesure encore pour la politique stmc-
turelle. Cette politique cornporte  der:x aspects. Le premier est lrharmonlsation
des mesures nationales destln6es i  venir en aid.e aux r6gions en retard et aux
secteurs d6favoris6s  en vue, dtune part, d.t6liminer les distorsions de concurj
rence i  }tint6rieur de Ia Comrn:.naut6, et, dfautre part, d.e renforcer Ia
structure 6conomique  de celle-ci,  Une politique 6nerg6tique comnrune revdtirait
icl  une inportance particulibre. te der.rxidme aspect est lrencouragement  des
activit6s gui ne peuvent st6panouir fleinenent gue gur 1e plan corffrunautaire.
Lrr:tilisation d.e techniques  modernes et la recherche n5cessaire i, cet effet
pr6sentent sur ce point un int6r6t exceptiortnel.
Le d.6veloppement  de ttindustrie nucl€aire 6tait consid6r6 conme un
exenple particulier de ce type. Crest dans cette optique quer paralldlement
i  la CEE et sur les traces de la CECA, gue fut  cr66e rme nouvelle Comuunautd I
EUIATOM. Cepend.a.nt, les int6r6ts nationaux i  court terme apparurent  tellement
plus importants que ceux de la Communautd d"ans son ensemble qUTEURATOM  se
solda praticjrement Par un 6chec.'
Bien que les pays de la Comrmrnaut6 aient manifest6 pendant la
p6riotle d.e transition une croissance relativement forte et diversifi6et
on ne peut affirm€r que la polltique stnrcturelle  d.e la Cornmunaut6 en fut un
facteur irnportant. Les tentatives visa.nt i. coordonner les potitiques nationales
des Etats membres se sont encore trop heurt6es d des conflits souvent imaginai-
res d.rint6r6ts nationaux. Cette coordination a notamment failli  sur le plan
irnportant de 1a politique r6gionale; Ia Comrnrnaut6  devait payer chdrenent cette
carence lorsglrri la fin  des ann6es soixante, sa croisaa.nce et sa stabilit6
furent 6branl6es par ltinflation  et par le d6rbglement du systdme mondtaire
mondial.
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Stasgration dans la CiiE
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13) ta gravit6 de ces difficult6s  est imputable d.ans une large mesure
i  Ia carence de Ia partie cle la politigue d.e la Commrnaut6 .fui aurait pr6cis6-
nent d0 en Otre 1t616ment central, i, savoir la politique conjoncturolle et
mon6taire.  Contrairement i  la politicl'ue ccm:rune quril  pr6voyait dans d.e
nornbreux autres segteurs, le Trait6 prdconisait dans ce clomaine la coord.ina-
tion des politiques nationales d.es Etats membres. I1 posait donc en principe gue
ceux-cit en prenier lieu responsables  d.e leur croissance et cle leur 6qui.libre-
proprer assureraient  la croissance et lt6quilibre  de Ia Commrnaut6  d.ans son
ensenble en coord.onnant leurs politiques, tout en acceptant d.f6ventuelles
d.iff6rences  d.torientation inpos6es par d.es ci-rconstances  d.ivergentes. Il  sous-
estinait donc les lirnites cJue la d"6pend.ance r6ciproque et Itinterp6n6tration
croissante des 6conomies allaient imposer aux politicnres conjoncturelles
nationales. 11 ut6connaissait Ia n6cessit6 d.tune politique conjoncturelle et
mon6taire  corunune rend.ue indispensable par lfint6gration  el1e-mOme. En cons6-
guencet les institutions Ce Ia Communaut6  ney 6taient pas pr6par6es. A mesure
que les tensions internationales sraggravbrent, cette carence orpp,niclge se fit
de plus en plus sentir.
14) Ia comnission  europ6enne, conscientede la n6cessit6 d,rune coord.i-
nation aussi effective que possible, d6ploya dds le d.6but une grand.e activit$
dans ce d.onaine. Cinq cornit6s con$rltatifs comp6tents d.ans les d.iff6rents
secteurs d.e la politicnre 6conomicJue et financidre pr6parbrent les d6bats
p6riodiques du Conseil des lvlinistres au cours d.escprels 1es directives 6labor6es
par la Coutission europ6enne en matibre cle politio:e  conjoncturelle 6taient
exanin6es..Ces d.6bats portErent bien vite  6galement sur des progranmes i  noyen
terme et permirent de recueillir  d.e pr6cieuses  informations sur la politique
zuivie par chacun des pays membres. Toutefois, ils  ne d.6bouch6rent pas sur
d.e rdelles confrontations et nrinfluencbrent  donc pas concr6tement  Ia politiqtre
des gouvernements  nationaux. Sur ces points essentiels, ceux-ci 6taient trop
pr6occup6s par la situation 6conomique et politique dans leurs pays redpectifs
pour accepter ttid.6e dfen d6battre encore au sein d,u Conseil des Ministres.
15)  Au d6but, it-nry  avait
forte expansion dcononique et d"e
assez lente A, cette 6poque. Avec
pas lieu d.e sten ingui6terrt  compte tenu d,e Ia
la progression du tar:x d.rinflation  encore
un peu d.roptimisme,  on pouvait considdrer
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qgril stagissait du d.6narrage drr:ne proc6dure qui, i  1a longuer deviendrait plus
efficace. Toutefois, I  mesure que lrinflation stacc6l6rait, le contraste entre
la gravit6 ctes problenes et ltinefficacit6 tle la coordination au sein du
Coneeil clevint plus ninlfeste. Les rapports et les recomEndations d.e }a
Connigsion europdenne 6e firent plus pressants, surtout lorsque les qrrnptOnes
d.e orlse non€talre lnternationale staggravbrent d.a,ns la seconde moiti6 des
ann6es goixanrts. ta n€cessit6 de faire front en cotl[un contre Les darrgers qui
nenagaient  La stabilitd cte la Conmuraut6  cle lrertdrieur apparut d'e fagon
6vidente. Toutefois, il  €tait tout augsi 6vlttent qutune action cornmunautaire
plus vlgoureuse sur Ie plan extdrieur resterait th6orique en lrabsence dtune
politigge 6cononigue et financibre corumrne gur le plan int6rieur. Ltinsistance
d.e la Coronission a,fin gufil soit tenu compte des int6rGts de La-Comnunaut6
dans Ia d.6finition des politlques nationales apparaissai.t cotnme un exigence
d laggelle il  6tait inpossible de satisfaire dans la pratigtre.
15)  Lr€chec cte la coordination  da^ns le clonaine de Ia politique nacro-
€cononiqge a colnoicld avec le nonent ot lriclde dr6riger la supra-nationalit6
en principe tlirecteur de la poLitique 6trang€re 6tait la plus d'iscr6ditde.
Dans la Conmr:naut6, les oppositions gui se nanifestErent i, ce sujet eurent
pour effet d.fentratner lraband.on provisoire dans Ia pratique tLe la rdgle d-es
ddlib6rations  g, Ia naJoritd au sein du Consell de Ministres, qui nravait
cltailleurs janais €t€ appligude. Les d.issensions au sujet d.e It6largissement
achevbrent  de plonger la Connunautd  ctans lrirnpasse. Il  fallut  attendre la
conf6rence au Bolutet de La Haye de cl6qernbre  1969 et les deur d.6cisions d'e
principe qui y furent prisee concernant lt6largissenent d.e la Conmunautd  et
son renforcernent  interne par la cr6ation d.tune union 6conomique et non€taire
pour il6bloquer la situation.
LtUnion 6cononicrue et rnon6taire
I?)  Le groupe Werner, Charg6 d.e pr6senter un rapport sur lt6laboration
d.e cette Unionl r6sume cle Ia na,nibre zuiva,nte le contenu d.e celle-ci :
- Ies monnaies conrnrnautaires  sont assurdes dtune convertibitit6 r6ciproque
totale et irr6versible, sans flucturation de courg et avec des rapports de




-  la cr6ation d-e licluid.it6s dans ltensemble de la zone et la politique mon6taire
et du cr6dit sont centraiis€cs;
-  la politique mon6taire 6, lt6gard. du mond.e ext6rieur est du ressort corurunau-
ta,ire;
-  les politiques des Etats membres  A. lr6gard d.u marchd des capitaux sont unifi6es;
-  les donn6es essentielles de ltensemble du bud.get public, et en particulier
Ia variation d-e leur volume, ltampleur des soldes et les mod.es de financenent
ou drutilisation de ces derniers sont d6cid6s au niveau comrmrnautaire;
-  les politiques r6gionales et structurelles ne sont plus exclusivement  d.u
reesort des pays rnembresl
- une consultation syst6matique et continue d.es partenaires sociaux est assur6e
au niveau conmunautaire.
18) Le rapport werner estireit  gue rtexercice d.e ces conp6tences n6cessi-
tait  Ifinstitution  de d.eux organes coril[unautaires : un centre de d.6cision pour
la politique 6cononique et un systEme cornmunautaire  d.e banques centrales. Alors
que ce dernier seralt responsable d.e Ia politigue mon6taire interne et exteme,
b lrexclusion d.e la fixation de la parit6 de Ia monnaie corumrnautaire, Ie
prenier exercerait d.e fagon ind"dpenda^nte  une influence d6cisive sur la politique
6cononique  g6n6rale i  lt6gard. d.es autres points cit6s plus haut.
En ce gui concerne notannent la politique r6gionale et structurelle,
Ie budget d'e la Communaut6 d.evrait Gtre major6 de fagon ad.6guate. Une autre
cons6quence  de ce transfert de comp6tehces serait le tra^nsfert d.rurre respon-
sabilit6 parlenentaire correspond.ante au parlement d.e 1a Coruur.maut6. Le
statut de ce dernier devrait refl6ter ce transfert de responsabilit6s, non
seulement du point de vue de ltarnpleur d"e ses attributions,  mais aussi eu
6gard au mode d.t6lection de ses membres.
r9) une p€iiode de 1o ans 6tait  jug6e n6cessaire pour ra r6arisation
conplEte d'e lfUnion. El-le pourrait 6tre accomplie en deux 6tapes, 6ventuelle-
ment davantage. La premibre 6tape flg trois ans 6tait d6crite de fagon d6taill6e.
EI1e devraitr grdce A une coord.ination intensive de la politigue mon6taire  et
budg6taire et ir Itharmonisation  des instrrrments  mon6taires suirrant un carendrier
pr6cis et sous le- ccntr6le du Conseil des l.,linistres, mettre en oeuvre une
harnonisation te1le cfue le transfert d.e comp6tences i  la Commirnaut6 et la
cr6ation drorganes commrnautai-re puissent 6tre entam6s au cours de la deuxibme
6tape.
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Un rapport sur les r6formes institutionnelles sera 61abor6 en
tenps utile  avant la fin  de Ia premibre 6taper afin qr.re 1es propositions  en
Ia matibre puissent 6tre sounises i  une conf6rence intergouvernenentale
qui sera convoqu6e conform6nent aux d.ispositions de ltarticle  216 du Trait6.
20) Dans sa r6solution d"u 20 mars 1971, Ie Conseil d.es Ministres a
adopt6 pratiquernent toutes les propoeitions du Groupe !'lerner quant au fond..
Toutefois, il  ne srest pas prononc6 sur la guestion essentielle des organee
comrmrnautaires qui seraient charg6s d.rexercer les comp6tences nationales qui
devraient 6tre tra"nsf6r6es i  la Comrmrnaut6.  Il  stest born6 provisoirenent
l  affirmer gue J'es institutions  d.e la Comrmrnaut6,  A. savoir le Conseil, la.
Coilnission et le Parlement, seraient mises en mesure dtexercer leurs respon-
sabilit6s en natibre 6conomigue et mon6taire avec efficacit6 et rapid.it6. De plus,
iI  a d.6clar6 expressdnent  clue Les politiques cofllrnunautaires  mises en oeuvre
d.a,ns Ie cadre d.e lrUnion 6conoroigue et non6taire seraient soumises aux
d.dlib6rations et au contr6le du Parleurent europ6en.  \
ta rdsolution exigeait certes Ie d6p6t, avant la fin  de Ia prenibre
6tape, drun rapport sur les rnod.ifications institutionnelles n6cessaires, nais
elle restait mrette sur Ia nature des modifications  ir apporter au Trait6. En
effet, Ie transfert de comp6tences pourrait srop6rer solt sur Ia base des
d.ispositions  existantes du Trait6, soit sur la base d.e dispositions non pr6vues
au Trait€, am6t6es conform6nent  Er. ltarticle  2l!,  soit sur la base d.tune
r6vision d.u Trait6 conform6ment  A. lrarticle  236. Ltavis favorable drune
conf6rence intergouvernementale ne sergit requis que dans 1e dernier cas.
Lrincertitude sur ce point fondamental nta pas manqu6 dtaffecter le dynamisme
de Irharnonisation.
21) Aprde une p6riode au cours de lac;uelle peu de progrds sensibles
furent enregistr6s, la conf6rence au sornmet de Paris d.roctobre 1!'12 confirna
express6ment la r6solution dans tous ses 616ments" llle  d.6cida 6galement, pour
permettre officiellement le passage i  la deunOme 6tape conformdment  au texte
de Ia r6solution de f6rrrier I)12, drinstituer  u-n Fonds mon6taire  europ6en,
dot6 prgvisoirement de comp6tences encore trbs timit6es, et un Fond.s de d.6ve-
loppenent r6gional , financ6 par des ressources  propres d-e la Corum.maut6.  Enfin,
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les chefs d.rEtat ou de gouvernement participant i  la conf€rence se donnBrent
conme objectif najeur de transformer lrensemble des relations des Etats nembres
en une Union eu:op6enne. Ils  pridrent les institutions de la Communautd
clr6laborer un rapport sur ce sujet ava,nt la fin  d,e L975r retardant ainsl
jusgutd cette date 1e d6p6t du rapport institutionnel gui, en vertu cle la
r6solution de L9?1, devait 6tre pr6t pour Ia fin tle L973.
Le faux d.6part d.e LrUnion euroqienng
22) La Cornrnission europ6enne et le Conseil de Ministres de la CEE
durent constater i  la fin de 1973 quer pratiquement, aucun_r€sultgt  irnpogtant
ntavait 6t6"attei-n! 
-"n_ge qui .concerne_ ltense_mble du progranme prdrnr pour la
prenidre 6tape. Pour ce qui est d.e la coordination d.es politiqtr-es dconomiqtres
d court terme, les procdd.ures et 1es instmments pr6rnrs ont 6t6 respect6s. Les
consultations  prdalables et obligatoires h, toute mesure importante nront
r6ellenent jarnais eu lieu. tes rdunions d.u Conseil des lvlinistres ont eu un
int6r6t surtout acad.6mique.  tes Comit6s ont certes pernls un 6change fmctuenx
dlinfonoations, nais ils  nront pu gubre aller au-d.eli. Les recomanclations de
politlgue 6conomique et nota.mment de politique bud.g6taire adtopt6es par le
Conseil 6taient de caractbre conventionnel,  mais sans gra.nd.e port6e pratique.
La convergence d.es politiques 6conom:iques nra 6t6 que trds inparfaitement
rdalis6e. MOne avant ltinpact de la crise de lt6nergie, d.es d.ivergences inpor-
tantes se nanifestaient  dans le rythne de ltinflation et la balance des paie-
mentg.
En natibre d.e politirhe mon6taire, certains progrds r6e1e ont
pu Otre r6a1is6s, roaig ils  se sont av6r6 pr6caires. ta R6solution de 1.97I
prdvoyait que les monnaies communautalres fluctueraient i. ltintdrieur  de
narges pLus dtroites. Ceci d.evait ee faire  drabord. i  titre  exp6rinentalr  avec
conme monnaie dlintervention le d.ollar. En cas de succBe d.e ltexp6rience, on
devait passer d.run r6gime de fait  i  un rdgine d.e d.roit, puis 3, cles intenren-
tiong en monneuies colRnlunautaires et i, d.e nouveaux r6tr6cissenents des marges.
Da,ng le mOne tenps, la coord.ination  d.es politigues non6tai.res
d.evait 6tre intensifi6e entre les ba^nques centrales, un fond.s europ6en  de
coop6ration non{taire cr66 et,  enfin, la libre  circulation des capitar:x




24) Ia suepension d.e l-a convertibilitd  d.u dollar no pernlt pas la
nise en place du n6canisne pr€rnr; n6a.nrnoins aprbs une p6riode d.fincertitucl.e
of le Mark et le Florin devinrent ttflottantsrr; un systdne d.tinterventions
coord.onndes fut n:is en place au printenps 1!12. Les rnarges de fluctuation
adniEeg dtaient trbs sup€rieures  A, celles initialement retenues et par li  la
r6solution d.e L971 nr6tait pas respectde forrnellernent, mais elles restaient
infdrieures de notti€ A, celles gui auraient pu 6tre obtenues sans un tel
systBne. Les narges vis-a,-vis du dollar furent d.rabord. respect6es  (ttserpent
dans Ie tunnelff) Eris abandonn6es (ttserpent seullr). Ainsi les monnaies d.e la
Connunaut6 conservaient entre elles cLes 6carts relativement r6duits; les inter-
ventions avaient lieu en principe en monnaies conununautairesl un mdcaniene
de cr6d.it i  trds court terne relay6 par un soutien A, court terne.d.evait
permettre un fonctionnenent sans heurt. En juin t!12, le Royaurne-Uni et
Irlrlancle se sont provisoirement retir6s de ce systdme, suivls par lrltalie
en n&rs 1973 et par Ia France en jarrvier 1974.
25) En natibre de coordination d.es politiques mon6taires, aucun
r6sultat spectaculaire nra 6t6 obtenu. Les consultations pr6alables,  notamment
en natidre cle nanipulation de tar:x ou de qystbne d.e change, ntont pas 6t6
respect6es.
Le foncls europ6en d.e coop€ration mon6taire a 6t6 cr6€ par un rracte
solennelrr en avril L973. I1 sta8it d.tun orga.nisme  d.ot6 de trbs peu de pouvoirs
et d.e oof€rBr Le soutien non6iaire A, court terme qui vient d.r6tre 6largi est
en th€orie incorpord au Fonds. Crrest urr m6canisne lourd gui nta 6t6 utilis6
jusqur) pr6sent qurUrre geule fois. Seg ressourcee sont drailleurs trbs linit6es.
Dr ce qui concerne la Libre circulation des capitaux, iI  y a eu
recul. Des tl6rogptions nombreuses  au Trait6 ont 6t6 accord.6es.  Aucune philo-
sophie connune nta p1r Gtre d.6gag6e sur Ia strat6gie i  adopter vis-i,-vis  d.es
capitaux ext6rieurs.
26) Dans le d-omaine de la politique r6gionalel &ucur progrds nra
6t6 acconpli au cours d.e Ia premiBre 6tape. Les d"iscussions continuent sur Ie
Fond.s r6gional ou plut6t sur leg monta.nts d.ont it  pourra 6tre d.ot6. Mais on
peut se demand.er si  les orientations srivies refldtent un d.6but d.e conception
drune v6ritable politique r6gionale d.ans Ia Consunaut6.
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Il  apparait alors bi.en care la prcmibre 6tape de lrUnion 6conornique
et mon6taire nra pas offert ce que lon pouvait esp6rero Le passade morose i,
une deuxidme 6tape sans relief  ni grand.e si5nification renforce ce sentiment.
27) I1 faut admettre c;ue, congue i. un nomerit oil le systbme mon6taire
international restait fond6 sur des parit6s fixes et la convertibilit6,  au
moins ie principe, du dollar en or, l.rUnion 6conomique et mon6taire ne pouvait
qurGtre gravement affect6e par les d.6sordres rultiples  survenus depuis tcois
ans d.ans le fonctionnement d"es B6canismes mon6taires du monde. Et il  est
ind.6niable que les diff6rences  d.e mentalitds,d.e stmctures, d.e niveaux de vie,
etc. 6talent d.e nature i  rendre difflic:le  Ifapproche initi.alement retenue
d rune r6duction rapi.d.e des marges de fluctuation entre les monnaiee,  en
lrabsence d.tun rapprochement suffisant des stmctures et d.tune redistribution
importante  d.es revenus. Dtautre part, le bloc comrmrnautaire repr6sente par .raIF
port i, lrextdrieur un ensemblo relativement homogdne, si lron tient  compte
d.u rapprochement  g6ographiqu.e et d"tune int6gration de fait  d.es 6conomies
notarnment entre les six pays fondateurs, E la faveur d.e plus de dix ans dfunion
do-uani6re complbto. Une plue grarrde flexibilit6  da^ns Itapproche mon6taire
et financibre et r:n effort fl-us grand. pour r6d.uire 1es disparit6s stmcturelles
devaient avoir 6t6 a la mesure des difficult6s  A, r6soud.re.
28) Au contraire, la CEE nrest jamais parvenue i  d6finir une position
cotrunrne claire sur la r6forme du systbme mon6taire international et par
cons6quent sur la placo cgrrune organisation mon6taire propre i  ltEurope pourrait
occuper d.ans le sch6rna d.tensembLe des'relations  mon6taires mondiales. Cette
situation de fait,  ne pouvait na.nquer draffecter la cr6dibilit6  du m6canisne
mon6taire europ6en et sa capacit6 d.e r6sister au moind.re trouble dans le
fonctionnement d.u systbme des paiements mondialx.
Le n6ca.nisme ci.es rEglements  intracomrmrnautaires stest alors av6r6
inadaptd i. son obJet. I1 nfa pas 6td possib.le en pratique d.e faire fonctionner
tut d.ispositif de cr6dits r6ciprocJues entre les pays europ6ens, et ceci surtout
du fait  d.e Irabsence d.run accord- satisfai.sant sur les modalit6s de remboursement
d.e ces cr6dits. A partir du noment, en effet,  oi. ni lror  au prix officiel,  ni
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Ie dollar inconvertible ne constituaient plus d.es instrr:rnents  mutuellement
acceptables pour Ie rbglement-de d6ficits ou d.texc6d.ents intra-europdens, il
devenait trbs difficile  d.e maintenir un r6girne d.e parit6s fixes impliquant
des transferts d.e r6serves. Dans ces cond.itions, Ie..rrserpentrt  conrmrnautaire
ne pouvait 6tre naintenu int6gralement que dans'trols hypothbses: une parfaite
coordination  des politigues conjoncturelles  6liminant par avance toute possi-
bilit6  de d-€sdquilibre  d.urable d.a"ns les paiements intra-europ6ens, I'accepta-
tion par les $artenaires europ6ens drun financement r6ciproque illimit6  en
montant conme en dur6e, la d6finition dtun instrument de rdserves adapt6
aux r6glements intra-europ6ens et serrrant d.e base ar:x rbglements des soldes
ou des concours intra-conmunautaires.
29) A partir de nars 1973, le n6canisme du rdtr6cissernent des marges
a cha.ng6 d'e nature l, la;,suite d.e lrabrogatlon de lfaccord de Washington et
de lrentr6e d.a.ns une 6re d.e flotternent g6n6ralis6 des monnaies. A ce monent-Ib,
les pays participant au rrserpentrt ont cess6 d.texclure 1tid6e dfintervenir
sur le dollar des Etats-Unis, mai-s ils  nront cepend.a.nt pr6rru. aucgne rdgle
pour la fixation drun cours connunautaire du dollar. Les interventi-ons  en
monnaies comrm.rnautaires ont alors pris une arnpleur trbs grand.e et les pays
i, nonnaie faible ont dfi supporter non seulement, conme cela 6tait- le cas
auparal/antr les consdquences de leur faiblesse relative par rapport aux
autres monnaies europdennes, mais 6galement celles d.e tout mouvement de sp6cula-
tion contre le dollar, cr6ant ainsi une tend.ance i  la r66valuation d.es monnaies
europ6ennes les plus appr6ci6es. Faute d.ravoir d6fini des rbgles pernettant
dtagir, en fonction d.es circonstances, sur lfampleur des fluctuations du
dollar par rapport i  lrensemble d.eg monnaies  europ6ennes, la Conmunaut6 a
expos6 certains de ses membres au risque de tensions insupportables. Certes, les
instituts dr6mission 6taient capables de srinforrner de leurs actions, et 6ventuel-
lenent d'e leurs intentions, mais ils  nr6taient pas en mesute de n6gocier, au
jour Ie jour, Itattitude connmne 3, lr6gard du dollar qui seule efi.? pu permettre
de parler drun flottement concert6 et qui aurait, en les 6galisant, rend.u




30) I1 faut en r66um6 conclute que les €l6nents externes ont
Jou€ rrr r6le d.ans lrdchec ctu d"6but drr:nion 6cononigue et mondtaire europ6-
enne, nais ce r61e nr6tait  pas fondamental. si  ces 6l6nents ntavaient pas
jou6, lrUnion 6conornigue et rnondtaire europdenne aurait peut-atre enregistr6
des d.6buts noins heurt6s. Mais sauf les cond,itions gui viennent d'rdtre
mentionndes ci-dessus, la construction 6bauch6e serait reet€e fragile  et
surtout les linites  i  son d6veloppement  seraient bien vite  apparues
6vid.entes. cela tient  i  la nature n6me des ngcanismes mis en placer d leur
incapacitd I  sradapter rapidernent  A. des situatlons dminennent cha^ngeantest
I  leur implissance l  distinguer'1tint6r€t  d.e Ia Comrunaut6  cle Ia sorome des
int6r6ts nationanrx
- II  -g-a aurait 6t6 autrenent si  certaines ctlspositiong institu-
tionnelles nouvelles avaient 6t6 prises.
3l)  a) On aurait pu cr6er un orgAne, investi de pouvoirs propres
et agissant en fonction d.es int6r6ts clfr:n systbme europden de paiements,
charg6 nota^mment de I
- fixer  Ie cours conmunautaire du dollar;
- veiller  i  la coorclination v6ritable (creet-i-dire  consultation pr€alable
et non Ainp1e information i  posteriori) aes interventions des banques
centrales;
- autoriser res am€nagements 
tn6ces""it"" 
temporairementl
-  proposer 1n dispositif  de contrdle des mouvements d.e capitaux I  court
terme entre ltEurope et les pays tiers  et surveiller  sa nise en oeuvre.
32) U) t6is  Ie , pro[rbs sur cette voie est cond.itionn6 par une
r6forne profonde des mesures prises d.epuis 1972 pour assurer la coordina-
tion d.es politiques 6cononiques internesr notamment  d.e la politique du
cr6dit et cie Ia politigue budg6taire. Une conjoncture plus honogdne ainsi
que la politique conjoncturelle qui d.oit pernettre de la rdaliser exigent
une double coordination celle du d.dveloppenent  et du fina^ncement des
3O
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d.6penses publiques et celle du d€veloppenent  et du financenent des ddpenses
priv€es. La libertd des nouvemente  d.e capitaux d6pend. des n6nes cond.itione.
Le rapport Werner avait mis lraccent sur une conception
claire cles politiques & suivre dans la phase finale d.e lrUnion 6conomique
et mondtaire et des organes connunautaires charg6s d.e les mettre en oeuvre.
Ie R6solution  clu Conseil tles Ministres de L97L, comme indiqu6 ci-dessus,
nra pas repris ce point. LD, se trouve une raison principale clrdchec  de
Ltharmonisation d.es politiqu.es 6conomiquee  et cle Ia lutte connune contre
I I inflation.
Les proc6d.ures d.e consultation devraient,
pour 6tre efficaces,  d6boucher Eur une instance d.e d6cision capabre
d.rinfl6chirr dans lrint6r6t gdn6ral, la cond.uite de la politique 6conomigue
d.e chague Etat nenbre. Cela nrest possible gurau prix drune mod.ification
du contenu actuer des traii6s. Lterp6rience montre quril ne serait pas
suffisant, b cet effet, d.rintroduire Ia rbgle de vote naJoritaire au
niveau du Conseil. Pour gtre d.es cl6cisions naJoritaires puissent 6tre
inpos6es ar:x Etats ninoritaires, il  f,audrait encore que ceux-ci prissent
conpter sur une large solid.arit6 financidre A. 1t6che11e  de la Communaut6.
t3) c) ff  nfest en effet  pas possible d.tinposer i. ltr:n des rnernbres
d.e Ia CEB cles ddcisions contraires e! ses int6r6ts 6cononigrres  imn6cliats
ou susceptibles d.e Itexposer  A, d.es d.ifficultds politicgres internes, si
cet Etat ne peut conpter srurr une splid.arit6 financiBre effective d.e ses
partenairesr permettant de r6partir, de fagon dgtritable, entre tous les
nenbres d.e la Connunaut6r  les sacrifices inposds par lrint6r6t g6n6ra1. Pour
que les pays d.e la Cffi puissent sulvre une ligne connune en rnatidre
Scononigue et non6taire, il  est lndispenseble de pouvoir proc6d.er, par
ltintern6d.iaire  d.u buclget d.e la cm, a des transferts importants de
resgourceg r6elles.
Crest en d6finitive, une unrtation d.e caractdre politigue et
institutionnel gui aurait 6t6 n6cessaire pour surmonter les d.ifficult6s
3I
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rencontr6es par lrUnion 6conomiEre et mon6taire depuis I97L. Les chefs
dtEtat ont pris conscience de cette ndcessitd lorsqurils ont 6voqu6 la
- cr6ation d.rune v6ritable Union europ6enne. Mais ils  nfen ont pas pr6cis6
le contenu et en ont renvoy6 lr6tud.e i  une date ult6rieure.
34)  Cependant, si lron veut 6viter que lrUnion 6cononiqu.e, et
peut-Gtre n6ne la politique agricole corurune et ltUnion d.ouanibre, ne
rdgressent a ltavenir, il  est probable que le saut doit Otre effe-ctg6- {ps -
naintena.nt. fl  pourrait €tre linit6  i  trois  secteurs bien d6ternin6e qui
ntexigent en aucune fagon une union politique complbte.
- te premier concerne les responsabilit6s  d.es banqueB centrales gui, tant
dans Ie d.onaine des changes que dans celui des taux dtint6r6t, devraient
6tre sounises par Ie moyen d.fune bangue centrale europdenne  A, une
supervlsion coru[unautaire d.ans la me€ure n6cessaire i, la r6alisation
des objectifs d.e ItUnion 6cononique et rnon6taire.
- Le deuxibrne concerne surtout les politiques budg6taires gui, au double
point d.e vue de ltimportance  des nnsses bud.g6taires..et  d.u mod.e d.e finan-
cernent d.es soldes, devraient 6galement 6tre soumises b rrne supervision
cornmunautaire par'1e moyen d.rune instance de ddcision couumnautaire  en
matidre de politique 6conomique et qui sera n6cessaire beaucoup plus
rapidement quton le pensait A, lrorigine.
- Le troisibrne concerne Ie budget de la Cffi cnri, dot6 d.e resgources
propres 61ev6es, devrait, 1ol." le contr6le d.tun Parlement europ6en,
6tre Itinstrument  dfune 6galisation des charges gue Ia r6alisation  de
cette union impose aux Etats membres.
35)  Ces mesures semblent n6anmoins n6cessaires  pour relancer non
seulement lrUnion 6conomique et mon6taire, mais par lrinterm6diaire de celle-
cir  6galernent 1e Comimrnaut6 dans son ensemble. La stagnation, qui a
comrnenc6 vers Ia fin  de Ia p6riode de transition, 6tait due avant tout
1 Ia carence de la coordination des politimres conJoncturelles  et
mon6taires.  Toutefois, la r6alisation dfun march6 conrm:.nautaire  absolument
libre et lt6laboration  d'une politi-ei.re strrrcturelle comrmrne se sont
6galernent heurt6es l  une r6sistance souvent opini3tre, A mesure que
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Itattention se concentrait sur les problbmes 6conomigues et financiers,
on enregistra n6ne d.e noins en moins de progrbs dans ces d.eux secteurs. Rien
ne permet d.e penser.qutil en sera autrement A, Itavenir si de meilleures
perspectives ne devaient pas srourrir i  ItUnion 6conomique et non6taire.
Cette d6pendance est doub1e. Si essentielles que soient 1es
r6formes exaqin6es prus haut pour la rerance de Itunion 6conomique et
mon6tairel son d.6veloppement  futur qui, sans aucun d.oute, nten restera
pas moins parsem6 d.f emb0ches, sera 6galement tribrr.taire d.e 1tactivit6 qui ::
sera d6proy€e dans les autres secteurs d.e lrUnion 6conomique" Enfin, il
est d.ifficile  d.tirna,giner  une coopdration europdenne plus active d.ans Ie
donaine cle la politigue 6trangbre si d.es progrEs sensibles ne sont pas
r6alis6s dans celui de lrint6gration 6conornicfue. Poirr toutes ces raisons,
un nouveau d.6part mier:x pr6par6 de ltUnion 6conomique et mon6taire est le
seul noyen d.tatteind.re lfobjectif  majeur que constitue lrUnion europ6enne,
gue les Chefs drEtat ouid.e gouvernenent r6unis i  Paris en LgiZ ont inscrit
au progranme d.e La prochaine conf6rence au sonmet prdvue pour lpl!.
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Louis Carilu, i'ris j dr:nt
iic la Rannnc rlt: Jlrrr:rclles
Lral-raltdon du r6ginre clcs paritcs  fixcs,  le s f luctrur'uions rltisor-
tionn6es cios cours cles changcs, ct  cn parti.culicr  Lc d;iJ abremr:nt
r0ct:nt du do11ar, ont consiclrlrrablerncnt  ?iccru 1es risrirrcs ii,is
aux pl.accmcnts cn clcv.i. scs .3tran{Orc s , ct  itottltcn 1- ti i ns i  rrn 1cqa.i.n
d r actual j t6 aux tccJrni.qucs dc couvcrturc contrc 1es i': sctucs clc
chnnge.
Pour lcs clpirations connercialcs, 1cs m6thorics or,.'!inaircs,
lras6cs sur lc  rccours aux rtarch6s ;'i tcrmc cles dcl'iscs srr{'f:ist:nt
gCnriralcrnent. l'{ais J)our lcs placcr,rcnts cn olrli.rtion:;,  iL  Faut
rcchcrcher tlrautrcs formu.ics, clr ririson clc 1a rjur,ie Dlrrs 161111uo
tic ccs Olli:raticrns, (lue ne ncuvcnt coutrrir lcs mrrc.!ri.s I  t-crre:
crcst ainsi quc sont n6cs les dif f"lrentcs "lJnit,is <lc comptc"
tltil.isries clcpuis 1361 clans <ies Snissions rlcs sccteurs prrhljc et
priv6.  Trouvaient-e11cs lcur 1llace clar-rs lcs cf iorts  11' jntirc'ration
non6tairc cttropicnnc ,  l  1 I inster  tle s unit6s <lc conirtc o.l. Fici e11e-
tncnt cnploy6cs dans 1e cadrc dc 1a noliticluc agricolc cor;lnrrnc,
ct  constituaicnt-c11cs unc rCpolr:.; r'alat;1c dcs o;riratc'-rrrs clcvant
1tSchcc dcs politirqucs curopienncs ?  Pcut-on y trouvcr, noycnnant
1cs noclif ications appropri,ics, 1'csquissc clrtrnc solution au nrohl i-*'
actucl du placcncnt ct  drr recyclagc dcs n6trodclllrrrs, elrc l:r mau-
vaisc tcnuc ritr do1lar risrtuc c'lc Iortcr  :i sr i.nvcsti r crr l)l,l. ,  "it francs suisscs ou cn .francs fralrcai.s, Llvcntrre l lLrlrcnt c:or\ r.rc Lc gr.1
tlc s nutor i tC s trorrC tai rc s ilc cc s r),1\/s ?
Il6sultats  dcs fcntatil'cs  tltitrt6r ration non6tl i:"r:
Ccs rdsr.rl tats
lintrc  1c fifc:tiri
i'I. iial'rnoncl liarrc
c!rrngcnrents clc l)a
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cfcst-ii-c'!irc pcnclant. lcs rrrcnidrcs ann6cs rle J.'cxistcnc-c <ltr llarchl
Con:nun. Le I'larlt allcrnan<l, l.c florin,  1c franc sttisse ct  1e franc
lrclgc ont 6t6 ri:6va1ui:s, tnndis cltlc se cl/:valuaicnt 1a livrc  stcrl i r
1a 1j.rc ct  lc  franc franqais.  Ccs trois  tlernic-\res monnai.cs sont
rcst6es c.n fait  clans ltorhj.te  clu doll"ar et ont abandonni> lrerpnarte-
nancc i  la  zonc mon6tairc ctrrop6cnnc, r6trScie i ,une zone lfarl:,
i  laquc1lc s t attachaicnt que1ques monnaics. cxtra-colTllnunautairc's.
En 1970, la  Comnission ltterncr rGdigcait un rapnort cornportant
un calendri.cr dont 1r aboutissentcnt 6tait  pr6rvu Dour 1 nS 0.  Cc plan .
qui comportait notammcnt I t abai sselncnt' pro.qrcssif cles rlargcs 11c
fluctuation,  clc faEon "cl6finitirre ct  i.rr6vocahle" fut  atloptii 1e
9 f6vricr  1971. 11 ntcxcluait  pas la rnodification clcs parit6s otl
taux ccntraux clans ceftai.ns cas llravcs.  I:n nai tle 1a nienre ann6:c,
la tnarge tle fluctuation du Dl,{., puis du florin,  sautait conmc un
vcrrou trop faihle.
lln avri 7 1g72, un nouvcl accorcl, touj.otrrs Pour la  ri:duction  dcs
nargt: s dc :fluctuation, ct' une concertation sur 1cs .op,:rations cle
sccours nrutuclles entrc banqucs ccntrales, 6tait  conclr-t. Iln .juin
tle la mGllc attndc <i6jii; 1a livre  clt':crochait, la  Francc rcnforqai.t
1c contr6lc <Jes changes, 1a couronne danoisc prenait clu cliarnp.
En 1974, le flottencnt  dcs trois  rnonnaies parmi les rrlus
inportantcs dc La C.E.n. a d|truit  1r illusion  dc cohi-'roncc et  cle
stabilitd  .tle 1t enscnblc. i46nc D 1! int6rieur  de 1a conccrtation
d6nornm6c rrscrpcnt'r, 1a possibilit6  clc norlification  cics taux ccll-
traux cntrcticnt  une inqui6tudc, qui rcncl lc  systdnc fragilc.
La lirnitation  d6clardc cles ntouvcrncnts  clc chanBc continrrs r.rrAnnn,
tc guErc dt, cortfiancc ou dc fiarantic,lorsoue lron s:rit  oue r]cq mn'r
r,rents discontinus plus sulrstanticls sont possihlcs.  Att noindrc
indicc ou corrrmcntairc inrliqtrant ccttc  possibil i tC, 1c risottc dc
clr:rngc';rugmcnte  et avcc lui  1a chancc de voir  sc 16aliscr 1a
rnodif ication du taux pr6vrrc
Le sccpticisnc tles opdrateurs aurait ptr 6trc  att6nrr-5 par 1r cxis'
tence d'un orgeini,smc ccntTal, lc  "Fond liurop6cn clc Coon6ration
l,{on6tairefr, (FnCO}i), qui cOt disposir de ntoyens suffisants iroul
intervenir cn nOnnaics dc pays nenbres dc la Connunauti. rlais .cct
organisnlc cst andrniquc, ct  n0mc ses interventions uti.lcs  n I inspi-,
rcnt aucunc conf iancc en raison de 1r C:troitesse clc scs noyen s.  I l
en va rle nrdnre rles concours i  court tcrnrc e.ntrc llanqucs Ccntralcs.
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Aujourtlrhui, lc  zonc noni;tairc tiu Nord -  la  zonc I)11. -  ne
corrcspontl plus ii la C.li.t.  ct  sa nonnaic doninantc cst trop fortc
pour fairc  croire ii La stabilit6.
l)ar aillcurs,  1a nolitique  mon6tai.rc .conmune n I a apport6 aucunc
amflioration t  la  libcrt6  clc circulation  dcs capitaux, ni  n6mc I
1a coor<lination  clcs lilrritations  impos4cs i  cctte libcrt6.  Aucunc
distinction  nc fut  faitc  cn favcur de La libre  circulation  iirtra-
colitrnunautaife, ct  Lcs sllspici.ons ou sp6culatjons cltoriginc extra-
cot:nulnautairc ont pu amplif icr  Lcs selttinents cltinstahil i t(: dd j i
suffisamnent g6nantcs i  ltint6rieur  dc la C.]1.n.  La misc cn octlvr,
rlractivit6s  financidrcs connLlnautaircs (hudJg.cts, fond5 rlivcrs,
gcsti.on cl t instrumcnts contrnrrns) srlr clcs llascs rati.ottttcll cs , ilevi.cnt
c11c-rn0r;rc unc irnpossihilit6 cicpuis nlusicrrrs ann,1cs.
La concLtrsion cst 6virl.cntc ;  lcs opi:rateurs cstinrcnt qrlc 1f jntr
gration riton6tairc dc 1a zonc C.ll.Il.  -  zonc optir,ralc pour toutcs
lcs raisons <16critcs par liuntlcl1 -  n I c>listc quc rlans 1 r ll'ttroire clcs
di scours .
II.-  Lcs soltrtions rat i ucs trouvdcs r  les o 6 rateurs
La rcnisc cn question ciu dollar  -  la tnonnaic la plus
cn i;rati<irc <ltcuro-cnissj.onJ'ct  1a c16 clc vo0tc <1tl systdnc
lcs  SchccS dcs projcts  <l t tlti.[ication  llon6taire curop6cn.ne
incit6  lcs banquicrs I  intagincr dcs forntulcs susccirtibles
procurcr D ltinvcstisscnicnt  international tlnc protcction
lcs risclucs clc chartgc. Ccttc i:fotcction  a llris  1a forntc
conU)osites cnglobant 1.os Principalcs nonnaics curondcnncs
dt agg16gats dc devi.ses national.cs clc l"a Conntunattt6.
Lrunit6 tlc conpte (ll.C.),  c166c en 1961 Par 1a l(rcclicthank,
aprds clc longucs 6tudcs au sc jn dc lt lnstitut  Intcrnational clt
Iltucles llarrcaircs, constituc une aclaptation oriflinale  au clonaine
pri.vd drunitds utilis6cs  clans lcs relations cntrc Etats, clraborcl
dans lc  carjrc tie f ijnion curou6cnne cles paycnicnts, puis -at.t sci n dtt
ilarchd Cornnun. La formtrlc i.nitialc  utilis/-c  cn 1961 reDosait en
effetr. sur 1cs monnaics clcs 17 pays'ntcnlbres dc ItLl.l,.P.  .i. pr6sent
d j.ssoutc.  Lo formule rnoclif i6e, utilisi:c  dcpuis 1e d6hut cle 1973 ,
ct  fort  proche clc la noti.on <le 1runit6 cle coml)te agricole dc la
Conmunaut6, est fonct6c sur lcs nonnaies des 9 titats ncmlrres de 1a
C.lj.f .,  pour autant qurcllcs remtrlisscnt dcrtx conditions :  a) avo'i
une parit6  ; b) voir  scs . ours sur lcs narch6s dcs cltanges tnaintc-
nus' J l t intdricur  tlcs mai ,cs dc llluctuation 6tal.,l ies irar 1c Consc i
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clcs ltini.strcs rlc 1a C.tl.ll.  (crc-st-i-dirc  n l tint(:rj.cur (lu scrDent).
Si ccs rnonnaics sortent du scrpcnt ou ntont plus dc paritC', cllcs
lrcrclcnt autonatiqrrcmcnt 1c statut  clc tnonnaic dc t6f.6rcnce. La
consiqucncc pTatiquc, i.'i lfhcure actucllc,  crest qrrg 1c franc
franEaisr la lirer  la livrc  stcrling  ct  la  livre  irlandaise ont
pcrdu cc statut,  ct  rlnc 1rtr.C. cst nomentandncnt 1i6e aux cinq
nronnaies restontcs.  lin cas de flottcnrcnt dcl toutes lcs rnonnaies
('hypothcsc rlf abantlon du "psti1  scrpcnt'!) 1'rtr.C. serait  assinj 16c
i  1a plus stablc clrentre c11es, clcpuis 1a clate clf6nissi.on jusqurau
nrorncnt oD il  y aurait ii nouvcatr clcs rnonnaics r1c r6f6rence.
En dchors clc quclqucs riiff6rcnces dans l'tapplication,  1;s tech-
niqrrcs rlcs dcux forlnules clrU.C. sont irlcntiqucs.
Lt{J.C. est 6ga1c I'un  poicls cle 0r8$87(rl gramne clror fin  et peut
ainsi 6trc  exprirn,-1c <lans lcs nronnaics participantes pnr lc  l-.iais
dcs d6f i.nitions off icicllcs  otr cles taux centratrx.  Les rel ations
cntrc  U.C: et monnaies 1a composant, existantes au momcnt dIune
6rnission cn unit6s clc conllte, constitucnt lcs "parit6s  cle bAsc'r :
tune noclification dc La d6f inition-or  dc 1tU.C. hc ncut intervcnir
euc si  clcux conditions sont s'inultan6ment  rcnplies :. toutcs les
monnaies ont dc nouvellcs ddfinitions  officiclles  rlifF6rentes dc
lcurs paritds dc basc, ct  unc majo'ritC cte nrodifications (lcs  cleux-
ticrs  clans la prenidrc fornulc,  la rnajorit6 clcs 5 monnaics restan-
tcs dans la  secondc) jntcrvianncnt dans lc  rnOnrc scns.  Ctest lc
plus pctit  changcnrcnt constat6 dans le  groupc rnajoritairc  clui scra
airpl ir1u6 il I I U. C.
L'aplllication clc ces ri:glcs rlans 1a pratiquc si.qni Fic ctlrc i'tl.C,
cst rcst6c irtchan.rli3c l)our totis Ics cr:tprunts, sarrf lcs trois  pre-
nicrs  (? ctnllrttttts SACOll ct  rtn cnPrunt ,Jc l.it I'inn11uc Corntnttnal e <lc
Norvu\1;c, rlui i:taicnt  sounris .i  tlcs. rDglcs sp6cialcs tlc mocli f ica-
t ion)
La 16sistancc inl chanllcnrcnt rlc 1rl.J.C. cst donc tcl1p (luc 1e
portcur cl t ohligati.ons 1ibc116cs cn unite s tlc conrptc nty trouvc rurr
protcction quc dans dcs conditions llicn'pricisos  : crcst cssen-
ticll.crncnt 1r invcstisscur clont la rnonna j.c nationalc cst  f a j hle qtri
y trouvc une protection (contrc la  cldvalrration tlc sn nroprc mol-
nai.c) ; cn rcvanchc, Dour un invcstissetrr <lont l.a nonnai.e cst
fortc,  unc 166va1uati.<ln sc tradrrj.t uar unc riimjnrrtion rlc scq
rcvcnus'cxirrir:rds clans sil rronnaic nationalc.
q0c-l
Lf i:nvcstisscur dont.Ia nronnaic latiorrule a (>t6 16,3valtr'ic otl
divaludci sc trouvc donc rlans unc situation. i<lcntiouc i  totrt inves
tisscur c1 clcviS_^s citranl;ircs .  Par contre, 1c 1i 5rruc 1i,< i  unc
lrroclif ication do paritti  tlf une nonna.ic 6tranilDre se trortve 1irnit6,
6ta16 on. !)rincipc sur Lcs ncuf ntonnaics curopircnncs.
Lc prQtcur trouvait  tlans ccttc  fortnulc un avantagc 1'rsyclrolo-
11ique, et  lrentpruntcur'sophisticlu6  un avantagc dc tallx : elLe eut
clonc un ccrtain  succDs tlani lc  donainc'clcs i:nrissions internatio-
nalcs, ptt.isqutcllc fut  cnrploy1e, cntrc 19fi1 ct  janvicr  1971', <lans
5,1 6nissions llubliqucs totalisant  729 nrillions  c!.tlJ.C. (6qtrivalant
n g77 rnillions  <lc ciol1"ars). Des entrcpriscs publiqtrcs et privf:es
<ic pays .&ussi diffi:rcnts  cltlc 1e Danemark, 1'rAfriqtte du Sttcl,
L tAutrichc, 1a NorvBgt, 1f Irlancle, 1r Italic,  l.a Francc, 1.e Portugn
l t ont 'cnrploy6e. Ce qrri. prouvc 1r irtencltte g6ographique  du hcsoin tlc
stabilit6.  l,{ais le  total  dc ces iinrissions reste insigni'Fiant
(3 r? t  sculcmcnt) Jrar rairport ii cclui  rlcs Cnissiorts intcrnationalcr;
cn curo-rtollars ou cn curo-ricviscs qui a attcint  qttclquc 33 rnil-
liards  cic rlollars.
.  conscicnts dcs linnites <le 1a irrotection of fcrtc  par 1rl.l.c. ,
lcs hanqui:crs inraginbrent gnc au!r"c Unit6 llon6tairc lluron6enne
1r:i.C.lr.  La diffSrcnce csscnticllc  16sitlc. datts 1c 'fait  (ltlc nour
ut) ctryruttt Libc116 cn II C.U., lcs pnritCs cle trasc cxistant atl
nloncnt clc lt6rnission rcstcnt valnllles pendant toute 1a c1ur6o clc
Itcr*prunt.  Lr[.C.lJ. nc constituc ricn  dtatttrc qttfunc. applic:rti.on
sp6cifiqrrc dc la  fornrulc classiquc clt option clc chanrrc, rattachl<c
ii une lrouvellc clrjnolnination. L'itrvcstisscur nc sc trotlvc pf us
sctrlcnrcnt prot6gi contre unc cl6r'aluation dc sa r)roprc rnonnai c,
rnlis il  profitc  iigalcncnt rlc toutc rir6va.l.rration c!runc tlcs nonnait-''r
tlc r6 ftircncc.
l.cs Paritds uti l isiics iitai'cnt ccl l cs ;rp1lliqu/)cs cntrc lcs
6 nonnaicS rlc l,a c.ll.[.  ct  lc  dollar  au rnontent ot'i ].r6nrissi.on
avait licu i
dc tcls  cnlprunts scraicnt 6nis aujourdrhui, lcs ncuf rnonnaics




Ltjl.C.iJ. frrt utilisi:  (luatrc fois,  ct  rlcltail anusant, i)ar 1e R16sil
ct  1a C.Il.C.A., pour un total  dc 165 millions  rlc do1lars.  Connne
1c librc  choix dc 1a nronnaj.e cst donn6 au souscriptctrr, tant nour
1r: iraienrcnt des int6rOts o.uc 1c renbourscr.rent du capital,  i1
s'agissait drunc fornule co0tctrsc pour lc  c!6bitetrr, Qui rJcvait
assunrcr, r) yrlcin, toutc nroclification du taux dc changc drttnc monnni
clc 16fi;rencc. A cc titrc,  un cmprrrnt cn il.C.U. constittrait  de sa
pnrt lrn actc dc foi  tlans 1il stabilita,  dcs poritds 5 lrint6rierrr  dc
1a C.li.li.  Crcst sitns cloutc porlrquoi ccttc  fornitrlc fut  rapjrlcment
alranrlonndc ; ct  artss i  longtcnrlls qrro scra maintcnu 1c systc\ntc de s
rnonnaics flottantcs,  i1 nIy a pas licu  clc stattcnrlrc li rlc nouvellt
C'rnissions cn ll.C.tJ
Par contrc, 1os titrcs  1ibc116s en E.C.(l.rn611oci6s srrr 1e
nrarch6 scconclairc, font largcnent prine :  les corlrs ont t16 j i
consicl6rablcncnt rlcvancil 1cs (:v6nerncnts non6taires ;  <lc ce fait,
1c gain dc ctanl;c polrr rrn invcstisscur d6sirant arrjour<1'hrri entrcr
clans Ic niarchd cst fortcnlcnt lirnit6.
l,e Iiuropcan Composite tinit  ou lltJRCO, 6galcnent fon116 srrr 1cs
9 monnaics dc ia  Communaut6, est colnpos6 clrun nomtrrc fixe  dfunit6s
cle ciractrnc  cl I entrc e11cs. La valeur cle l rlltlltCO est calcul6e en
fonction des cours cffectifs  <lu narch6, ct  sc nodifie nar cons6-
qucnt clrun jour i  ltautrc.
Iltant un cocl<tai.1  . dc 9 nonn-ai cs,  son originalitf:,  .on'r" dans
Lln cocktail,  rdsi<lc clans 1c closagc. l)ans sa connDosition, on a
cssfly6 11e tcnir  conrrtc du poi.cls rcsrrcctit dcs J)ays clans lrC.conomit
curoPL-)cnne (comncrcc cxti;ricur  ct  PilB) torrt en allgnrentant qrrclq'uc
peu la part cies rnonnaics "fortcs"  cn vue <ic renforcer I t attrait
de la  forntrlc.
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Ccttc clcrni0rc particularit6  a rcndu 1r lllJItCO dif f j.cilcnrcnt ac-
ccpfll;lc politiclucnrcnt par 1es autoritCs officicllcs  rles la)'s dont
1a monnaic 6tait  jug6c faible,  ct  inrposait des clranqemcnts  rdp6t6s
<lc 1a polrrl6ration, tl/:routantes f our 1c or,"ghi:, clraquc f ois quc les
sp6culateurs rnodifiaicnt lcur  attitucle qrrant il 1a force or-l t  1a
fltiblcssc dcs rnonnaies <le 16filrcncc.  lln olrtrc, dans cctte  formul c'
lcs corrs6qucnccs dc rnodi.f ications dc la paritd  d runc n)onn''c ind j -
viduellc nt6taicnt pas 6lirnindes.  Les invc.stisscrrrs rlcs nays dont
lcs nronnaics sont pcu ou sous-rcprCscntfes  courcnt i)rcs(luc int6{Tr'|
lcrncnt 1c ristluc dc 16valrration <lc lctrr proprc nronnaic.
Lcs .invcstiiscrrrs importants (institutionncls)  ont qucloue lcu
lroudf url cochtai.l clc nronnaic clui lcur 5tai.t  inpos6
alors <1u t ils  6taicrrt en r,rcsurc rlc r6a1iscr, cn rii vcrsif iant  leurs
placct;tcnts ii 1e ur 916 r' un dosage tie lerrrs j.nvcstisscmcnts rdpon-
clant I  lcur Droprc jupcnent.  ile flus,  les clif.l.icu1t6.s posics au
tnarchti scconrlairc ont 6gerlencnt constitui: url frcin  ii 1a $4n6ra1i-
srLtion dc lrnliRCO (sa valcrrr varic  chaclue jour,  sur hase <lcs
cours prntiquGs ii la llour.sc dc Luxcnrbourg ct  la  pr6vision cl'6volrr-
tj.on tlc ccttc "virlcur abstraitc"  !):rrcc qrrc conr'tros j.tc,  n6ccssite
ur-l travail  t'le r6flcxion  6vitlcnrr.tcnt  p1.trs cornlllirrrr4 euc stil  s t agis-
snjt  clrunc prdvision sur 1a valcur ftrturc tlrunc sctrlc nronnaie).
Lcs j nvcstisscurs ont rlonc accrre i 1 1 i  cof te  fnrmul e nv'ec, rles
scntilicnts  partaqds :  trois  6nrissions ont vu 1c'jotrr  -  don
clcux pour 1a llanqrre Urrrop6cnnc  ' <1r Investissencnts (l].11. I . ) -  pour
tun montant total  dc 110 r:rj.l1ions drIillllCO, i:<luivalant i  138 nri11j.on
clc clo11ars.
Au-dcll rlcs fornrulcs d5 j ii appliqudcs rlans dcs i:nrissions intcr-
nationalcs, c[rautrcs propositions drturit6s rle cornrrte sont dans
ltair,  qui tcntcnt rlc pallier  lcs  inconvclnicnts  ,,1cs systc\rttcs cxj-s-
tants
Lc Profcsscur Triffin,  dc lrllnivcrsi.t6  Ya1c, a lancLl lrirlirg
clc ltijl.IllOPA, rlui conrbincrait lcs avantallcs rle 1tlJ.C. sccon(lc for-
rirule ct  clc l tl')IJRCO, cn ivitant  lcrtrs i-nconvrinicnts :  j 1 1a cld:f i ni I
coftnlc un cocJttail dc nronnaics, rrrais . avcc unc poncl6rirti on pcrma-
ncnte.  ll1lc nc varicrait  pas chaquc f oi s rlurunc sculc ltonnaic
stapllrc<cicrait ou $c d6pr6cicrait, nais sa valctrr corrrernte rcs.c-
rait  6qui.va.lcntc r'i cc11c r'lc 1a nronnuic clont 1c corrrs c Ffcctif  rlc
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nrilrclto scrilit  rcst6 stal)1c otl atrrait hotrg'3 1e rloi ns '  CalculCl dc
ccttc rn;yricrc, 1'lltlR0l)A lrraintiendrai.t, par d6f inition,  1c naxintt'tt
rlc sti15j.lita) vis-i-vis  <lcs rronnaics dc 1a Colrnttnautti pri.scs clatrs
lcur  cn scnltlc.
Ltnrloption <l I unc unitd rlc chnnllc colrintunautni rc paratt  parti-
ctrl icrcncnt opl)ortuno au t:lonrcnt ot'r 1a Comrnunatlt6 cnvisagc tl | 6mcttt"
<lcs clrprurrts irrtcrnationaux,  notanmcnt pour rccyclcr lcS p'3tro-
clollars.  0n atrrait 1e choix entre 17 formtrles rlif f6rcntcs qui
ont dt6 analysrics, cntre autrcs, rJans le  rapport du Cornitil des
Onzc cxt'rcrts arrllrbs rlc 1:r C,omtttun:rttt6, r6uni's cn 1973. Patmi ces
di f tdrentes propositions, la pr6fdrcncc dcs tha:oriciens va if une
unit6 de conrptc clui conscrverait un pouvoir clr achat constant.
Cettc id6c cst notantncnt avanc6c par llonsicur Jacgttcs Rihoucl,
tlui proposc ,  sous 1c vocablc d t tltlROSTABLE , unc f ornntrl c nouvc 1lc ,
colsistant en un ap,gr6g.at dcs ntoltnaies r1g la Cormunaut6 ct  qui
posstidcrai t  1a llropri6t6 cle maintcnir, i  trave rs 1c tenps, la
constancc tlu pouvoir drachat <les monnaics de rd Ffircnce. fcchni-
rlircnrcnt, lcs taux dc ConVcrs j.on clcs nionnaieS Crrrop6cnncs en
Utill.OSTABLCSi scraicnt calcul6s cha<1uc jorrr,  <lc mani0rc ii rcspcctcr
lcs rairports cntrc cux dcs taux <le changc dc ccs lilonnaics natio-
naIcs, te 1s qtrt ils  rdsultcnt tlcs rttarclti:s. I'in r,r0nre tcntps, on fera i
cn sortc quc lc  nr6nc nonrlrrc dttiUlLOSTAnLES itcrncttc <lc se rrrocurer
trn "pahicr" curop6cn constant de bicns ct  <ic scrviccs.
Ccttc irlCc f igure 61;alcncnt au n',ulrre dcb nropositions faites
16ccmnrent par 1c l'ro'fessctrr Trif f in,  qui cnvj sll,lc 1a posSibiLit6
rlr6nrcttrc dcs obligation's inbcx6cr i,li"^r"  co{it clc 1a v.ie ou sur
un ttpanicr" cle rnatidrcs prcmi.6rcs ou dc pro<luits tlanufactur6s
i ni"lortants.
III.-  (lonclusions
Lcs cIforts  rlcs on6rntcurs ct  rlcs l>anquicrs pour tfouvcr des
soltrtions pratitlr.rcs Rux nrolrld:rrcs poseis l)ar 1c rctar(l d I int6gratirr
tironiitairc nront guDrc 6t6, ratif i6s po.r 1cs rnarc.hi:. Lc ttol 1ar
dorrrinc totrjourS par 1cs volurucs trartCs tant clans 1es inrissions
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itttcrnat j-onrrlcs i  long tcrnc (luc clans 1cs criid.i ts  f j nancicrs t
l:loyct) tcrmc, riui tcnclcnt aujourrlrlrui rf cn prcnrlrc le rclais.
,,ir.ianrroinsr lc  succds ;rarticl  tle Lf ll.c.,  rlc 1rll.c.ll.  et  cle
1f Ilt,RCO ndritc  df Gtrc rctcnu, face au nanquc dc souticn officiel,
gouvcrncmcntal ou colnnlunautaire. Lf approtration rlu sourrcrain  a
fait  dcfaut, ct  lc  support couragcux dc.deux granrls vassaux -  la
C.ll.C.A. ct  1a Ii.[.f.,  -  n.fa pas -suffirdans lln clinat  rlrinccrtitrr,]
rnon6tairc grandissant, ii cr6cr l r aclh6siou clu prrhl ic.
La condition de r6ussite drune unitri rlc compte euroll6cnne est
donc sa consCcration par 1a C.li.ll.  c11e-m6rnc : lrnc sinple c16clara-
tion .i cct 6gard est instrFfisante ;  il  est n6ccssairc qurtrne
formulc prdcisc soit  adopt,Se llar la  cornmunauti.: ta.nt pour ses
op6rations intcrncs (buclgct, agriculturc  (FncOl!)) quc nour ses
rclations  f inanci 6res cxternes (cnirrunt conmunautai.rc,  par
cxcnplc-) .  C'est 1a Connrttn?rutf) scule qui I)cut cristal liser.la
clJfinition  clc ltunit6  dc conlpte ct  cn g6ndraliscr lrcnrploi.
L'actueLlc fail.,1cssc du dolrar,  ou son instahilitrr,  ct
1 I i.mportarrcc du ltroblDrnc du rccl'q1agc clcs p6troclollars ni orrtcnt
attx cJranccs clc voir  sc ddgagcr unc unit6 {c conpte crlropL-icnnc.
Non sculcmcnt,  e 1lc sc substituerai.t il cet dtalon-fant6mc,  cc quc
tout lc  ntonclc souhaitc, y compris lcs  ar;rirrica j.ns eux-n6mes, mais
c11e tr.anscendcrait lcs nronnaics cr:rop6cnncs cxistantcs,, ces mon_
rr:ri-s nationales 'concurrcntcs qui r p&r calcrrl ou p21 faihlcssc,
sreffaccnt lorsqufil  est qucstion dc leur faire  joucr l.c 16lc
ri I instrunrcnts de 16scrvc.
t,luant ii I I opittion pul>lirluc, c11c acquci l lcra j t  rricux qr:'auj our
Ittti ttnc Iiurons dont 1a monnaic serilit  plus -stahlc r clonc jrnmrrn j s6c
cn clttclrluc sortc contre I t inflation,  ccttc nralarlic angoissante
qui n | 6pargnc aucllnc nlonnaic.
+sftaD
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Fund for  LEI_ Cornmuni L'r
The creation of  an Ecolomic and l,lonetary Union as a pa:^t
I
of or in  connection vri{.h the .EEC has been outlinc'C in
the i,fefner-reporL  bas
end of  the 6Oes. The





e cutlook possibl.e at, the
repcrt includes a dcsign
ss mainly based on anntraL
surveys, anc! decisiorrs  made by the Council, thc Com:"nis.sion
anti i;lre ConmiitLee of Governofs of  tlre Centr.al .Ilanl:s.
llhc lfcrncr-rclprt ind.Lcetcg ncw institutlone but kccps
the por+er of  Lhe decision-rnak!.ng
institutions  -  at least as far  as Lhe main suggestjcns
are conce.rned-inside the scope 'of the Treaty of  Rome
On the other side the suggestions  made have not proven
very effective,  ancl the politica.!. bac!.:ing and thereby
the will  of  the Council Lo make decisions and to implemont
the ideas of  the l{erner-report has been lacking.
This has created the wish also from a legal point of vicw
to try  to suggesL nerv desi-gns for  instiLtitions  wi.t,h
power clif ferent of  the power vesLed in  the ex-i.sting organt'i
thereby tc.r try  l-o re-vltaLize  Lhe notion of  st.rengLfrening
the iluropean cooperal--ion in  the econornic and monetary
fleld.  By considering such a project it  has to be born
i n mind ,  horvever :
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10  that  Llre'r pol i.tical  climaLe in  Europe does not seem
favourable l-o alterations  in  ilre Treaty of  i?omer,
al 2-  that the poli-tical  development in  th.e member statr:.s
in  connecti.on with Lhe major economic probrems fac-ing
these states today anc in  the 
-foreseeable 
future
makes it  unlikely  that the governmenLs rvill  be ready
or able to accepL decisions on major political  issrres
made by organs compreLely outside the orcli.nary rrat,ional
politicaL  esLablishrnents. of  course the politicat
cleveropmenL in  the inLern,ltional econornic fielcJ also
acib as a caLalysaLor for  t:he opposiLe appr:oach i.e.  a
n'rore European solution of  the nat.ional ecorromic and
monet.ary probLems. l{orvever i t  is  at  leas t  doubtf tr r.
vrhether the necessity of cooperation outweighs  Lhrr
grolitical  res.istance against such cooperation.
The problem of
overcom.i.nrj- the political  doubts and hindrances  nec-ess-i.tates
in  any case a clear definition  not only of  the goals or  tlre
objecLives which should be achievecl, but also a clear
definition  of  the decision-making process vrhich rnay be a
condition for  the achievements of  the definecl goa1s.
It  may however be pertinent make tv;o observat,ions  : to
1)  l'Jhile the clescription of  the nec'issijr'). -i.nsti tutions
and the formulaLion of  the procr-r<lure:;  i:trey shr-,ulcl
follow is  a legal task, it  gr;es .oii LhouL sayirrE tirrL
the technical ( reEal )  f ramr: f or  ::rii:ol)can cocit..;.rta  L j.r-rr-.
5Otal
D-1
might -in a dccisive way j.nf luence Llre outcomr'r of' thc
cool-)eral-iorr. IL is  r'ot onJ.y a c{uesbicln of efficiency
or norr-ef f iciency,  it  j-s mainly a qLlestion of  l-he
substonce of  the decisions.  This means that l:efort:
a 1ega1 frame catt be suggested, the pcliLical  end
econcrnic goal should be well--def irred and agreed upon.
Erren if  the overriding political  goal is  well-clef ined,
the inil-.lementat.ion  of  such a Eoal leaves a number of
t>otions as to
iA) the @  fo:r Lhe concret'e decisions
(B) th"  olgot i'rhich should rnake Lhe decision
(c) the conrl.ret{rnce or the Power which -  in  the
large -  should be decision-rnaking process at
vesLed in  thc organ.
Even if  it.ls  possible from an analyt.ic point of  v.iew l-c
make a distinctiotr  beLween (e) subject-maLterr (B) organs
anct (C) conrpetence, there is  a close and natural int'er-
reLation arnong (n),  (ts) ancl (c).  If  il-  is  <iecidecl to
creal-e a ilalance-of-Payment.  Fund or an EuroS.reatr Energy
Board or a new monetary system, a -IUROPAT Lhe choice in
the instittttional  and 1egal respect is  of  course lirnitecJ.
on Lhe other trand if  a European EMU has to respecL the
widesL self -cleterrniniition of 'a11 the ntember stai:e.g, th':rr
the competence of  Lhe organs has Lo be rather modest anrJ a
5.1nUnlb,.'r c).[ sUi) jaCt.-t,t;.:.,  1 c-:l;  f sj j.r
f rr..trii r erJul.i i- i-ort .
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Lir j. s  llJac)\' 
j- r,-) e)icl Llr:tr(i
rn the rc;ror t  r>f Lhc s tl;dy G .';oup i L -i. s prt--posec! th.r l_ ;jn
FlxLerrral 3c;r::orr,."'irrg anr,l a:r Excriange' stabi_r. -i-z:aLiop Irurrrcj
for  the crrrni'rrurriLy shourcr be establ-islred. rt  j.s fur:.Llrcr
sug;esLed thaL Lhe opercrt.ions of  ilre Funci shr:lrlri be
carr:.i-ed out by Lhe EuroF)ean l,tcrrr:tary cor.,pcr.aL:on  L-unct,
vrhiclr has e>:isted for  thc pas'c tv"'o years. Tl.re lFicl:, lrcrv-
ever, has haci no cornpetence  {,c rrrak-e ciccisioirs c)n euly
subsLant,iaL operational functions.
rn ccnducting Lhe operaLions cf  t-he propc-rsed E>:clrange
stabirization  FuncJ ti"  following suggestions might be
appropria te :
An independenl- agency shoulrJ be set up, consi.st ing
of  expert.s represenLing the central l:anks ancl/or
the. mernbcr staLes governmcnts. Tire agency shoul,l for
obvious reasons be smalI and shoulcj be abre to rneet
regularly.  It  coulcJ be a ne\"/ agency or a group of
members of  the Moncl-ary comm.tttee or the committee
of  Lhe Governors of Central Banks.
1)
2) The agency shoul<j l-rave cornpetence
decisions.  The decision  should be
majority  vcte.
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t.he form;11 anC sul)sLantial- cc:ni-letence.
As the deci.sions Laken by thr: agency are of great
importance to the member staLes,  the Council of 
.-1
Ministc-:rs should give concrete and dj.rect i.nstrucLions
to the agency. These instructions  should be aclol>t,ecl
by the Cr:uncil in  accordance with the ordinary rules
of  the Treaty as undersLood  and applied by tlre
Counci I .
'ihe agency should normally only be entiLled to act
within  Lhe scope of  Lhe instrucLions from the Council.
f f ,'howeVer, the Council Coes not aclopt an1, concrete
-i.nst-ructions, Lhe agency can make its  decisions ac-
cording to the staLutes for  the agency descri.bitrg in
general terms the substantial ccmpetence of  the agency-
By this  system of  combined and shared compeLence bet'*reen
the agency and the Council, it  is  secured that the Councj.l
of Mlnisters lrirs ti're decisive irtfluence on the concrete
decisions of  Lhe irgency it  the Council so rvishes. On
the o.Lhel harrcl, if  the Council is  not ready to acL <.rr is
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1. A Fiscal Framework for European Union
!.  Enerry scenario and. European Energr Institutions,
r I5r"una-ro F{-1
A FISCAL FRAI{E],.IORK FOR EIJROPEfu\  UNION
by Franoesco tr'orte
1. Consid.ering the matter froro a pur6ly theoretical. point of view, the nost
obvious public finance item for a Europea,n Union (ru) is pub)-ic e>qpenditure
on defence or military erpend.iture  and. policy reJ.ated thereto. l4ilitary
expendituro is a "colLective good'r whose benefits (if 
"r,y) 
acorue to the z
genera).ity of individuals without a plausible wiy of measuring the a.nount
obtained. by a sing).e person or brusiness entity,  and, whoge effects arige
in places distant from those where the services are supplied. Thus one
cannot argue about the correspondence  between amount paid and benefits
enjoyed by a given area (as so often occurs uith the EEC. agricultural Pro-
gramrne) nor can one argue about the f,airness of the regiona] d.istribution
of the services (as occuxs with aid. to und.erdeveloped  regions). I,iilitary
erpendi*ure impi.ying public ordpr is  cond.itionaL to all  other activities:
therefore it  is appropriate that it  be undertaken by the top tier  of
administration, which establishes the framercork for the lower tiers  and. for
any other power, public or private. In faime'ss, nilitary  elqpenditure is
also one of the moet controversial kind.s of public goods; some may consid.er
as beneficia). particular units of service which others consider most
damaging. So that, even if,  technically speaking, on the supply side this
could be consiclered. a good. with a very large area of diffusion, or the most
coLLective good of all,  on the demand side one requires rather homogeneous
social g?oups to maile this supply acceptable. t{e may argue that conflicts
of interests nrn across the countries rather than between them. But it
should. be recognized that to surrend.er autonomy in this area is a very
delicate thing i4. whtch national identity nay be very importa.nt, to repre-
sent honogeneity. But if  we assume that Europe yants to be united, we must
also assume a rather high d.egree of homogeneity  from the point of view of
rnilitary public good.s (or evils).  It  should be added. that military  e:qpen-
diture funpliee power for the supplier more than any other public expenditure:
olearLy it  would enhance the power of the E\rropean Union (U;) noro than any
other public finance activitY.
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Ptocurernent for it  wou1d al1ow E\rropean ind.ustrial arrd technoJ-ogical
cooperation to d.evelop.
But in proceeding from theory to practice in this  case there are several
' 
obstacles, both historical and cunent. I  do not need to list  them here.
. I only r,ra.nt to gtress that if  military  e:rpend.iture  became Eu.ropeanr  a
solid,for:ndation foq E\ropea^n pubi.ic finance would be built,  and the
rernaining issues would become much easior.
2. A6sunin6l that this cannot be c,on,l ,  we must ad.just our reasoning to a second-
best r,rorld, where EIJ public fine,:rce must rely on Less cohesive matters.
In ury opinion, there are, however, areas where it  can find irnportant elements
of cohesioni i.e.  capital movements, inveetment,  supply of labour. fnese
lead us to consider four topics:
a) jurisd.iction of the Eti in matters of profits  taxation and perhaps of
ta:cation of personal income derived from corporationsl
b) fiscal benefits in Less d.eveloped. regions of the EU and. taxation of
investnents in congested industrial areas of it;
c) public expenditure on unemployment and. rolated. contributions  by
the EIJ;
d) direct investment lf  .lle EU of funds related to social insura.nce where
.  reserves a.re required, such as ind,ustrial injury insurance and. adclitional
pa;rnents (perhaps of a voluntary kincl) for o1d age and sickness insursJlc€r
' 3. If  jurisdiction is given to the Eu in the field  of capital investmentr it
eeems ).ogical that the entire corporation  income tax should become a
f,\ropearr ta:c, administered by EU and. used for its  expenditure. This could
be the first  rrEuropean Tax't. fts  revenue is now about 3 /" of GNP and this
could also be the size of the tax  levied by the Eu.
ft  is tnre that corporations are a phenomenon more relevant in certain
natlons and less in others. But in shaping the new European tax one may
" -take account of thisT at- Least to some ertent, in defining the taxable
. subjects which d.o not need to be rrcolporations[  in the narrow sense of the
ilord,. Needless to say, rates shoul-d. be uniform in the various areas of
the Uriion (except as indicated. later ulder 4.).  Uniformity of nrl.es
relating to the concept of income and to its  assessment for this tax will
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bave inlortant effects on accounting. Lawe regulating corporations other.
than fiscaL law could. aleo be more easily rurified.; and nobil'ity of corpo-
,  rations from one section of E\roi e. to another enha.nced.  The new Er'Eopean
nonetary unit could be employed ;.n pq'"ing this tai.  Inspectors of the EU
ehoulal che.ck the asdessment in each region, assuring uniforrnity of criteria
and reliability  of reeult,s. 'lhe entire'natter of internatj.onaL aspects of
corporation  taxation will  be d: r1t with by the EU vis-I-vis rrdoloestic'i (Eu)
cor?o::ations  wj.ih interests ab::'oad and foreign (non-Eg) corporations  with
interests in EII territorY.
I uould like to stress that these proposals include EIJ jurisdiction over
the treatnent of diviclernrs for tax pulToses3 obviously eince this natter
impingea on the basis of personal income tax, a dividing line nust be found
between the tax yield on dividends attributable to nationa). goverrrnents
(even if  ooLlected fron the corporatione) a.nd. the yieltl attributable to
. ta:cation of cot?oratlons i.€r to the EU. Br,rt in principle it  is not diffi-
cult to find a div'iding linel that part of the tax on diviijlends col]ected
fron corporationg  whrch is eqnivalent to tliai paid by undistributed' profits
ehould be consid.ered as ucorporation  'taJ'rr, a^nd the witholding on clividends
exceeding that rate should be ccrieidered as t'personal income taxation'r'
lfhat is inportant here ie th^at a rurified regine r*hould be adopted, whereby
the tax treatment of all  E\rropean resid.ents in receipt of ctivirlends would
be identical while non-residents (of .EII) nould have to undergo a'nother
treatment (nodifiable through intertration tatc agreenents)'
4. I'he whole dlBcussion  on regional policies, at the E{J leve}, so far has
oentred on the amounts.of contributions to be paid a.nd of benefits to be
received w the varlous countries! ,i.6. has been a d'iscussion  on pub}io
finance a6 a weapon for income (or weaith) redietritnrtion. As alrea{y
pointett out by Professor Giersoh in his report on Monetary Unions, there
is another approaoh; which has to do with public finance aB a weapon to
promoto efficiencyp i.€.  a better allocation of resotgces anong areast
oorrecting narkot failures a8 to erternalitieE.
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Coets of lnvegtneni in congeated areaa nust be increased to
take eccount of the rrsocial costsrf of these inveetnente in terns
of congestion, vhil.e investnents in lese developed re6ionc nust be
€ncoure.ged by taking eccount of their nsociaL returnstt ia tersre of
positive externllitiee.  Eere there ie an area for  rrfiscal. Jurie-
dlctionrr of tha EU both uay6: i.€.  for flscal  incentivee and
fiecal disincentivee.  And t;;ere is also an area for direct adnini-
etration by the .EU. Fiecal Jurisdiction vithout direct adnini-
stration may have euperficial results and cauee tensioa betneen
the iSU euthori.ties.  aad national authorities who have to folLou
tbe rules eet by thi-former. So thet,  ae far as poesible, lt
appears wise to concentrate the regulatory porrer and the taxatioar/
publ.ic expenditure powera relating to it  in the eame hande-. Ttre
EU nay diecourage investneut ia  congeeted areaa througb a licence
tax (or property tax) levied on pl,ant -or:plrnt  and other
instalLrttone eet up there by bueincse enterprisee.
tJhetber thie ehould be n franchiee tex or a property tax ie no-
atly e uatter of terninology, since la botb caaea reference should
be nadc to tbe phyeical lnpact of the reel lnvestneat, graduatln6
the tax according to the eize and type of, installation  througb
generel- predeterniaed ru1es. But obvioely here terninoLogy  has
e1so lnetitutionnL inplicetions, siuce nattere like  property
taxation might be thought to belong to other levele of governnent.
Uhat ls inportant, in the caae of a fraachiee, ie that it  ghould
be e tax i.e.  a price for eocial coste of congestion end not a
Ityes or norf autbority, which vould appear to be against tbe
philoeophy of tbe Rone treaty and too nuch of an interfereuce
by tbe superior authority iB LocaL ectivLtiea. Corporation Lacone
tax rates could, be reduced by the EU Ln respect of, iaveetnenta
Ln underdeveloped regions. In addltioa, lt  could pay aubsldies
edniaistered di.reatLy by lt,  to proJects wblob havc ltc  epprovali
this  ;oul"d not uipe out the poyer of. aational gbverntreats to artil
other lncentiveg of their ova, but theee obviouely sbould folloy
certein e8reed ruLea. 
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l.  Socia1 security contributions in principle should be entirely harmonized.
in the nl0 arear not to distort the cost of labour within it.  This
harnonization, in n{r opinion, is more importartt than further val.ue-add.ed
tax harmonization, because one may normally asaume that value-aclded. tax
is mostly shifted fontard in prices to final  consumers  arad -unlike payroll
taxes-- does not intepfere with costs in the various regions a.nd eectors
of activity.  Some of the social- security benefits however enter into real
wages and may affect (in a downw;"rd. d.irection) ttre price of 1abour.
it  ir  therefore inappropria'be tc try to harnonize soqial security contri-
irrrtions without trying to harmonize also an importamt area of social
secui'ity benefits. fn the limiting case, one night think that the entire
matter could be given to the EIJ, as regard.s both jurisd.iction and. d.irect
ad.rninistration: but this,  while it  riray be a ternrinal objective, appears
too anbitious a pla'n as a starting point. Differences in national systems
iiere are very broad. at present, particul.ar'Ly for health benefits,  o1d. age
schemes and family aIIow4r.r;esr  What is elien more important is that theee
differences refl'ect different socio-economic conditions and. d.ifferent
historical trends in the labour novements.  The areas Left with which to
begin to build a European social eecurity system, therefore, are qnfortu-
nately marginaL with respect to the massivg and growing importance of this
phenomenon.  However they are not trivial.  A first  area where unification
appears appropriate is that of unemplo;rment charges and. benefits: clearly
with labour mobility within the EiJ and with the growing interd.epend.ence
of the economies of the ffiC, unemployment becomes a Europea"n issue, both
:.s a str.rctural and technological  phenomenon and as a business fluctuations
pher'iomcl.lon,  and is more arld more related. to migration flows of maspower.
ilates of pa.yroll taxation for r:nemployment social insurance are a7.owrd. ?,4o
wi't')r ihe exception of France (less than 0rJ/") and, the Netherlands (where
it  ranges from 1r2 up to Bf,). Pa;rments as a share of GNP are rather uniform
and represent a low percentage with the exception of Belgiuro and the ifether-
la.nds, where they are more important. Systerns are very different from country
to countryrbut a general European system could be set up, allowing for
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natio:ral or local  eupplements to it.  In addition to  contributione
baeed on payrolls,  money from the European social  I'und could be
used to  expand this  policy vhich, in  fact,  would absorb eome of'
the functions ppesently performed by that  I'und, broadening and
naking more 6y6tematic the entire  area of action and relatiag  it
to the policy  for  underdeveioped regione and for  labour nobil-ity.
6. Tlie reasons for  unification  at  the European leveL of  industriaL
injury  social insurance are very different  from tbose relatin6
to unemployment social  inFurance and policies.  They have to  do
vith  the fact  that here redistributionaL  elenents and sociological
factors have minor relevance, while there are reBerves to  be
lnveeted, wbich may represent an interesting  tool- of  European
.  public fiirance and monetary attion.  Payroll contributions  schemes
here differ  narkedly: sometines being uniforn,  sometimes differing
accorcling to the risks  involved. But a unification  of  schemeo does
not appear too difficult:  after  all,  rvhere riske  appear objectlvely
nore uniform a differentiation  according to the degree of riskt
dces not change the distribution  of  the burden oubetantially.
What is  inportant ie  that  reservec could be inveeted in  rtEuropatr and,
in  any event, would increase the financial  powers of the EU.
Another area of social  insurance where unification  may be deemed
approprlate in  connection vith  reserve6 policies  is  that  of
eupplementary  penoions schemee for  old age and other causes of
retirement from activitY.  .
Supplementary  schemes but not the baeic one6f for  two rea6on6:
first  of alt  because the basic echemes do not involve'  in  moet
case6, reserves; and secondly becauee they are too different  from
country to country (and from one category to  another) and their
unification  would impl-y an anortrous amount of  redistribution.
Obviously supplementary regimes exist  already in  the various
countrie6, but they need not be abolished. They migbt be partially
ner6ed in  the unified  European system. And, very important to  ctiumu-
Late this  development, beirefite could be paid la  European curreucy.
6a7.
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I  would consider that the nininun qo"ntitative basie for Europeaa
public finance should be 5% of Gt{P iu clirect aourcea.of revenue
levied and adminis!ered by the EU. Corporation taxation, licencea,
social security payrolJ- rates for industrial injuries and unemploy-
nent plus the exclusive right of Europa-iesue  rnay give a  yield
reaching thie ldveJ-, together with external custon dutiee.'Social
eecurity paymente for supplementary peneions and the revenuea
eevenues from other derived from reserves related to them, plus :
eocial ineurance reserves (iadustrial injurl)  may help to naintain
this percentage over time, compen6ating for falling receipte fron
cueton dutiea.
To these rrdirectrr 6ourceE of revenues, additional sourcea shouLd
be added in the forn of .a percentage of the yie1d. of the value-added
tax andr perhaps, direct contrlbutions fron the nember countries.
Another area of expansion of European public finance ln future should
be found in social eecurity finance, naking it  increasingly European.
Furthermore it  should be enphasized that ttjurisdictionrr ia 6iven
fields of taxatioq (e.g. international agreenente and the taxablc
basis of the naLn levies, such as those on business enterpriaec)
and of public expenditure criteria,  nay be nore inportant than
specific adniuistration of given taxes and expenditures. At preoeat
the EEC operates in these area6 through guidelines and euggertioaa.
fn eome area6, instead, it  should have direct legislative powersi
it  ehouLd also havs a genora3. power to represent the EEC couatrieg
at the internationaL level (not only custom unione, but aleo
lnternational tax agreements). fhis obviously impliee a true





































































































ENERGY SCENAR.IO AND EUROPEAN ENERGY iNSTITUTIONS
_-__F:;;;_============================
Report by Francesco Forte
i.  What wi 1I happen
.  It is very difficult to forecast now the possible developments
in the energy sector. Prices have not yet found their own stability
level, and could still fluctuate wildly in the near future. Figures as
those in the Merno on Mediurn Term Economic Aspects of. the Energy
Crisis for the comrnunity  therefore should be considered provisional. So coulc.i
quantities produced in the Middle Eaat: for sorne producers (i. e. Saudi
Arabia) the inducernent to produce decreases with/the increaee in
prices. Too much depends now on the political decisions that wilL be
taken both by producer and consurner countriee, and by the u. s.
.However, it will be useful to put down aorne tentative points which
seem now to be the inevitable outcorne of the present situation.
a) Energy will be dear irr ifurope, possibly dearer in the
u.s.  in spite of a tendency to some reduction of oi1 price possibly
in the next twelve rnonths oi-ftftu next years. This wiU have consequence6
of some importance  on the ability of some European industries
(especially petroihemicals and heavy industry) to corr-rpete on the
world market, particularly with U.,S. industries.
b) Oil will  continue to satisfy the largest part of Europe's
energy needs, although high.prices will bring old sources, Iike coaI,
and, perhaps new ones, to the cornpetitive threshold. Nuclear energy
will certainly receivera substantial boost but will not be able to change
the situation at least f6r the foreseeable future.
c) The Middle East will not be challenged in its role of
prime supplier of oil for European consumption.  Notth Sea and other
possibld developments will not change the basic dependence of Europe
upon Middle East oil.
u1z.
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d) Europe will be embarassed by balance of payments
problems for many years tg come. The foreign accounts situation
will be tight even in the b';ighties, when it is hoped that Europe
will balance its booke. Eor this reason, Europe will have less
room for manoeuvre in its relations with poqrer countries and
with.the U.S.; the dollar might enjoy 4long period of unchallenged
supremacy.(See  Memo on Medium Term Economic Aspecte of
Eneigy Crieis, pag. 33-36).
e) It *itt  not be easy to dispose of the producer countriect
money, both because of their limited !'absorption capacityrt and the
difficulty of giving thern opportunitiee for guaranteed investrnent.
This will ereate monetary fluctuations and hot money runs, and
rnay add to Europers embaraesment.
f) The economiee of the various European countries
will adjiust differently to hdgh pricee, energy shortages and 
'l
balance of payments problems and wilL thereby be driven along
different and diverging paths.
Gonsequences for the European Economv
The tentative nature of these points should not dissuade
us from discussing  sorne of the consequencee of the new situation
on the European econorny. W'e have already included in-point I a)
Europe's reduced competitivity, and our .subeequent  remarks ltili
be of a general naturer.
a) It wiU be rnore difficult to rnanage the econorny, and
specially,to control inflation. The concept that the modern econorny
can be rrfine tinedil at the pleasure of governments  will be increasingly
dieprov6d. The high priceo of energy and other imported raw materials
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will add to built-in inflation for a number of yeare. The prolonged
balance of paymente deficit will add some inflation particularly for
weak currency countries with flexible exchange rates (but also for
thoae affected by them,,'who will have an easier life, in caee of
prices increases);  and monetary disorder will Provide additional
stimoulus otf and perrniesivi'ty to it.
b) High energy prices will inf luence the location of
industry, and broadly spbaking, of econornic activity. Investments
chosen on the "cheaper energy" basis will lose this advantage, and
areas long considered unfavorable (i.,. e. some coal regions) will
regain a much better position. The retunn to coal - even if to be
welcomed - will in fact create a lot of probLeme (transportation,
pollution, etc. ) which until now did not exist or were not very
relevant.
c) There will be an,. effort to reduce the dernand for energy
through more efficient consumPtion  in lndustry, in transport,  and
inthehome.NewenergyeavingProcesseswillreguireheavy
inveetment, and a well planned effort on a very broad basie. The
ability to contain total energy demand without reducing production
will depend upon the succees of thie effort, both in the energy sector
(i. e. electricity production) and in industry'
d)tnordertoreduceoroffsettheweightofoilimports
on the ba.Iance of payments,  FuroPean countries will, try to increase
exports, both in..gendral and to oil producing countries' with  the
danger of "beggar rny neighbourtt policies such as comPetitive
devaluations  and competitive  deals with oil countries'
e) High energy prices will  spur exploration for new
reserves in Europedn countries and off-shore' and may bring baci:
previouslynon{ommercialdepositstoproduction.Thismaycoincide
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with a world-wide boom in exploration for new oil and coal reservea.
A new impetub udll aleo be given to applied ecientific research on
new energy sourceB or on new ways of ueing the old onea.
\
3. Areas of possible European action
The points listed in paragraph z) aefine areas of European
action. They indicate possible Lines of develolrnent  of EEC action
in new areaB: which is particularly important, taking into account
the fact that it is easier to rnake the EEC responsible for new policiee
than for old ones that have already been pursued by national
governments.  Point Za) cover6 very wide issues, wfuich - in fairneEs'-
were with us even before the energy crisis: they have been much
aggravated and mad.e topical by it.  The nature of the problerns makes
it very difficult to give hints on what specific'poLicies  Europe should
follow (this would be any way outside tiie scope of this paper). Suffice
.it ta say that the need for European economic control will become
etronger and stronger, and that the very chance of avoiding a rnajor
crieis  may eventually depend on it.
Point 2b) too deals with a problern that is arready here. The
geographical distribution of economic activity in Europe is far from
satisfactory, with congested areas which keep on developi4g and
poorer areas which are not able to better their poeition. Left to the
free working of 'the 
-inarket, 
the adjuotments required by dearer
energy will  create new and more intractable imbalaqceB. There is
a lot to br: said in favour of European territbrial  planning to correct
the present situation, and at least prevent it frorn getting worse.
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The return to coal will increase the 6cope of a European energy
policy. on the other hand it will also give fresh strenght to the
attraction of the traditional industrial areas of Northern Europe,
due to the fact that transport costs are higher for coal than for
oil.  This may require t  Eutopea,n transport-poliby with differential
rates for different areas. It may be difficult to give an indication
as to what policy to follow. It ie enough for the moment to state
the issue.
Point 2c) and Ze) relating to the energy sector proper,
are of extreme importance,. and afe a great challenge to tthe
European econorny. The search for nerr sources or new methbdsi
and the drive to greater efficiency in energy consumption, wiII
require large capital outlay which could help considerably to keep
global dernand at a'satisfactory level. Great store should be set on
these programmes, as it is hoped that they witl not only reduce energy
de.mand, and so imports, in the short run, but also increase Europetb
independence in the long term. obviously, it  would be far-fetched
for the Europeans to speak, as the Arnericans  do (with some
aSditional reason, ) of self sufficienclri but certainly a coordinated
effort on the points quoted may bring great rewards. In this field,
it is not only neces.sary to coordinate national programmes, if any;
there is a genuine need for a comrnon approach and institutional
guidelines at the 
"1", 
whereby European countries could pool their
efforts and achievernents.
Point'Zd) has been very much discussed since the enerfy
crisis started'.i and s9 we need.not delve into it.  It is obvious that
a common stand (as it.seerns now beginning to develop) wiII greatly
increase Europe's political credibility in the producer countriesr
eyes and immensely facilitate the difficult task of creating and
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sustaining new flows of exPorts toward6 these countries. As the
bulk of the new exports witl be in capital equipment, the pooling
of productive capacity, technical knowledge and organieational
experience wiII be necessary if projects of auffi'cient size are to
be launched, financed and realized. The financing side, rryith the
possibility of creating joint institutions with the European and
the producer countrieg, will be just as important a6 the ability
to gather the neces6ary know-how. This point relates the energy
issues with the issues of EuroPean monetary policy and with
"Europa" dealt with bY other6.
AnEECpolicyofexchangingcapitalequiprnentforoil
would in due course lead to the coordination of oil supplies, which
would in turn allow the European countrie s to share the re sulting
benefits. But a common supply and industrial location policy requires
a comr.t.lon oil price policy. EEC institutions to set thie policy aPPear
necessary. The importance of energy prices has been so drarnmatically
stressedinthelastyearthatthereisnoneedtoinsistonit.The
price of energy will certainly influence the competing ability  of
European industry; affect agricoltural costs; create new trends
in the location of. industry through transport costs; and affect the
Ievel of real welfare in the various regions of the continent. If
European countries have to develop togs'dher' they must have sorne
degree of control over energy prices, and be able to integrate
vafious energy sources with different production and transport
costs. The Eur6pean Steel and Coal Cpmrnunit' did have a prfce
policy for coal; ",,d it.ie very well known that coal pric€5 V?r} r r,  '  :
considerabty for different mines, different ore grades, distance from
the consumption point, ecc. so the task of aPplying the European coal
724.
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price policy wa6 by no means easy. Nevertheless, it was discharged
honorably, and it played a useful part in the European energy policy.
Consequence  s for- Europepn Inititutions
rhe energy crisis i" p.,tt?rr{fi"f"tTfl""rt.B:blii over the
world, and is inducing even the mcre t'Iaissez faire" governments
to intervene. This trend is already visible in the U.S. and many
countries in Europe and elsewhbre. The European institutions are
subject to the same pressure: avoiding intervention at the European
level may mean throwing away a very irnportant chance, which rnay
not occur again.
The points we have outlined above give a basic idea of
the demands that are beeing made upon the European Comrnunif,f  ,
and the institutional innovations  needed.
The first need is for planning, and not only at the sectoral
Ievel. European institutions are required to have a high degree
of control over the European economy, if they (as above outlined)
have to support global dernand; launch or coordinate heavy investment
plans to adapt the European economy to the higher ene,rgy prices;
pool resources and research ve4tures in energy; correct possible
industrial location imbalances; deal with the producing countries
and control energy prices. Without a proper planning meciranism,
there is no way of preventing the energy crisis frorn drivingthe
economies of various European countries furthbr and further apart.
Plairning at the EEC level - for the ibove outlined areas of action -
should cover the drafting of objectives, the choice of main instruments,
and the control of their actual effect. It may be too early to spell
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out the form and structure of such a mechani6m, but ie must be
stated that there is a definite need for such institutiona, if European
Government is to became a reality.
second, the energy sector reguiree'the  speedy revamping
of existing coal and nuclear energy institutions,  and the creation
of. ad ho-c instruments, similar to those of the CECA, which will
deal specially with oil in addition to coal and nuclear energy. Their
task as for oil will be to coordinate relations with the prod.ucing
countries, to monitor crude and products prices, in a word,, to
evolve a European oil suppry policy. crude oil prices will
increasingly come under public control due to the wid,ening scope
of direct produc€r-corsumer agreements,  which wilL be negotiated
by national governments,  or-better still - by European institutions.
The integration of oil from this source with oil coming through
commercial channbls should be done by a European institution,
which will also be responsible for controlling petroleurn prod.uct
prices throughout Europe. wide diver,gencies of oil product pricee
in European countries cou1d, in fact, create serious imbalance.
Europe wiIl, have to be divided into zonee and prices fixed in
accordance with'the Communityrs  overall regional and territorial
policy.
Planning in the energy sector will have to take account
of the need. for a reasonable degree of security,  and indicate the
best way to reach this goal, through stocks, by keeping on the
market energy oources that are enly marginally competitive, 
-and
by insuring a high deetee of flexibility for European'energy production.
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15[1uf.  The Cate for  a European Parallel
Currcncy
1. The calo f,or creatLng a European Parallcl  Ourrency
1o baced on tho oare agaLnat thc Werncr-Plal.
2, Thc lferncr-Plan aLmed at an exchange-tatc unLonl 1..c.
a ty!tcn vLth j.rrcvocably fj.xcd exohange-patca.  ThLc
approaoh 1r bound to fall  for  the follorLng roasonsr
-  An exchangc-rato  unlon :iecemblea a prLce cartcl.  It
I'a viablc only Ln combLnatLon wtth a quantJ.ty carter,
10cr en agr€€ment to regulate cupply. The quantities
to be reguf atcd are thc natl,onal Eoncy stockc. They
vould havc to Lnorerac Ln approxLrnatcly equal
proportion to the ncraber oountrL'os I potentLal output
ln order to prcvcnt dlrturbenoo! frorh differcnom Ln
tlrc ratcg of, lnflatLon.
.  Atr altcrnati.ve and nono dLrcot rupport for  an
cxohango-rats  union vourd bc an egrcenrent vLth regard
lo ratcr  of lnflatLon. rnflatton  ratec rould havc to be
roughly thc lannc wlth lomc lccway fon d{ffercnocc Ln
produottvlty grovth and for  prto.  rri.arr duo to abnorqnolly.
hlcth Lnoomc oleotLoi.t{or of dcmend for  tho cxportr of
r  peftt aulrr  oountry.
- Lacllyt  thr nembona of an cxohengs-ratr unLon oould
egrec on I  oonmon paor of vagc !.norcecsc vLth duc
allovanoc for dlffrrcnoct  Ln produot!.vj.ty grovth.
. lllro purpolr rould bo to hrvr roughry rtmLler Lnorracrr
ln netlontl  oott lrvolt.
flrr rulrr  to .upport rn .xohanSo-rltr rrnlbn vould hrvr to
br lald dovn ln rdvenorr to br drfLnrd Ln rn oprrrtLonu
rry rnd to bc oonbLnrd vtth rffootlvr  lutotionl.  Srnottonr
vould rrqu!.rr L ruprr-nrtlond ruthonlty. Dxohur8r.rttr
flxLtly  thrt lr  not vdtdrtrd by thr nro.f trr? port ol$
1r bound to brrrlc dorn or to lrrd  to r rrtrort  fron  -/1x,-I
convertibilltyr  'llris  ie  in  accordance vith  the theory
of  t}a  Second geit  r*hictr teaches that  a.n improvement in
on€ respect may result  in  a general. deterioration  unless
it  ie  aecompaJried by compl.emerrtatT improvements'
3, The promoters of  the Van.er-PJ"an thought that  poJ.J'cy
coordination vould come about automatical"ly. (ftt"y  tlrus
adhered to what ln  dev€i'opment economicg j.s calLed the
si,?ctrine of  r:nhalanced, .J.rowthi) Suctr automaticy, ttowever,
caru:ot be expected unLasg there Ls oupport f,rom the
general trend.  In  fact,  tl.e wind, has been blowing {n  the
opposite directlon;  vo have obeervedr
arr increasl"ng need for  demarrd managiement and grovth
pol.icy after  the end of  the poetwar r€construction
perJ.od,
-  a strengthening o.  cost pueh tq,rdencies due to  a
alowdown of  reel  grovth in  gofie countriee,
-  the failure  of  U.S. lncome polJ.cy in  1966,
-  an lntensified  soci.al rrnreet and a fiercer  struggJ-e
'with  the Lncome. dietrLbutl,on after  the events of  May
1968 '
the fJ-ood.in g of  the world with  dollarg  in  the second
half  of  tho sixties'
j.ncreasi,ng perrnissivonegs  of  governmsnts and central.
banke vis-A-vls  l"nfLation in  general.
I{ith  rates  of  inflation  close to  or  above 10 Per cent
the differences  ln  inflation  rates  from country to
country tend to  bocom€ accentuated. Ifithout'a  prior
retu:m' tt  condltLons approaching price  Ievel  stability
there le  llttle  chance for  any return  to.a  oyatem of
fixed  exctrange-rateo. vlthout  restriotions  on J'nternational
paymentd. We ar€ goLng to lLve v{th  f,loatLng rateg
vhether ve like  lt  or notr
,784.
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It  would be good if  two principles  governed the vay
to  Durope€in }lonetary Union:  gradualism and automaticity.
Ttre first  has prlma facie  arlvantagee as has been
experienced in  tho  remoTal of  tarihb.  Automaticity  carr
take the  form of  a polj.tica1  comrnitment to  a specific
time  achedul.€ or  of  a well"-designed  meoharrie.m governed
by market forces.  Vith  all  respect  for  the  achievements
of  enlightened  polJ.ti-ciana and statssmen I  am confident
that  a European money vlJ.l  either  be the  creature  of
a European state  or  it  vill.  emerge becauee the need for
lt  eipresses Ltaelf  Ln the  market
Tlre market v111 decide ,vhat  form the  Europ€an Money may
take.  Candldates are the  dollar,  the  porrnd or  any other
member corfntry curroncy -  of, a now unit  which is  launched
l"n competition  vith  extetLng monoyo. A new rrnJ.t ha,s many
obvious advantages. Its  dravback le  thht  it  has no.
hietory  from vhich  confidence can be derived.  And it  needs
overvhelmlng  eonfLdence rrntj.L it  can claim  to  offer
alml1ar  scale  economLes a6 the  doLJ.ar or  the  pound. The
confLdenco t,or*ards a nor noney must result  from promises
attached to  it,  and ths  promloe that  matters  is  the
promLae of  an interest  vhich  ttrs  holder  can expect to
oann {n  terms of  an appreodation vis-d,-v:Le other  moneys





Poseible Deflnltions  of  a
Common European Unit  of  Account
One of  the  frrrrctions  a good morrey has to  perform is
to  be a unit  of  account.  i.n this  function  it  has to
facLlitat"  (ex poet)  prof:r-t  and J.oss accounting  and
(ex ante)  cost-benefit  accounting  J.n aJ.J. decieion
maqing unl.te.
Vira'b a good unit  of  account rneans l-e reveaLed in
periods  of  inflation.  l,Ihen the  value  of  money
dateriorates  the  tradl-tional  use of  historical  prlces
In  calcuLating  depreciation  al"Iovances leacis to  an
rrnderaseessment of  costs  and to  an overaesessment of
profite.  Some economic activlties  which are  sociaJ.Iy
vagteful,  appear to  be profltabJ-e.  The result  rriJ.l  be
a misaLlooation  of  resources.  ThLs is  partLy*or-.vtrolly
componsated to  the  extent  that  tnfLation  .raiees  the
leveL of  employment and capacity  utiJ.ization  -1"  it
happene aE long  as inflatlon  is  at  least  partly
unantlcipated  by vage and prl"ce settera.
3.  Sooner or  lator ;*
t if  j"t  {s  to  remain unantlcipated,  inflation
'must acceLerate. --  - . 
'fhl,s- ie- the  st'ag6--ve hawe reached
nov ln  moet EC member countries  arrd els€irhere.  A return
to  loae  trrfLaticn  .l:eicomes mors and more urgent,  brrt  a].so
more and more dl,f.ficult.  Ona of  the  tr+o ao].utions  to  the
problem of  accelorating  lnfl"atJ.on is  the  Lntroduction  of
a new unit  of  accorrnt. InfLatlon  can thus  aupport  tlre
caa€ fof  a Common Europearr Currency,.  -
&.  It  vilL  be aeeumed in  the  subaoquent diecussion
that  a European Currency to  be called  ttre  rrEuroparr is  to
be laaued paralJ.el  to  natlona.l  currenciest
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-  that  the  rlEuroparr le  to  be attractive  enougtr to
oqueeze nationaL  currenciee  gradually  out  of  the
market arrd
'  t  that  tho  'tEr.rroparr ie  attractive  enough to  become
a vor1d, currency in  ttre  sons€ that  it  ca11 successfully
comp€t6 with  the  doIIerrl ln  lnteroontlnental  trans-
actione.
AttractLy€n€Bs ryil"l-,  thereforer  be decisive  in  cftoosing
alnong poesLble typea of  defini.tions  for  a Common
European Unlt  of  Accorrnt.
J"  Mo"et appropriate  for  indl"vidua.l usera Ln the  Community
vould be a r.rnit of  accor.rnt
that  had eome roLation  to  existJ-ng nitlonal  currencies,
-thatvasstab1etnterrneoftlroeecommoditiost'hich
could. be taicen to  rapresent  the  Lnpute and outputs  of
firme t
-  that  vas otable  i.1 tenns of  a, r€presontative  basket of
contumsrl t  goods.
6,  An appropri at e f er.r. *1t1rnehi ;r 'i:, rtwe*rr the  rrDuroparr alrd the
natlonal  crtrr€ncjfi.$ nan bn astablJ-sfred if  the  former  ie  defined
a3 a bag of  tlre iatter.  AII exalrtpie i6  furnished  by the
denominat{on of  the  Eurco loans,  vhere  arr Eurco is  the
aurn of  DM O.90 ..(wright  28 ,g /r),  ffrcs  1 .20  (weight  22.3 *) ,
c 0.075 (veight  14.6 'i),  L 80 (veisht 9,9 "h,  hfl  o'75
(veight 1O.1 "i),  bfr  4.5o (veJ-ght 9.5 /"),  dkr o'2o (weight
2.7 fi)r  lrish  f, o'OO5 (rreiSht 1?t) and Lux frcs  o'5o
(wetsht 1 #).
The rate betveen the numbers of rurlta of 'any two currencles
Ln the bag l.e deterdined by the  (croae )  exchange-fate
prevaLlLng {n the marlcet and the relative  velghta. T}re
hJ.gher a oountryra Gl,P t}.e groet8r Ls tlrc wej'ght of  l-ts
ourr€ncy ln  the bag'
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7.  ?he exchange-rates applied  in  calculating  ttre number of  unlts
of  each currency  can be flxed  or  ad.justable.
-  A flxed  aystem of  ratec  ar  l.mpll'ed l.n the  tr)rreo definltion
..lnigiri  soon bocome trnreallstic.  If  markot exclranl;o-rntes cgn Ll rrrr,
to  vary  trnder the  impact of  dlfferenc€s  in  ratos  of  irrflrrti.rr,
.  tB value  of  the  Dur.co ln  terrns of  goods and services  will  thcrr
-at  artificial-  welgllte  whicl. wil.l  no longer  reflect  the  relative
importance of  the  respectl-ve national  GNps in  real  terms.
rf  €very currency revaluatLon.:vlc-A-vls  the rest  of  tho b:rg
w€re compensated by a 'correaponding reductlon of  the nurnber
of units  of  the currency tn  tl'e  bag .and lf  convorsely -  every
.devaluatlon vcrc rnatclrcd by a coreepond.lng increase in  the
number of units  of  ttre currency ln  the*pog, ttre Etropa
would reflect  the LnflatLon rate  of  tlre member currencles  vtrose
parJ'ty had not been ctranged.
The Europa rrould have a,llable  external value (rn  terrns of
goldl  sDRs or any third  currency) tf  tne previous fo:nnula
were appll.ed wl-th ttre modLflcation that  .apprecLations and
depreoiatlonlr vcrc mcasurcd with- referenee to gold,  s)Rs or
any third  cumcncy.  i
-  The Eu would be ttod  to  the  s st  curren l. n  ttr cr
lgiir  if  onty  devaluations  werq permLtted, vls-l-vls  thc  rest
of  ttre'bag,  lf  devaluatrons  wire  compensated by a corros-
ponding increasq  l.n ttre number of  un1ts  Ln the bag and if
one currency  (ttre  atrongast)  would, never depreclate.
ropa wou lso  be tl o the strongest  curren
in  the bae,  lf,
-'
vould  be treated
1n tlre bag.
in  caae revaluatlons
as devatuations  of
were permltted,  they
the  other  currencLes
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-  The Burr,pa woul"d a te  vis-A-vis  an currenc
in  the. bae, 1f',  during  the  period' of  referencet
€very currency vould  depreciate  at  ].east  once
vis-d-vis  the  othere  ao that  the  number of  rlnits
of  every currency would increase  due to  the
compensation formuLa.
-  The Furopa vould  a reci ate
Surrenclr, lndependent of  wtrether there  ver€  exchange-rate
changes and 'it gould be made stronfier  than  the  doLla!,
if  the nurnber of  trnite  of  each cunrency in  the  bag
would be increased by x-  z per  cent,  vhenever the
welghted average of  the  natlonal  consunor'price  indices
lrad increased by x percent.  x  could be of  ttre  order
of  mag3rituds of  5.  z may be zero;  but  if  anybody sav
advantag.es Ln a.rr lnflation  which  oould, be fuJ"ly
antJ.alpated, he could  argus i'n  favou? of  a z of
one or  two  and a oorrespondingly  higher  interest
on claLms denoml.nated Ln Europaa '
er [ ('lo
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A notg on the lri*  gFerience
by
Patriok hrnoh.
rlil ost perois de se demandor si los .ryi r,ltal;"l,,rns suivios
rerftteit  d.e prls ou d-e loin un,l6but de ooncroiition d.rune
vdritable potitlque rfgionalo dans la CoronunauCot' I
Today tho Ropublic of lroland is a smalL periphoral
European economy, but by a pradox of history its  oxperienos  sheds
souo 1lght on the problems of achieving eoonomio s"nd rironetary iirrion
in a very muoh greator geographloai area suoh as tlre European Eoonornic
Conrnurity.
Prior to the Union of the British and trr.ish
Inrllaments ln l.80L oaoh oountry had a separate curreacy and retained
it  until  1826 when botb aurrencles wore aesiniLated. (lnctdenta).ly,
one member of the British  parlianent suggosted that it  should bo a
declrol ourronoy!). This ended a oontroversy ovor lrl.sh nonetary
policy whioh had gone on for nea.rly a guarter of a oentury. And, to
guote Frank W. Fetter2, ttFor nore than a century ancl a guartor lrelancl,
as part of the United Kln8dom, as a neriber of tho Britisb Conmotnivealth
o{ Natlons, and as an independont Republio, hae nrsin'bainetl its  currency
at par wittr the British  pound through redenrptlon in Loncion oxchan6o
and eale of London exohange, in line with the recommondations of tho
Corrmitteo of l.8O4t.
Th€ L804 Cornsd.ttee to rivhich Fetter refers produoed a
report by a Untted Klngdon ParlLanentar3r Conunittee on frthe CirouJ.ating
Paper, tho Spaolo, and the Current Coin of lrolandrr. It  contained,
I.  Utsfi - tg  Fapier de llM Clappler et Brouwers l  Analyse orltiquo
de la premiere etape de lrUnlon oconomique  of uronotaire
curop6cnnco  P.5
2.  the Irish Pouad (tL1en and Unnin, London.1955)  po 62
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accorcling to f'etterr'ra large pert of the doctrine later ii'oorporated
ln the Bullion Roport on the relation between monetary and' banklng
policy, prices, internatioral Pa1penj:j, sPeoio Premtr5lr  and exchange
ratos  r....  - the exchange situatlon betrveon lndependent  nronetarlr
systens in the sanr politloal  Borercignt)r ....tt5.  The tsrr-Llion  Report
of tho United Kingitorn Partiarnentart' Comlttee was publlshed in 1810;
it  achloved popular.fasro  in the Bnglish Epeaklng world and had an
influenoe on eoononlo.policy  wpquall€d W any other pttbllc doournent
on monetary problons. David Rioardor 6 narn hsd been associatod with
it  partly for legendattr !€agont. In any' ovont, the Bullion Retrnrt
beoarns the orthodory of nlneteenth  oentuty Britlsh ooobomlcs. Its
uain princlple was that the monetarr authorlty in an area can raintaln
a stable exohange rate ihrough the use of its  ex*orna1 r€seflr€s arld
Ohangcg in cr"cdlt pelioy.  This was the dootrlno acoopted by
trvo directors of the Bank of lreland, Arthur Gulnnese (tho great br"ewer)
and lfilltam peter LunslL in thelr evidence to the Barllanentarl Comnrlttee
whoee rccomrnendations  led to the assirnilation of thc Srltiah and Irlsh
currcncice in  1825.
Thls po).ioy of assi:nila'bion had lncnediate deflationery
offeots for the lrish  monotary eoonorqf. 'rlt  ls lronical tirat the policy
vsith whioh Arthur Guinnass nas associated a.s a banker /t&I1 '-:;:e cf  'bhe
tauseg of hls ten bad yoars as a brewer"4.  iho Assini-la'tion of th'o
two ourrenoies in 1826 oonsolidated tlre Progressivo re irt'lua"tion of tho
Irish pound ubich had been dopressing Iristr extrnr{;s s:nes 1815. The
year 1826 nrarked for lreLand the boginning of an econor'ric nalaise
corrosponding to what Great Brltain rvas to experienoo ;lrl bhe trentielir
oenturl, after the r.eturn to the gold standard in 19e5. Ilatil
contrnratively qo.oop!\r the econonlo sbagnatic'n ci' Ireland, inoluding
t846/47




Guinnessr s Brerve the Irish Econorn.y
zey (Cambric6r:
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i, 56)(Ft
largely in polttl'oa1 and soolal terue - eud' ln rny oplnlon'
rnoorr.eotry.  The adoption of Koy'oor.an toohnrqucg end F'st-
Ketrnerl'en natlont tncm aooorrntlng  oonoepts haYe, ltonever,
hcltrntt grcatly la trcatlng poblens of eoonmio deveLopnent'
and thc hlatory of lreltDd ln the nlrcteenth oeutr'rry and after ls
6
ao eroel*loD .
The Irlsh ercperlenoe strongly sug6dsts that
the rntrod'ctlon of eoononio and mouetary'nlon ls feasibre ln
an EFC oontert trnovlded tbat ttre socirr and r.egional policias of
tlrc comrnltlr are alreadlr suffioiently effeotlve to prevent a
on -fay movement of the faotors. of ProduotloS, labour and oapltal
fromlihcpcrllbrr:rtorardst,}rooentreandsodestroylrrgthewho].e
oonocpt of an eoonon!.oally  and soolally balanoed oolur'rnlt1r' Befireen
18?6 and the 19601 r there rae aLmost oontinuous otro-tay nobtl'lty
of the tro Sotorr labour and oapltal nry  fron lreland'  The
rocult wae cnlgr.atlon, unernploymut ard eoononLo stagnatlon'  There
ia llttle  doubt that norctarlr unioa uith the unltetl Klngdon arrested
eooaml.ogrodhrrnttlnrohtlDalt,hccedeterrentstogrowthwore
tdsntlf,tetl and evcntually off-gct.  In the 1930to a trnllcy of
coononloproteottolpe9adopted.Ithadllrnttedgu'gggggand
ll  nor dlrrplnerlng ln llnr yltb tbc llb.ral'lretLon of trada
lutorartlorul\y-  After 1956 lnoentives for pronotirg exlort-
or!,entatcd lndustrles toro lntroduoed' Tn any oYent' as has been
plnted outGtarlff proteotion and export subsldles haw the ssne
effeot as d€,ralultlon  of, thc ourrcrotrr'
The Irleb cxpcrlenoc sould seen to 11]ss!1ato
nry of thc oontentLonr of glr Donld tfiao Dougall in hls lnper on
6.
6.
E;- rbld ."d u"r  (tutt;;?l
Sec f .K. thttakcr nllonetary Integratlgr t.Rofl'cotr.on8 on
Irlah Experlanocn Quarte:'ly Bulletin'
ol"tt r -rnnr or rr#ffiElffiffi. 71c-1
Lcor:c,lic and Monotary- union which ho presented at the seoond
meeting of the Group U.EjM-8, Ln partlcular, pcrhaps, in his vicrg
'.;he harmonlzation of fiscaL polloies.  It  points firrthcr
io'iihe neoossiQr for adequate emphasle oa the role of factor
nnbility in an integrated currenoy area. 
- 
ft..a1so indioates that
a ce.rtain regionaL autonony in nonotary and economlo natters is I"




Starting from tho basio point of agreement
Donnld MacDougall, tho Irish experience suggests:-
Ihe distinctive feature of a regional eoonoqr
as against a uetionaL eoonory, is its  o;nnness; it
oannot influenoe tho terms of its  rerternaln trade
in relation to ite  nintenraltr p:oduct.
Any econony - housohold, reglonaL or.national - must
balanco its  external aooount. A national (autononoua)
econor[r, h@reyer, has a wido neasur:e of discrotioa
(through impol'l-oontrol, flscal and oredl.t polloy,
exchdnge-rate policy) in relating the need for the
exbernal barance to the desir-able volrrns of dornestl.o
enp3.otrment and prioe trende. For a regiolal eoonory,
on the contrarlr, prices a.re fi:ced erternally as aro
export earnings and., to a vertrr 1arge exteat, incomei
and su6tainabl.o  emplolment. In short, a rogion ig
doninated by oxogenous determl.nants  unless thero are
col,rxrrarya,iling foroes oongoiously deployed to preserve




'In the caso of congested regiong the outlvard mrbvement
the
of3aotors of produotion, eslnoially of labour and
capital nay be coasidered an oguilibrating one'  This
moverent is induced by the exfernally dorninated level
of,  and changes in,  econonic activity.  In the oase of
the large European poripheral rogions, however, such
nrobiLity in fact constitutes a destabilizing  arrd a
gonorally debilitattng flight  of oapitaL and of active
poErlation, Leaving the region with'a d'isproportionatoLy
high per capita oost of sooial sorvices and of infra-
structure whilo the tarcable cala oity to Deet the cost
ls reduoed. This 1o the Losson of tho frlsh experience
up to the 1960r s.  A sollal substnrcture  of ooonornio
intogratlonisapre-oonditlonofmonetaryintegration.
In the United Klngdorr ths transfers of income through
the oentral Soverunent bud'get go a long way to offset
tlte sooial and infrastruotural  cost of a baolcward or
dopressed regLon and arer of oouraer vertrl' rolerant r"rithln
the ooatext of a Cornnunlty Reglonal Polioy'  It  should be
cnphaslzed that the oage for these transfero 1n the EEC
nay be oonsiderably etronger than 1s at present generally
appreciatedwhensuchunr^enlurrerate.iservicesasPrescrvabit-rn
of enviionmental alnenities a'1o brought into tha reckoning'
Here again, the Irish experience proviCes  evlclenoe blLat the
so-oallod eooaonically  depressod areas are' itr fo'c'c' tLose
i';l: j.ch ';,re of most rolevance from the viorupoin'b of an
environmertb rvhose val-ues must be assessed in aesthel:ic 'pather
than in nss5111ab1e econonic terrns'
4.
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or  ra'rrgrrd. to tbr r-trat to r&dd th+ rortrry  rdl rmnortc
l
r'tonongr of rn s@c r-rgr'ea{a{boue  .ry b-prrrtirlr, thr 
, t-
; Irtrh  rgnrlrncoenrrtre bo rorr dfildvnlrvent,  ',
prtlcularly  lf  tho trrobable develo;mnt ln the
EC ts. I  devolution of the present national
autonomlee downrvards to rogions as welL ag uprvards
to Coumunlty tnstttutlons Z.  Such ooncepts of,
devolutlon a.c subeidlarlty wouLd be consl.stent with
reoont thought gbout public adninistration on the means
of avolding nonolithlo centrallsrm .  f  have already
suggested that there is urgent need for the EEc to drovise
a mod,era eysteu of trnrbilc adrnlnistratioa whtoh npkes
use of delegation, devolution and the applicatlon of
the principre of s'bsrdiarity if  uonolithio stultifioation
to be avoidod.  In any gvent, aftor a postwar deoad.e
of near stagnatlon, duo largply to the circr:nstanoos
deegrlbed in paragraph g-abovc, Ireland ventured into
planned nautonomousr eoononic dovelopment  whioh soon
brought relatively raprd exlansron,  an cnd of enigration,
-:
a reduotron r.n unenproyrnent  .and to the flight  of capital
. (therc has, Ln faot, been a sutrstantial net capital
inflow) and a narked rnprovement in riving anil in social
stanQgrds ggncrally.
6.  fn the 196otg freland reJeoted the idea and practioo of
lsolationlst proteotlonlsu. It  accepted the fact that a
m1l  shertersd hone rerkct could not provido enpl0ynent
7 '  To oonplete the pioture it  wou-ld be uscfnl to have also a closer look at the r.egional e;tler.ienoe of Federal Ger.nany.
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for its  labour or capital, that an ability  to oornlnte
internetionarl'y  was essentlar.  The ecorronrio grorth of
the 1960t s xras p:ronroted to a 1arle extent by heavy infra-
stmoturar inveetment whioh had taken praoe. in the 1gb0r e.
fri full. recognition of the. open:ress of th" 
"ooooury, tho
objective was €xport_led. grorth.  In the Irish experienoe
the equilibratirg movenents of fbctors occur outside
ascertainable nnargins of toLerancetr. Dosplte a trnrticularly
oLos6 monetarlr interdolnndenoe wlth tho U.f,., a domestlc
intorest rate ptt€rn  erprged in froland. and the Central
Bank of lrsland has been able to attalu a certain degreo of autonomy
in credlt polioy.  An lndependent inoonss plicy  is being
pursued whioh, wlthout belng particul.arry  suooeseful., is
oertainly not less so than rn other, muoh more autonomous
oountrie s.
7.  ilhat 613 rrish exporionoe  seemg to suggest is that on the
basis of adeqr.rate e;rternar nonotary ro'erqres (net oapital
infLow lnto the region) lt  nay be posslble - wlthin
quantiflabJ.e rarglns of toleranco aa r.egards inoomes and
oring to asoertalnabre frlctions in oapital movenentg -
to attain a reasonablc degree of autonomous, planaed econor,ic
develolment (nutsido tho straight-jacket of dependence on
external factors) whioh may glve ttre region an ad.equate
degr.eo of self-relianoe to rta\e offr  into sustainablo,
eormercially notivated, grorth.  (tn ttris connexion it  nri,3ht
be usefur to cousider in  sone detail the stg.toment in tho
pepor by l,lll Clappie:.  .s.nd Snourcrr that I  have quoted as an
o;,igreph to thi s nt te ) .
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This means, horvever, that the EEC pysten of public
administration lmrst be suoh as to dolegate to
regions a reesonabl.e oa;ncity to dlreot their  own
affairs with the ablllty  to ralee looaIIy by talation
the alrounts suppl.enented by Comuaity regiona!. grants
nocessary to sustaih the cultural,  oooial and economio
viability  of the reglons.
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provocative in order to stimulate discussion'
A. Political  objectivcs  and the t s of econolqls-and monetar cooperation
liketL  to achieve thetl'
As we are starLing frorn scratchr we might consider first  the politlcal
objectives of  the ConrnunitY
one fundarnental  objective  is  to malce !'tar virtually  unLhinkable between
the members, as it  is  between' saYr England and Scotland;  the States
of  the U.S'A.;  the Provinces of  Canada' Can ancl should vre identify
tl.rereasonsforthisstateofaffairsandtrytoreplicatethemlntlre
Conrnunity? I  suspect that  the possession of  a comrnon currency is
unimportant  and that much rirore important is,  for  example, the facE that
most People living  in,  sayt Scotland have friends  and relations  in
England ancl vice  V3r58o
LfsordoesEhismeanthatintheEEC'inframingastrategyfor
developing cooPerationt  we should' for  example' give SreaLer priority
tomdasuresdesignedtoincreasetlremobllityoflabourtharrtomonetary
union?





achievernent. of  these objectives,  arocl why? How, for  example, would the
suggested creaEion of  some form of  Europeaq cent'ral bank help?
Contli tions  for  nronetary-u.nion'
IdoubtwhetllermanyPeoplehavetheslightcsLicleaoftlreenormoug
changes required to achieve and maintain monet'ary uniou, by which l
mean irrevocably  f ixed exchange rates or  a.collunotl currency'  The Group
witt  presurnably  have to analysc, and report ont tlrese changes' One





/'prevent j.ntolerable dj sparities"  "prevent irrLolerable
standards and rates
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sparities  in  levels of  emplo;'ment,  tiving
growth in  the various parts of  Che country.
First,  there is  the rropennessrr  of  regions within  a
country.  For example, t.herropennessrr of  regional
economies in  the U.K. (as measured by the ratio  of
their  t,rade with  the resL of  the counLry and overseas
to their  regional product,s) is  very high in  compartbon
with  that of  sovereign states with  comparable sizes of
domest,ic products  -  often  several t.imes as high.:9
This no doubt reflects  the great, interdependence of
the various regiorral economies tlrat  has developed
during many generations of  free movement, of  goods,
services, Iabour and capit.al betvreen.them.
One consequence is  that  if,  for  example, there is  a
drop of ,  say, S1Orn. in  thetrexports't. of  a region, this
will  typically  be offset  directly  by a reduction in
tfimportsrr of materiats,  components, etc.  of  perhaps
'1 e6m. -  -  a f ar higher proport iorr t,han in  a typical
independent state,  even one of  tlre same size.
Seconclly, a large parc of  tl're drop of  54ni. in  che
rewards of  factors of production (wages and profits)
within  the region wiLl  be offseL as a resrrlr of  the
existerrce of  a large national budget and of  national
insurancc funds.
So far  as workers are concerned,  those beconring unemployed
will  receive on average somet,hing like  50 per cenL. of  t.heir
previous wage in  uncmploynent benefit,  and also stop paying
taxes and soclal  insurance contribrrtions equal to around
20 per cent. of  thcir  previous wilgc.  'l'hose working fewer
hours will  pay lcsr; L;tx et.(;... ccrrivalr.rrt t.cr around one-third of
their  l<:ss of  g,ros:; ittc'ornc.  lrr (trt al.  sonrc.thing like
onc-lral{ of  t:lrc <l roll in  Llrcr rv;r1',t';rrrtl :rrl:rlv  hill  r^'ilt  be
ofIsct- j.n Lhcse ways.
Lilcewi.sc, arottrrd 50 116r ccnt.  trl  111,' 1111'| irr  1r11.t it::  r.'ill
7: lrr'  rr | | ;:r. I  lt)'
See A.J.  Brotrn rrTlre Iiratnework of  llegloul. l.Lttrrt'rrri, :: i rr llr,. lr.l(.".









be offset  by reduced payments of  corporal-ion tax.
Thus, about half  of  the drop in  wages and proflts
will  be offset  by a reduced monet.ary flow to  trre rest,
of  t.he count.ry because of  the nat_ionat budget and
social  insurance arrangements.
Thirdly,  because the or^mership of  f inns ilexportingff
goods from regions ls  in  general fairly  widely dispersed
throughout the count.ry, quite a high proporLion of  the
fall  j.n post-tax proflts  -  probably well  over one_half
will  be offset  by a fall  in  the frow of  dividends and
undi sLribut.ed prof its  to  the rest  of  the c-ountry.
For Lhe above reasons a f.aLl of  €,10m. in  the "exportsrr of
a region will  typically  be offset  Eo the tune of,  salr
58-ftn. by lower imports of materials etc.  lnto  the
region and by lower net transfers of  tax,  social
securiLy cont,ributLons and benefits,  profits  and
dividends out of  the region.  Conversely,  rhe
purchasing power of  resident,s of  g1.,n ae.3ion will  be
reduced, typically,  by only E!-2m,  In addition  thls
drop in  purchasing por,rer will  be partly  offset,  after
some time lag,  by (a)  financial  transactions  between t,he
central  and 1oca1 governments resulting  from standing
arrangement,s  to help less prosperous  local  aut,horit,ies
to maintain a given standard of  services <lespite a fall
in  their  local  revenues; (b)  cleliberate regional policies
to help less prosperous  regions through various forms of
subsidy or  tax relief  t.o privat,e investment or  employment,,
and t.hrough public  rfinfrast,ruct,urerr investment.
rncluding these public  seccor Lransfers, the typical  offset  is
probably in  rhe region of  90 per cenr.  Given rhe highly
inLegrated national banking system, one might expect any
residual rvorsening in  thertbalance of  paymenEs?rof a region
to be fai.rly  easily  offset,  at  least, in  the strort run,  by




/in  income per ..,.......H-l
in  incorne per head'in Ihe region, relat-ive to  the nationat
average, is  likely  to be offset  to a considerable  exLent, by net
nrigration of  Labour out of  the region, given the very
consirlerable mobility  of  labour wiLhin Lhe country which 1s
several times as Ereat as that  beLwcetr countries.  In
addition,  if  labour becomesrelatively  plenciftrI  in  che
region, whereas it  is  scarce elsewhere in  the country,
firms will  have an incentive  to direct"their  investment.
to  the regions,
Even given the extremely powerful equitibrating  mechanisms described
above, a country lilce the U.K. is  just  able to  sustain a contrnon
currency without inLolerable regional disparities  in  levels of
employment, living  sr.andards and rates of  growth.  (ScoEEish and
Welsh national movemenLs  refLecE in part. dissatisfaction  with  such
disparities.  )  tn  the case of  one of  the larger  EEC counEries vis-i-vts
the rest  of  the world these equilibrating  mechanisms are aE Present
enormously smaller and, in  some casesr non-existenL.  I  would Suess
thaC Che figure of  90 per cent.  in  sub-paragraph 5 above would be more
(1)
Like 15 per cent)'(arrd under 10 per cent. vis-i-vis  the rest  of  EEC).
/In  Ehese circumstanc€s .. o. o r
( r)
The following figures (irr €m.) itlustrate  in  very broad terms whaE I
have in  mind.
Fal1 in  rrexportstt
FaIl  in frimportsrtof rnaterials,
components, etc.
Fal1 in  valrle added/wages  and prof i ts)
in  region/country
Typical region  Larger EEC
of  a country  countrY
€m.  Sm.
10  10
FalL in  tax and social  security
contribution,  pltrs increase in









Fal1 in  profits  paid outside
region/ country
policy, etc., say




t Effects of  regional
Fa11 in'rdisposable
region/ counl-ry
Allowing f.or multipl ier  ef fects,  and for  [he greater rrleal<agetr into
ttimportsrrfrom a region than from a count.ry, the figures  in  the bot.tom
row might be of  the orcler of  1k and 12. i These illustrative  orders of
magnitude admittedly overstate the relative  strength of  the equilibrating
mechanisms in'the  case of  a region compared with  that of  a larger  EEC coundry
insofar as changes in  the texporEsr of  a region are greater in  relation  to  its
fnational incomer: but the disparity  is  sti11,  I  believe,  great.
100H-1
In  these circumstances I  cannot believe that monetary union would
be sustainable.  Moreover, for  it  to be sust,ainable I  suspect the
figure would have ro be raised,  if  not all  the ltay to  9O%, at
least;,to Something very much more than 15%. I  suggest that  this
would require:-
(a)  at  least  several decades, and possibLy  a
generation or  so, of  growing economic
interdependence,  including much more geographically
diffused ownership of  European industry;
(b)  a Cornmunity budget enormously greater than is  at
present contemPlated, which would involve
taking over much of  the existing  powers of
taxation of member states and, directly  or
indirectly,  a Large measure of  control of
their  expenditures;  this  would probably
involve,  among other thingsr a conrmon uD€rD-
ployment fund.
In addition to  these devel-opmentsr'.but  39! as a suf f icienL
alternative,  it  r*ould be necessary to have a very much larger
Coriunrinity regional fund than is  at Pfesent contemplated'  Measures
to increase mobility  of  labour would a!-so hetp'
I  hope rhe Group lotrr  atscuss whether (a)  and (b)  above are
necessary conditions of monetary union.  If  they are, it  follows
(i)  that monetary union could not be achieved nearly so early  as
I
1980;  (ii)i  thir  it  would require a very. great pooling of  sover-
eignty equivalent to the creation of  a federal union'
If  iE were agreed that,  despite these considerationsr monetary
union was still  a desirable longer-term objective,  there would st'i11
be a good deal" to be said for  concentrating  on measures to  speed up
the achievement of  condition (a).  I'lost of  these measures would in  any
101
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case be desirable in  their  own right.  r  am thinking of  chings like
the progressive  removal of  invisible  barriers  to trade (u.s.  in  the
field  of public procurement) I  encouraging labour mobility;  encouraging
the mobility  of  capital,  incl-uding both direct  and portfolio  investment
across national frontiers;  There would be implications for  Conrnunity
policy  in various other fiel.ds,  e.g. policy  on industrial  mergers.
At the same time gradual progress could be attempted  towards
the achievement of  condition (b) r  e. g.  by enlarging  tl-re regional and
social funds and possibly by some move towards a cojrunon unemploympnt.
fund.  But we should not deceive ourselves that  such relatively  modest
moves would make possibLe an early achievement of monetary union.  Nor
should we go in  for  harmonisation for  its  own sake, e.g.  harmonisat,ion
of  tax rates which would reduce the power of member governments  to
manage their  economies; such national management will  continue to  be
essential unless and until  a federal union is  achieved.
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ANNEX
It  may be objected that  the above analysis is  viriat.ed  because
the Republic of  Ireland manages to maintain a fixed rate of
exchange with  the U.K.'  despite the absence of  a connnon budget.
Professor Lynchrs views on this  will  be valuablel  My provisional
reply would be as foLLows:-
(i)  Ireland has in  a sense been a ttfringefr economyt
and monetary union between the U.K. and Ireland
is  different  in  kind from a monetary union
between, sayr the U.K., France, Germany and Ita1y.
(ii)  The economic inter-dependence of  the IJ.K. and
Ireland is  very great and much greater than that
bet-ween, sayr the U.K. and most Continental
countries.
(i;..t.)  Irelandrs marginal propensity to import is  very
high, perhaps 80 per cent.,  and much higher than
that of  larger countries like  France, Germany,
Italy  or  the U.Ko
(iv)  Movements of  labour between the U.K. and Ireland have
been large (helped by a common language) and sensitive
to relative  wages and unemployment, and thus an important
equilibrating  mechanism.
(v)  Despite (ii)  -  (iv)  above, problems have arisen in
maintaining an effective  monetary union and the Irish-
pound has been effecLively  devalued against sterling
aE times by tariffs  and export. susbsidies.  It.  is
estimated that  in  1966 the effective  devaluation  was as
much as 19 per cent.
rq ltolLocuments r6dig6s par i{. ;'tAi?lG,iA}iN
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2. Concerted Action in the Economic and Monetary Union




.1..'fhe lbeaty of Rome i;  dealing rcith the politics of eocial secrrrity in on1.y
one sentence rtl the I'rame of 'the ains of the 6\ropean integration in speaking
of an 'rer.;rylerated. r:ise of the living eta.nd.ard.n.
':';re articrea Li? -  i-',2't- cf the lteaty are containing only a catalogue of
intentj,o*o for th6 qooperation of the nenber countriee in the various fie1dg
cf the sccial policy, tnrt there are no precise d.irectives for concrete action.
ihe free nobili.ty of l.abcur is only a part of the technocratical  concepti.on of
*lre 'lsionon l{arket.
ttre Europoa.n Social l\.rnd" is an important instrrrnent of the social. policyt
particularly because a conmittee of representatiws of the social partners
(traCte unions a.nd. enploSrers orga.nisations) is joined. with it.
2. Societal and social security politics have suffered. for long years a life  i-n
ttre she,atone, At the best they gOt the firnction of a nakeshift. l[re trade rurions
as the organisations  of the Largest sector of the working population  hsve to
a large extent been exolu.d,ed fron the decision*aking  proc€Es in the EC,
althougb they advooated. the E\ropean iategration fron the very begLnning'
3. IIre EldU will  fwrdanerrtalLy clrange declsion-xoaking in econmicr social a'nd.
political a,ffairs. Naitionel institutions a,nd procedures wi1l te al.tered. too.
All econonic cleclsions harn sociaL effeots. therefore it  is absolutely
necessarlr to talce into account tbe sociaL aspects while constructlng tbe EtlU.
4. It  is neceesa:ry to nake the E\ropean inetitutions more denocratic if  they
ghall get none cornpetencee especially in the social domain. But denocratigation
me€lns participation and co-deternination of all  those' who are affected by
cliecisions. Participation ca.rnnot be confined in fornaL equal.ity before tbe lawt
but it  nret leacl to naterial eErality of chances for ernrlrbo$r.
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The pninciple of subsidianity should be obsel'ved in al.l tases of
powen-delegation fnon one decision-naking level to the othen.
5. The Panis Summit of.octobuo ri72 has adopted a basic mood of the
populatibn, which is  dinected at stnonger notice of the social
'  sphene in genenal. The Eunopean statesmen obviously got the righl
penception of the immediate intenests and needs of the masses of
wonking people, who must be motivatedr'because this  is  the only
way to stinul-ate political  pressune in.favon of EMU.
The Panis declanation animated the hope, that the long-lasting
stagnation of thle social policy would be succeeded by an ena of
nefonmatony activities .
6. fn detail, the l-eadens in Panis had declared:
to use economic growth in the finst  line  fon a hanmonisation ol
.  the living  conditions;
...  to impnove the living  standancls and the quality of tife  of the:
peoples;
to invite  the social pantnens fon participation in the Eunopear
decision-making  pnocess i
- to elabonate a social program fon actions;
to give the seme weight to enengetic social measures as to the
nealisation of EMU.
Most groupg, esp,egialJ.y the tnade unions , outspokenly have .weI-
comed that decla:ration in the hope of quick activities  fol.lowing
But the activities  exhausted themselves in onatony and declanati<
as fon instance at the Copenhagne Sunrnit, wltere o't;ler. p.rolrl-eras
conpletely oppnessed.the social aspects of community politics.
7. Ttrene is niw tne .commissions prognam of action in social politics
which has been adopted in full  by the Council.,of the Labour
ministens in decenben I973. This document is  slightly  suffening
of the Bnussels penfectionism in details,  which makes disappean
the broad lines of a consistent oonceptr €rs the heads of
govennments had sketched in Pa.nis. 'I'he Cornmissions progran pointt
at the following goals:
lot,
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Full  employlnent and betten qualifi.cation  cf  tle  laboun f once;
amelionation of  conditi.ns  of  rife  and work;
mone panticipation  of  the. social  partnens in  clecision-making,.
'8'  rt  is  impontant fon the r,ronkens and their  onganisations, th;rt
'  social  pnogness finally  wirl  be bnought fonrvard at  differen.t- i.r(rv:j.
while a forced gnotvth poricy has encied r.rith gravc a.nd obvj.oris
sociaL darnages and thneats.
But thene are tvell-based doubts about the nearisation of  thcr b;:rr.,i:,c
rnentioned goals, especially  of  democnatisation  by participaLJ.r-in,
dottbts because of  the lack of  political  r.rillingness and of  thi.r
. lack of  appnooniatb institutions.
As a eone fon a futune development one could mention the Economj c
and Social Cornittee, the competences of  rvhich could and shoul-cl be ,  enlanged.
Sponadically established  cornmissions, c o::rposed at  a parity  basis,
couLrl and shou.l-d be institutionarisecl  in  d. rrior€ fonrlal way anii
given none cornpetences too.
9 '  There can be no doubt that  sociar policy  in  the dcuble sense of trGesellschaftspolitil<" air,ting at  nefonms of  the society as a r,rircl.e
and of  sociaL secunity ancl social  insunance rnust have an inclepen-
dent status anong the ot'hen fields  of  political  activities.  The
mone social  policy  is  ciranged with pnophylaxis of  social  darrrages
instead of  ex-1:ost cut'.rtive meAsurles, tlie  mone expensive ru'i11 it
becone. The seculan tnencl in  all  industrialised  societies  is  roin;,
'  towands mone individual  seeunity by colLective and solicjanistic
activities.,  Gnave sickness has become sucS a bunden for  most
families  that  only a large officia]  insunance systerr wi-th subsidies
on at  least  guanantees by public  ;noney can alleviate  that  bunden
and avoid innurnenous individual" catastnophes. Only few urealilry
people can'take care for  their: age of  netinement fnoin active  r"ron<inr
life.  Unemplollrrelt is  thr.eatning alnost eveny e:lployee in  t1c:
privdte  secton. The loss of  inconre in  the case of  unernployr;ierrt
must be conpensated by public  funds. The state or socie'ty tnus-t
pnovide netnaining faci.]ities,  transfcn mecanisms ancl otiren means




It  is  centainly night to say, that without an adequatc-wages  or
incomes policy and without'a close linking of a social security
(with its  voluminous panaf isci  and govennment subsidies ) with 'i:l'r,::
overall econornic policy at Europe.en leveL a neal El,tU cannot
iunction pnoperly. It  is  certainly true, that indepen.ien! cr,a.l,=
unions by thein autonornous activities  can distunb on even dr,.::;'l;:',.;-'
any econonric policy of governqlents. One should not neglect '[iri:
fact tlrat one of the rnost basic guidelines of unions policy;i  ;l:.::
redistnibution of income and capital fon the sake of the rvor,:i..,'r.,,.
Any atternpt to decree to the unions an incomes policy, which cor-r*
sj.sts only of a restnictive wages policy linking wage rates ;rt
the devel.oprnent of the overall productivity, inevitably must fui.L"
because it  would mean to  fneeze the incomes distnibution be't-we,:n
tire soc.ial gnoups at a given level.
The sheen weight of wages and salanies ccnpaned .rvith the national
pr.oduct and the poirer' of tnade unions in the {Q nake it  urgently
'necessany to search for a form of social oontreot rthtoh could
satisfy the interests of all  panties involved.
':
A veny inpontant pnoposal has necently been made by a gnoup of
l{onr'.regian expents unter tire Chainmanship of l.tn.Skonlancl. It  can be
sumnanised as foLlovrs :1 )
Pnecondition, is  the defense of the manket economy, against a
nigid dinigism, which would lead to sacnifices of gnowth, full-
employment, equity of incomes distnibution, peaceful industnial
nelatidns; these goals ane too important, in onden to sacnifice
them to pnice stability.
Incomes pol-icy cannot be sepanated fnom the genenal economic
t policy and thein instruments.
- ALI measunes of incomes and pnices policies must be tneated as
a vrhole; they must be flexible  enough in orden to be adjustablc
any given situation.
fncomes policy must encompass a vride range of incomes r whether
neceived as wages, pnices on in any. othen form.
!'t  cf . Morges Bank' -  Econornic ElulLetin, 197 3l3 , pp. 116-125 r esp. 11-ti
11.
tl0Although incotnes'policy rnight be based on dicisions  by the
politi.cal  eiu't-honiti.esri't thould nather be based on extensivc
coopenati.on between the authorities  and'the organisations whicit
wou1d lave 'L'o share -bhe nesponsibility  for  its  implemett'1t3'6j.r.iti"
- T,ire targets  must be :realistic;  unrealistic  tangets woul-d olr'i-Ji
se]:ve to  bn j np, iric.omes policy  into  dif f iculties  and neglec't  .
Al.though the centnal aim is  the inf luence on pni'ces, rnucit
ernphasis must be given to  incomes distnibution'
*. j.ncoines; policy  necessani.ly must be conceived as a lotrgtentn
en.te:"pni.se , especi;rIly vrith negand of  distnil:ution  effects .
-  -I'he figur,es of  o::ientation of both government ancl bargai"ning
tr,at:'Liter.S tnust be cor:rpatible; thene rnust be GonsensuS about -i:l-t':
h;i"rrnonistic i.npJ.ernentation of  the politi.cal  neasull(')s av::il'lli]":
fr):.';;r:.ji..Ffr:ren't gnouPs; at  such a basis g,uidelines can be
estab.Listte<1, whic[ then are binding aI]  groups and authori ties
concerned.
-  The panliament must pass the grridelines and can rraPY tirern;
par.[ianrentany approva] wil]  strenghthen the positiotr  of  govern-
ment. The autononous bargaining parties  nnust Sha::e responsibi-
:lity  with  the govennment in  the norninal incomes policyt  but as
a cotnpensa'tion tl'rey will  get mone influence a't the real  income's
of the emPloYees.
Instead of  pushing nesponsibility  and competence fnom one
i.nstance to the other an exchange of  influence vrould be
established between constitutional  institutions  and pressure
gnouPs
The autonomy of  tnade unions and enrployersf associations would
be nesp6cted arid also the right  of  labour clisputes, but the
guidelines would senve as a safety-vaIve'
". The nrember:s of  the onganisations involved shouLd cast thein
votes fon the. guiclelines; in  cases of  nejection the guidelines
must be renegotiated.
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!2,  The Norruegian pnol)osal was reponted in  such length rbeeause i'f
couLd become nelevant fon nilU. But thene shoulcl be no cloubt, th,"t';
the intnocluction of  srrch a plunalistic  on multilateral  nodel of
an incornes policy  at  a su-Dnanational level  must iner"itablv  :n,li,ij r-
insunnoun. table dif f iculti.es.  Thenefone should it  be tcs-l-erl lt
national  Levels
.In an intenmediate phase the EC-institutions  gradually r;ltoti.L,l .'
prepaned fon the talce-oven of  conpetences in  the fielcl  of  i:-'.",.:r;
policy.The Colrurj.ssion ancl tl're Eoono:nic and Social Comtri--[tu,:  i,
s;tart r.lith lnedium-term, econornic projecl-ions and vritli  tlir.: ilt''-',,'.,':
of convincing tlie  na'tional authonities to  'take notice  of  jts ')''':i'
-rrosdls i.n their  econoni.c decisions.
Brrt in  vrl-eu of  the .l-erck of  pol.ren of  the European authoritj.es  i, i.;,o
j.rr the year lgBo an c,then stnategy seenrs to  be nore succc.';r;j'ttf  :
The memben eor:ntries establish national  I'Councils of  i.nco;'it.:s ;tn-l
-orice polic5it'. These eouncils are setting  the national  ecottot:tic
and social  objectives anci neport tirem to  tire EC-Cornr,is:;ic'nr tvlti.i:lt
'Liren tr"ies to  coordirrate them. 'r,lh6t-he:r and ]ror.l a feed-ba.c;< !)r)orj(]r:iri
iretween national  ancl European bodies could be pnovicle:d rreco$furtir'
dis cus s.ion .
i'Jj.thout ci sol j cl bas i.i  of  rnutual trus't  airy f orn of  j ncc,r:t,-,u i'oJ .i.r'))i
necesrict:."iIy nusl: fai.1..'llhenefone tlie  creation of  an attnosl'iielt: t-ri
confidence bet,,.reen ptrbl.ic autiro:rities,  enrployens and unions is
ex"tr.enely inportant.  Institutionalised  exchan6e of  infonr;iaticlts,ill
olrinions between the groups concennecl', obligatony participatioli  of
the sodial  groups in  the pn'eparation of  the outlines. of  an ecoircrr:i
anci social  policy;  avoidance of  preferences or privileges  'Lo only
one of the partners: tiiese and othen nelateci tneasunes and at'tj'tu:c
r.;|ould be Uonne in  rnind, r^rhile preparing an incomes poli.cy.  fir;r'L
steps in  that  dinection could and should best be done in  eountn-i.es
vlhene there ate good relations  betrveen laboun and govertimen.;'.
tt ecause nothing is  more convi.ncing than ".r"Luou, 
a tvc1l.-ftti:c'L'';.ri,
e.xample .in onr3 count:ly coul.tl serve as an incentive  for  othe rs '
tlv13.
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In  addition  to  a l.Ja€les and prices  policy  neasures of -c;rpita)'
fonrnation or  profi.t-sharitrg  for  the  rv'orkens should be provided'
,J.heir effects  r^roulcl be a gradual redistribution'of  the  prociuc-tion
capital;  6dfllfl6rna.l incones froln capita1  gains;  more ittclr:i-'i"rnci'::it:c
;incl freecloin of  the'- vrorking'population'
In  orde.. to  coriie't-o a stable  social  and political  ordrji"tt;  -i-lt''
j>asis for  any .'lcsirable  cteveloi;rrent, also  in  clirr-:ctiort o-i- lrrrr'l '  '' '
,.li1I  certainly  be useful  to  s'trenghthen the  unions ri;'1r'l-:r 
"'!-r!
-L.ircir ;ruton<;::ry.  'I'ir:-s is  the  only  r,vay to  rvin thcn  'for  c:c'ot'clitt.i'''':ii
,iriril conccptecl actiorr  ancl thus to  bring  the;:r irrto  the  irosil-ion  t-r-
..r 
'd1,i:ci- 
s1.a:ri1isi.16i for-ce in  econorny and society.  Sui-rpo|tc''i l,'
t:heir  ncrnbe::,s alct by tire public  opirrion they r'ril1  be wel-l D1'':':"
peireci L() ol;ey th<: r'ul-es of  the  gatTlc als o :i-n the  dis-tribtt-tiol
s;tru;1gle '
1['ire conclucling qtrestion is:  rJhat can socia]  poli'cy,  trade  ui'il't)rr!l
l.es.p. Lire social  partners  contribute  to  a fairly  r^reIl furlc-[ii-rttittl';
}]t4l.i? The lr,cyr^ropci for  the  ansl'telf can only  be panticipatici't  ;liir'i iro-
cL:i:entnina'i:ion ol  ti're rao::icers and thein  reDresentatives  i't'otll tltr:
sh<;rp llor>l'  to  suprattational  boclies
If  the  nrain objective  .is and remains the harrnonisatiotr of  the
living  an<l vlcr.ki.irgi contlitions  throughout EC, atl.1 if  it  i.s tilite,
tl,,_=.: 1.,.,. ,.:,.1!onal atrthoriti.es  are not yet  pnepared or  t'ri"l1i-ng 
'Lc'r
make decisive  s.teps in  that  direction,  so it  is  possible-Lo  u:;c
the  flexible  tool  of  collective  agrecnents across the  boundarics
witlr  tire  support of  the  comniission ancl the  international
conf ederations  uf  unions and employers '  The multinational  co;:ipan:i'es
Irave a)-ready come into  the  role  of  uriclwifes of  multiuatiottal
social  policies. -a
If  the tracle unions willremain  exclucled from the decision-making
jnstitutionb  and, pnocesses, so inevitable  the confrontation with
ilre given soc'ial anri economj.c system v'rill  ta'bt' Also r^rill iarsL
the mist::ust against e-verythi.ng the tttechnocrats'r in  Brusscls "'ri'11
proPose ancl Practic': '
nt It t{
l.t+.
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',Concerted Action" in  the EconOmlC and MOnetary Unlon
1. In order to secure a most solld basis for  those
measures for  whlch actlve cooperatlon or at least
toleration  by the parties of  ccillecttve wage agree-
mentsisindispensabreoratleastdesirable,a
Conc'erted Action on the level of the European Communlty
will  be established.
This body should be charged by the lnstitutions  of the
community with aII  subjects having their  contrLbutl'on
to the creation of an Economic and Monetary unlon.
The concerted Action can additionally  discuss all  sub-




informat,lon, discussion and consultation. voting on
statementsofthebodywlllnottakeplace.Every
participanthastherighttoinformthepublicabout
his particular  ldeas on the actual subject'
Itshouldbetheaimtoreachaconsensusoncurrent
measures or about certain behaviour of the partlcl-
patlngorganS.sations.Butnopressureshouldbeexerted
to make compromises. I?here ciffer;lces  cannot be brldged,
these should be clearly  articulated'
3.Thereconrmendedbodywillneltherbeincompetltion
to the Economi,c and social  comnittee nor to the European




The EEc commission is  obriged to inform the concerted
Action regularly about all  actual problems which are
of importance to the creatlon and stabilization  of the
Economic and Monetary Union. The Commission will
regularry inform the concerted Action about, all  lmport-
ant steps that will  be recommended or which will  be
taken to establish the Economj-c and Monetary Union.
Partlcipants to the consultations of the Concerted
Action w111 agree and engage to keep the members and
the decision-making bodies of their, own organisarions
completely and correctly on the spot about the
Commission's proposals to the Concerted Action. They
also lnform their  organlsatlons about the proceedings
of the dlscussion in  the Concerted Action. Should a
consensus about a subject be reached by the concerted
Action, all  participants try  to have this  consensus
acccptet by their  organisations.
The Concerted Action will  as a rule once in  a quarter
be invited to conferences by the presldents of the
commlssion or by the member responsible for  economi-c
and monetary problems. One member of the Commission
will  be in  the chair at the consultat,ions. rn critlcal
situations,  special meetings are possibl-e. The
Commlsslon wl11 provide the Concerted Actj-on with a
small office.  Official  minutes will  not be kept. The
participants will  decide i-n every particular  case if
or perhaps in whlch form communiqu6s on the discussions
are to be publlshed.
6. rn order to preserve the character of the Round Table
and to emphaslze the political  character of the group




The following composition  seems optimal:
-  The trade unions of aII  member countries in  the EEC'
which are authorized to collective  wage agreernents t
are delegating their  Presidents ' 
Chairmen and General
SecretariesasfarastheyafememberboftheEuropean
Trade Union Conferation' The Secretary to the ETUC
is  member ex officio'
-  The national Employers' Associations ln  the member
countriesrwhichareauthorizedtocollectivewage
agreements, are delegating their  Presidents'
-  The President
as far  as he
of the uNrcE is
is not President
member ex officio




representation is  not possible in  order
the continuity of the discussion and to
by llttle  a cllmate of  confidence '
7. The national governments are not members of the
Concerted Action. No ob.,erver rvill  be delegated. The
national governments wiII  be informed by the Commission
over the Council of lr(inisters about the continuance
ofthediscussionintheconcertedAction.Therepresent-
ativesoftheparticipatingorganisationsr+ilIcli;their
behalf keep their  national governments informed'
Only in exceptional cases '  participants should be
accomPanied to the meetl-ngs by experts '  The experts of-
the organisations should' of coursei have enough
opportunitytopreparetogethervlithCommissiontheagenoa
anC the proceedings of the conferences '
u?J-2
8. No statutes and no formal and proceeding provisions
will  be necessary for  the Concerted Action. The
character of informal opinion-clearing will  thus be
emphasized  and the fear that it  would become a
competitor will  be taken from the organs of  the
Community.
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I'leasures to  fiqht  unemPloYment
I. since in many industrialized  countries ful1  emplovment of  the
labour fofce was attained or at least the threat of  lasting
structural  unemployment was reduced and on the other hand even
a scarcity of  (skilled)  labour: became more and more pressing,
qualification  and mobility of the workers became key words for
an active labour rnarket PolicY.
The search for easily applicable measures to promote labour
mobility led to a fuII  catalogue of activities  carried out by
labour market authorities  and by the bargaining parties '  The
general strategic  line  was prophylaxis and prevention of
unemployment at all.
An active Iabour market- or better:  employment policy must be
based on a maximum of information about volume, composition
and development of private  and public demand for  goods and
services, about development and mutual dependences of employ-
ment and education, about economic growth andabout working
hours.
In addition to  those "classical"  parameters nowadays the
humanlsation of work and the "social Indicators r4ovement" cam'e
into the debate.
All  policies  and measures which were developed in  fairly
,,normal" times to mobilise the available labour potential of
course can be implemented also in  times when fuII  employment
is  no longer an automatic result  of economic expansion.
The concept of  an A.L.I'l.P. should comprise
labour exchange
-  labour and Professional  ad'vice






promotion of starting  a career
aid for  the handlcapped
creation and securing of working places
all  unemployed persons.
5. subsidies can be given to both empr.oyees and emproyers for  the
amerioration of vocational education, training  and retraining,
for more geographical mobility  in  searching and finding a job,
for  continuation of construction work during the bad season,
for the sociar and vocational rehabirit.ation of  the handicapped.
6.  Employers could be offered
of  addit,ional  employees in
special  incentives  for  the hirincr
the form of
-  subsidies for  the additional costs of training
subsidies for  the establj-shment, running and enlargemenr
of training  facilities
-  subsidies or roans for  the vocationar integration of
unemployed persons who cannot be brought into work under
normal conditions (6o g of the normat wage)
-  subventions for  the construction of boarding-houses
for  apprentices and retrainees (up to 5o g of the totar
costs )
-  subsidies for  the hiring  and providing of work for
unemproyed persons; projekts must be undertaken in  the public interest.  (6o -  L2o g of the wages)
-  subventlons to the 1abour costs for older employees
to protect especiarry that probrem group who is  often
most severely hit  by economj-c difficulties.
7. Active Labour Market policy is  an integrar part of  sectoriar
and regionar structurar policies.  Therefore, the funds of
the respective agencies or authorities  shourd be combined
in order to attain  optimar success in  fighting  unemployment
by measures of structural  poricies.  There are encouraging
examples in  Scandinavia and Germany.
1208.
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If  j.n the long run the absorption capacity of the labour
market wourd decrease the periods of edqqation and traininr-'
shouldbeprolongedrthusdlminishingthedemandfor;oi";'
At the same time such a policy would help to meet the {Jir-'ri^'
demand for  higher professional qualification  and better  kn'.''/
how -  even as an "export commodity" '
rnvestment in  human capital  is  necessary and profitabre  not
onlyunderhumanitarianandsocialpolicyaspectsbutalsol-|l
economic terms of rentabirity  and productlvity.  The Program





Io.  A highlY effect'ive advisorY
available for  everYbodv' It
throughout his working Iife  '
II.  Such a comprehensive employment policy
value for  t'he economy and societ'y as a
should be financed by a general labour
a special tax levied on every citizen'
and counseling service should be
should accompany a vrorking person
system is  of high
who1e. It,  therefore,
market contribution or
of  an A.E.P. should be as
to enable the system to react
event at the labour marleets '
12. Legislation and adminlstration
flexible  as Possible in  order
immediately and quicklY to  any
I3.SinceIg6gtheGermanLabourPromotionAct(''Arbeitsforde-
rungsgeseEz,,)iscoveringmanyoftheactivitiesmentionedabove.
It  should be noted that  self-government  bodies at  federal'  state
and municipar revers are formurating,  imprementing and controllinq
theemploymentpolicy.Theyarecomposedby]I/3TradeUnionists,
L/3 Employers and L/3 Labour Administrators '
L2l-J-3
l4'  A well equipped l,abour Market Research rnstitute  is  provlding
the Labour Administration  and the publiq. with all  data and
methods necessary for  a rational  preventive employment poricy.
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I.  EMU ancl fuploynent, Price and Income policies
2  .  The Link between rnternal Monetary poricies and. a cred.ible
fntra-Errropean Exchange Rate Systen
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EMU and employment, priee and income policies
7, rn a oost-benefit. arrarysis of EIVIU regaining control at the
EuroDeoo level of management.of monetarv affairs.  internal  as
well as external, would certainly r?nl< on top of the list  on
greater i-mbalances in regionarl (intra-Community) growth and un-
employmenb patterns.
Although otirer costs and benefits may not be unimportant, the
deoate ls  neverthelr;ss dominated by these two issues.  Any
scheme of Et{U which cannot deal sati.qf:-ctory with both issues,
not only in economic but also in  soeial and political  terms,
has probably no chance of being accepted a.nrl even less of
being implemented, The benefit side which runs in monetary
terms, is  more or less crear and in  any case is  outside flre
seope of this  note.  Things are more eonfused on the cost ,side
althoygh the problems involved there are more imoortant.  rn-
deed, imbalances in regional growth and ernployment patterns have
direct relevance for the social objectives and thc kind of so-
ciety' one is  aiming at.  The monetary aspects cf  EMU are onry
instrumental. in the sense that vrhat is  at stake here is  not an
objective.in itself  but an instrument of stabilisation  policy
together with a stable institutional  monetary framework to  sup-
port ihe attainment of real economie and socials goals.
It  is thc purpose of the following pages to conment briefly  on
(i)  the reiation  between monetary unification  and regional grovrtl:
and erhployment imbailances, (ii)  the possibilities  of a European
employment policy as a countervailing action, and (iii)  ttre
desirability  of European price and income policres.
the benefitside he cos
125K-1
2, The confl ict  betvrecn monetary unification  and balanced re-
gional grolvbh and emirlclymcnt is  t,raditionally  presented in
terms of the loss of the exchange-ratc instrument as a weapon
for  fighting  balance of' payments difficulti-es.  With demand ma-
nagerncnt policies  cljre'cbed tovrarcls internal  balance, external
equilibrium rirs for"ce.rl to rely  on market forces able to  ohviate
balance of  pa:rmcnts ,l.lfficulties  automatical).y and withouu tlie
aid o1' rlcl-iberate ccr-,nomic policy.  It  is  rather paradoxical
to  suggesb automatic cqrril.ibrating forces to maintain balance
of payments cquilibrilrm.
rrOne v.'onld hardly suspc.ct the existenec of  sueh forces from
the history  of  intcrnatj-onal economic relations  And yet t
within  timits  ard undcr favourable conditions, balance of
payments equiliSpaLing forces' do exist.  This is  attested
by the fact  that  iralance of payments difficulties  never or
hardly e\rer arise  among regions of the same country, although
no conscions poJ-icy j.s aimed at maintaining in  equilibrium
the balance of interrcgional  payment s  (.1 ) o .
The equilibrabing mechanism in  interregional  relations  relies
mainl:r on the mobi.lity of people and cap:-tal.  Unfortunately
the factor mobility  trhich maintains payments equilibrJ-um among
the regions of a currency unj-on is  of a socially  destabilising
charaeter.
(i)  Income differenccs  attract  immigrants from low income (Iow
produetivi-ty) to high income (fri-gfr productivity)  regions,
thceby  furbher rcducing income and expenditure in  the low
income-deficit region and increasing it  in  the high income-
surplus region.  Through migration of people regional dis-
parities  ln  inc.orne exert an equilibrating  influence on the
balance of  inbe::regional payments. If  labor mobility  is
1ow fhe albernative adjustment mechanism is  higher unenploy-
ment as a resulb of  lower activity  1evels.  In both cases
paymeirts eqrriljh;r'irrm will  be furthered whereas the income
dispariLies rcmain.
(1) T. scrrovsKY, Iiconomic Theory and Western Eurorrean Iniegra-
1962, p.ffi tion,  LonCen,
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(ii)With  capital  lnovements things are even wors.e. Profit  indu-
ced eapital  movements will  constantly allocate  savings in
favour of the higher growth/lower rislt  regious.  This will
create cumulative i.nterregional diseguilibria.
It -appears that  in  a currency union payments equilibrium throrrgh
factor  mobil.ity is  bought at the expensive of  (cumulative)'in-
come and ernployment desequilibria.  Unless eompensating mecha-
nisms and policies  ean be designed, currency unification  coupled
with iree  factor  nobility  is  not a very attracl;ive  device.  It
will  enhance continuous shifts  of  labour and capital. from low
productivity  to high produetivity  regions.  It  is  *-ot neccssary
to dr,reIl much further  on trying  to  clarify  t,he fundamental pro-
blem ancl the underlying mcchanisms of  causation.  It  is  suffi-
ciently  spelled out in  the literature  (1),  and the examples of
Northern Irelanci, West-Virginia and Southern Italy  are regular-
Iy  'lrought up in  the diseussion.  They suffice  to  illustrate
what one is  tall'.ing about
The ot jective  of  pursui.ng growth pol.icies not at the expellse
of but to promote a more equitable distribution  of  income and
t{ealth militates  in  favour of  a Community regional and social
policy  aS an integral  part  of a seheme for  European monetary
unification,  particularly  at  a moment when quality  of  life
concepts compete successfully for  government attention  with
the quantity of material trelfare ereated.  EI{U as a policy  pro-
blem becomes a question of  hovr to reconeile monetary unifica-
tion  witn regionally  balanced growth or put in  other ierms :
is  it  possible.to avoid solving the intra-union  payments des-
equilibria  withorrt doing it  at  the expense of  cumulative incom_o
and employment dcsequilibria
The anstvcr to  this  question offered at thc Community level  is
the Same as the one one gets ai  the national  level.  It  stres-
ses {-.he necd for  assistenee provided by the central rcgious to
I-iJ  See p.e.  1.1.t4. CORDEI'J, Monetary Integration,  Essavs in  inter-
national Financc, hr.  93, Princeton University,  April  !972, re4\.
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the periphery.  Whether the policies  invoived are succesgf\rl
in dealing rvith bhe' problcms may be questioned if  one remcm-
bers the persi.sti.ng difficr-rlties  of the  examples of  depressed
areas menbionned above. It  is  not our intention  to pursue the
pi:oblem of thc efficie:tcy  of the policies  involvod.  It  wj-11
be asiumeci that well  designeC assistance pol.icies can alleviate
the difiiculties
).  Possible assisbancc clevicq:s include in  the first  place long-
term sbructural 1lo1j.r:j.r:s intcnciecl to  of fset' the competitive dis-
arJvantages of tire lovr.prodrrctivity  per:ipheral regions.  This
can be rlone through {"gronal1y clifferentiate.l  taxes and subsi-
dies on bire use of  factors of production anci by irvestmcn'i.; in
public utilibies,  transpcrtation nnd other basic facilibies
and social overheads to  erlsure that private  profitabil.ity  coin-
cides with sociai- uLil.ity  so as to  cause factors movements in
soci.ally desirable directions.  One might add government ini-
tiated  and state owned enterprises, but that  is  another story.
As far  as tlre transibicnal  cost" ,il  terms of  unemployment are
ccncerned, the original
Cornrnorr Market approach envisaged in  the Treaty of  Rome included
already the ereatiorr of  a Social Funcl t,o deal with the social
(anct ecr:nomi.c) costs of  incrc.ased .unemployrnent  resulting  from
increased competition and from the expccted need for'the  reallo-
ca.tion of  facbors of production due to trade liberalisation.
The prrblem vras conccived as a minor one.  ft  turned out to  be
that way.  Economic growth during the sixties  was lafgely  suf-
ficienb  in  itself  to  absorb whatever redundancy j.n labour force
clid devt lop as a'result  of  t,he process of  adaptation to  the
cl'eAtion of thc Ccmrncn lvlarket.  Consequently, the size and the
scope of the Sccial FunC iras been rather  smalI
Witir thc advent of llllU thc situati  n is  different.  The need
for  a streirgbhe rrcd Community sclidarity  has to be advocated if
the danger of significant  unemployrnent in  the vreaker countries
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of the Community should materialize as monetary unification
progresses.
An enlarged system of Communit,V financing of employment f'oli-
cies not baseci on the principlf  of  rjustc retourr can contri-
bute to a soeiaLly better bala+ced distribution of the adjust-
nrent burden which aceompanieslprogress towards EMU' Two par-
ticular  fielris for aetion'at the Community level might be sor-
ted out :  (i)  Community assistance for retraining purposes of
r,rorkers hib by strttctrrral readaptation  needs-, a.nd (ii)  an em-
bryon of a Community unemployment bencfit'scheme. Thc finan-
cial  transfers vrhich this kind of policies troul.d introducc, are
;bt  the same tirnc a stcp in the direction of a European w'ide
/'automatic adjustment mechanism compar.able to the mechanism whiclr
does smooth out inberregional imbalances at the national leve1
and which does make the nation:state a ft'asible currency area.
As a start such policies neerl not be inconsj.stent vrith nat.ional-
lIs.  In a realis'uic sche- Iy differentiated absolute benefit leveI";.  In a rea
me Community policics vroul<i only guarantee European minimum
benefits to be supplementcd by discretionary national eifolts.
Quite apart from their  i.mportance for EMU these pol-icies would
also improve the social image of,the Community as distinct  from
its  predominant concern with economic interests.
4. Divergent price, costs and productivity trends among the
member countries are generally considered to be the major ob-
stacle monetary unification has to. overcome. To offset these
divergent movements which wilI  affect the competitive position
of the countries involved it  is  argued
ttthat i.f countri.es do not permit themselves appropriate
exchange rate acljustmcnts, they impose on themselves losses
essentially resulbing from enforced departure from intcrnal
balance  Assume that (in a complete exchange rate union)
France and Germany are in internal and external balance,
with the appropriate exchange rate relationships.  Then monel;
wages increase more rapidly in France, productivity uses morc
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slowly, or both conditions arise ; relative costs get out
of Iine.  Thc maintcnance of internal and external balance
requires France to devalue l;he franc relative to Germanyts
mark. If  this is not permi-ttcd either France must deflate
or Germany must inflerte : one or both must depart from
inte."na1 bal-ance ( 1) " .
ExChange rate flexibility,  according to this - particularly
British -  look at EMU, is necessary to.conpensate for nominal
wage rate rigidity  if  fuIl  employment' ab stabLe prices is  to be  :
maintained. The f inal  stap5e of EMU is  then impossfbl.e as long
as labor costs pcr unit of output - the ratio  of productivity
increases to increascs in money-wage rate'.s  rise at different
rates.  To keep moncy wage increase in tine with the rates of
productivity increase Community-r'ride, i.e.  to .maintain the
same rate of increase of labor cqsts per unit of output, will
ultlmately decide orr the feasability of EMU
Prospects in this respcct, however, are not very Qright.  If
as a result of integration in general and'monetary unif,ieation
in particular, trade unions arc becoming more inbernational
in their outlook leadin6 cventually to some significant formal
trade union integration, it  is  likely  lhlt  intra-European nomi-
na1 wage rate unification will  be stimulated. If  productivity
differences, howevcr, rcmaj-n', fixed exchange rates re.lation- . .
ships will  have to give w€rVr un1ess financial transfers beyond
what is rea.listically envisigable are taken into account.
Even if  one dccs not fully  subscribe'to Cordori" exireme ver-
sion of a wage standard theory, his analysis shoulci remind us
of the v1tal role thc social partners have. to play j.n any suc-
eeesftrl approach tcnvarcls EMU. An increased ciegree of participatior,
of the social partners in the decision-making process Europe-
wide is needed if  wage and price claims consistent witfr produc-
tivity  gains have to be brougtrt about. Scepticisr,r with regard
to a Community rvide price anci incomes policy militates in favdrr
(1)  r^t.l'1. coRDEN, ?he Adjustrnent Problem, in  L.B. KRALiSE ancl
W.S.SALANT,  European Monetary Urrification  ancl its  Mcanin t^J.J.5/\LAN'r', lgfopean 'tlonef ary Unl1'1ffi  ancl ].ts Mcaning
for  the Unj.bcd Stat
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of t;he maintenance of'some form of rimited exchange iate
fi  xibility  unbil1 productivity unification r,ri11 catch up
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closer exchanele rate cooperation with, enlarged mutual financial
support in the form of the proposed comrnunity Exchange stabili-
-sation Fund and the introduction of an authorized European unit
of account, still  falls  short of a. ninj'mal comprehensive program
for succesful Europea! monetary cooperation. common action in
the field of external monetary policy imposee constraints on the
use of internal monet.ary policies at the national level as well'
In a franework of generalised floatine the objective is to orPa''
nize a European monetary zone characterized by intra-E'C' exChange
rate relationsl:ius tti-ffcrentiated from those with the rest of the
world, tnough stil1  for away from a full  monetary union and abeo-
rute exchange rate rigidity.  The acceptance of Lirnitations and
binding commitments far the conduet of external monetary policy,
exchange rates in particular, remains a virtually  impossible ob-
jective if  it  is not supplemented by eertain pre-agreed limita-
tions in internal monetary matters. Theoretical  and enpirical
evidence is accumulating that even a floating exchange nate does
not liberate a country from extenral constraints on domestic eco-
nomic and in particular nonetary policies '
The essence of the argument ca.n be summarized as followg '
In a fixed exchan$e rate'system a change in monetary policy in
one country will  effect the money narkets of all  the othen cotrn-
tries in the system through reserve flows.  Countries seeking to'
set low interest rates a.nd easy monetary conditions wiLl be decei-
ved in their gbj.e.etives tfirough capital outflows to countries with
higher interest rates and restrictj.ve monetary policies '  The
nonetary base wilL contract in the country looking fon an expan-
sion whereas the moneta-ry base will  expand in the country tryinB
io achj.eve the opoosite nanely a contraction' Reserve flowS un-
der Lhese circumstances  do operate in a destabilisin8 nanner.
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rndependently set intcrst rates as an indicator of the desired
monetary conditions for internal balance will  easily turn into
a self-defeatin6l oligopolistic struggle. The conclusion readily follows : if  monetary independence ig to be achieved for sake of -domestic economie'objectives, it  is necessary to ret exehange
rates vary
rn a fuIly flexible rate system reserve flows are absent. rn or.
der to keep reserve movements equal to  ze?o, the exchange rate will  react to divergent nonetary policies of the different coun- tries.  rn an interdepenoent rvorld exchang;e ra-tes become a func_ tion of noneterry policy,actions of all  the eountries in the sys- tem. An expansionary (contractionary) monetary policy will  re- su1t, ceteris paribus, in a depreciation (nppreciation) of the countryrs cxchange rate.  A depreciation (appreciation) of cur_
rency i  is equivalent to an appreciation (depreeiation) of cur_ rencv i.  Thc pursuir of indepen.,:nr monerary ,";;;;;  rnay be inc patible with stability  in exchange rates
rn both the erse of fixerl r.nr'flexitle  exchan,oc rates, the ini-oe- pcn.lent settino of terrrets for thc monete_,y base bV np.tional
authcnities nray Iea'r to instability  in the system. i.e.  insta.bir,i-. ty in reserve flows unaer fixeC. exchr.nne rates and instability
of exehanqe rates un,Ler flexible exchanc,e rates.
An important policy conclusion readily fo110ws : if  either kind ol instabilitli  is to be avoided, national monetary authorities shoult no lon6rerr set independent targets for their monetary base but
aceept rules of behavicur r,rhich d.o guarantee ilrat each country
allows external forces to influence its  national monetary base, lnconsistc'it te-rgeL;; anci. thus instability  of the system will  here-
bil be avoicied
The speeific meanj_ng of settinq an independent target for  the
natio:re.I monctary base may neecl fu:,ther clarifieation.
The rnoneta-ry be.se (B) of Ln economy (r'monev issued by the govern-
ne't  sector')  :-s equar to the sum of intcrnationar reserve ho}-
l-irnqs (n = Lhe i'o*cig"n ccnironent cf  the mcneti!"y tase) and of
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credit to the domestie banking system of the monetary authori-  , ,i
ties  (D 3 the domestic com ronent of the monetary base) '
Ttre following concepts and assur,ptions are used 1.
a. The monetany authorities of a country have full  control over  .
the dcrneStic component of'the monetary base. That le,  by 
'-
appropriate discount r.!te policiesr reserve requirements or open  '
market operations they ea.n determine any desired level for the
donesticcomponentofB.Therefor€,Dbecomesanappropriate
monetary polieY variable.
b. Llnder a fixed exch,:.ngu- rate system the monetary authoritiee of
.  a country hcrve no direct centrol over the total  monetary bage
(fOr.eign + dontestic corqpcnent).  The re3'son is that ln an open
ec6nolny wj.bh fixed excSangc rates any monetary policy action
teads to a partia"lly or whol1:r offsettiFg. movement in the foreign 
:
compcnent of the base, cet. Par  ,  u
C. In a multicountry gontext, the baLance of payments (= the chan'
in the fyci.gn conponent of the monetary base) ef country i  le
the outeome of 'monetary policy actions of all  countries of the
8$6ter,. As a result tire r,-cnetary base of country i  is  affected
by the nonetary pclicics cf atl  eountries, exeept if  country i
succesfull-y stenilizes changeg in R, the foreign component, throug
oppbsite changes in D, ihe dcmestic compenent'
d. In a ful1y flexilrlc  rate world the balanee of paynents of a Oou 
I
try  is always ?,ero. }Ir:,tJeverr the exchange rate reactg to none- 
:
: tarV pc,licies of the different  countries '
Symbol.icallythiseanbcillustratedS'9fcllovls.
i
By definitic'n B, i  Ri * Di
ast .: dRi + dDi
only the iniernal compon6nt.D of the-total ba'se is under the con-
t1o1 cf the naticnal monctai'y arithorities '  If  a counttry sets lt-
self a target for nineter3y conditj.ons in the econory, say Bot and, ft,{
i-.ilT.  DE GRAUWE, Monetary Interdependence in Europe under Fixed
.  and Frexible 
' Exctrrng"" nniJ tl -Ciqeil.i't *"r  bconorni-** Nr ' 
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the mcnetary luthcritles could assune a given value for movementg
in lnternaticnal reservesrssv Ro, it  wcuLd suffice to eet i  target
of the domestic component, Do, Eo as to achieve
Bo :  Ro.+ Do
But in a multicountry worl_d
the stock of international
of monetary 'policy actions
Thus R, = Rr(Drr Dr,.., t
w.ith fixed exchan.ge ratee changea ln
reserves of countny i  are the outcone




where bV 6gi > 0  if  i  * j,
J
i  = 112e...ell
nnd<0  if  i=  j
The feedback of ehangcs in D in the d,omestic cconomy as well ag
in the fest of vrorld h.ave to be taken into account. A fixed tar-
g€t for B, such that dBi - 0, implies that dD, = dRi.
Unden a fixert exchanBe rete system sterilisation  techniques are
thus necessary to a.chievc a given target for the national monete-
ny base. Tht'se sterilisation  techniques, which have been wldely
used in surp]trs and defiei r' ccuntries, irn^ly that external money
creation (contnaction)'through a balance of payrnents surplus (de-
ficit)wi11becompensatec1throughinterna1noneJrcontraction
(expansir-rn) so as to naintain the donestic target for the total
base Bo.  Changing the target for tire dornestic eonponent of..the
base th'rough cpen rnr.rket operations, diseount_policies  and none-
tary financin6 of the government deficit  may induce furthen ressr-
;ve.flows through the impact cf dD. on dR., thereby again deceiving
the target at the national level
More important stilt,  independentry set targets fon B at the na-
tional I'eveL in the different eountries of the system oan easili
beeone self-defeating if  eaeh countny tries  tc sterlll.zes congi!-
tently the external monetar.v irirpulses and the independeltly set
targets 'fon B are net 'ccnsiitent.  The result is  a destablllzatl,on
of the whole systern 
\.,
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A widely accepted vie',^r is that a eountry rtrhich Lets its  exchange
rate freel-y fluctua.te can isolate its  mcnetary bape from outside
nonetary disturbanees. This vierv is  generally baserl on the &8-
sumption'that a country r.rith a freeLy fluctuating exchange rate
has no need for,  and therefore does not hold, internationaL re-
serves, puttinf dR = 0 by rlefinition.  The monetary base is  then
equal to domestic credj-t extended by the monetary authonities to
the domesti.e econorly.
It  can be argiiccl hcwever, that if  the assumption of ze?o holdings
of international reserlTes is rlropped, the monetary base of a coun-
try'is  affected by fluetuations in the exchange rate.
It  can be expecterl that in r- countrlr with a fluctuat;ing exchange
rate the monetl"ry ruthorj ties will  continue to hcld a stcck of
international- rqserves, bc it  fcr pure precautiona'ry  motives '
llowever, dven if  this  wcre not Lhe caseo it  ern be argued (e'g'
as FlcKinncn has rllrne t ) thir.t pri-vete demand for international  ne-
serves .(foreicn exchangc) vrill  be higher under.flexible than under
fixed exbhanSe rates.  The reason is that t:nder flexible exchange
rates ihe private seetoi'. cspL'cia}Iy commereial banks, wiLl have
a higher need for transaction and precautionary  ba'lances in fo-
reign exchlngc.
If  internatic,nal rcservrrls are he1d. try the privr"te banking sectort
the definition of the rncnetary base hcs to be modified' In that
cage the base nhieh tlre private banking sectcr can use to expand
clomestic credit consists not only of currency and reserves held
at.the central bank but rl-sc of its  (net) forei6gr exehange hol-
dings. In other worCs |hc eommercial banking sector has the
choice of buildin.q up its  ff$riafty position either by obtaining
clomestic central b0nk liquidity  or foreiEn liquidity.
'.R.  McI{TNNON, Private and Official Internati.nna-l l4oneY : The
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Exchani'e rate chan:'es ncvr directly a.ffect t,he monetnr3r base ct a
eountry, in the forn of catrj.ta1 .qains cr lcsses fcr the hoL,jers
cf foreinn exchange (i.e.  monetary authoritiu.s and/or eonrmercial
banks). A deprecinticn (appreciation) of the currency leads to
n capitel r'ain (loss) for the net hoI,lers cf fcreign exchanpe.
{his will  increrse (decre^.se) the monetary base cf the deprecla-
tinrl ( a.ppreciat j.nr') country
rt  frllc;ws from" the preceding ariument that a monetary pcricy
aetion in one countr"y r^rill affeet the monetary bases of al.l the
ccuntries of the system thrr..uih exchanrc. rate changes. rn addi-
ticn it  has been shovrn that if  there is nct a ninimum of coordina-
tion of dcmcstic r.nrnctlrl, nclicics a rreneralized flexible exchange
rate system i,n liurope will  bu. unstable
Accop6inn to the preceeding analysis rreater stability  of, intna-
Buropean exchen."e rr.tcs as cr-rnpared tc the situation vis-a-vis the
rest of worlrl, criticrlly  ciupcn,is .n eommonl.y agreed 1initations
on national monetary inrlcpcnclencl,. A nn.tural starting point in
the direction of cr:nplementary sunportin.l internal monetary pollcy
neasures fcr a differentiatcd Eurrpean mcnetary zone is to be lin-
ked up with the sterilisa.tion techniques used to ofsett the inpact
of reserve movements .n the monetary base. A flexible discount
rate mechanism coul-cl bc us,:cl for this pur?ose :.increasing discount
ra.tes in Ceficit countries end lcr.rering thern at the same time in
surfrlus eountries, n,:,t neutralisec cf course through open nnr'liet
eperations ey cther discroti.cnar../ mcnetary actions. Starting -from : pericdically revis"::-l set of mgnetany ta-niets fon each country
of the Ccmmunity, 3 c,1rl;. rf  ccncJubt on clomestic sterilisation po-
licies wcul,l autamp.tic:r11y c;cljust these tarflets upwards or down-
wards by tx1.y partia11"1r sterilisinq  interventions in the exchange
The monetrirtl authorj.ties have the option to ttsterilizert  this
capital pain (cr lcss) rn their  cfficial  reserves.  Howeven,
ihere are many examples nf monetary authorities using the pro-
eeec.ls of the capi.tal go.in from a rleoreciaticn to finance govern-
ment budget operati,rns





It  is  not the purnose of thi-s  note  tc  suggest a fulry  cperatio-
naL scheme, but it  is  clear thet the technical and practical
difficulties  to implement, the in  itself  rather simple basic idea
should not be unrlercstimatej. Yet the fact  cannot be overlocked
that national moneta"ry n-utii-,nities harre cften fc,llcwecl rlisere-
tionary rnonetary policics  inimical both to extcrnal e.djustment
and trt dc,mestie m()neta.ry !ttabilit;r.
Two principlcs  for  gui'iing policy r.ction seem to bc of na.rticular
importance.
(a) OffieiaL interventirn  in  the foreign excha.nge market should
have a'quantitativcly  significant  irnpaet cn each national mone-
tary base, in Darticular if  it  is  the lurpose of these inter-
ventions to achicvr: a Conmen Eurcpean exchange rate pattern.
In addition a synmL'trical  behavi.-.r betwecn surplus and defi-
cit  countries in  the F,.C. is  rcquirert.  Onl_y in this  way can
the rnonet,l.ry base of the uninn as a wholc be stabilised.  pre-
sent institutional  arranp'ements in the snalce €.g. ane far  from
guaranteeinS' this  symmetry.
(b) rn supncrt :f  a s;ymmctrical exchange rate policy,  a manket-
oriented discount nnechanisrn has a slronr eomnarative advantane
over onen-market operations an.i over otber 'rrore 4iscretionarv
instruments of domestie roneta"nv nolicv.  ACequete rules of
behavior on. national :liseount rnechanisms  ean be helfrful in
elininatinf  nuch n'rirn,rc:nt conflict  between the need for inter-
n:rtional rrljrrstment nn the one iran.1 g.n.] .ionnestie nonetanv
stability  on the other '"
t.  For more i.etails  scc ii.I.  I'{eKI}{NON, On Securing a Common Mone-
dc1 Lavoro Quarterly
)ru.ntt  Da'l i-rr  in  Frrr.nrr,r  ---.nrn..  j.:-ZiOnllg v  --L J  i  vf  r\r'ry  rrl  J.ur,_,_,u,  ,-.:11u-
R, 'rri  or.r  irl^ na 1r  I O7 7 L  L)  t  J.
t9 ltlaDocurnents r6ctiges par A' SHOIIIFIH'D
Docr:rnents written by A' SHOIIFIELD
L A E\uopean Connunity Ba1a^nce-of-Palrnents tr\rnd'
2. fnc Alns of thc Comr:nity in thc 19?Ors




lhe Comuniiy faces a ner.I siiuaiion in the nanagement of its
baJ-ance of payrnents. D.ring the first  decade and a hal-f of
its  existence the co:inercial relations between the neinber
countries were eased. by the assurance that thel' would.
collectively be in balance-of-paynents surplusr on cu:=ent
accorxrt, with the rest of the world.. There vras therefore
a high probability that each ind.ividual  member country' so
Long as ii  nanaged. its  econony rvith reasonabLe  pnrclence  and
d.id. not have to cope with special stnrctural problensr would
have a  gcod  chance of earning a surplus on its  colonercjdl
transactions outside the Comrunity. This roade i"b easier to
take sone of the risks attendant on the removal of trade
ba:riers and financial controls required. first  for the creation
of ihe custons union and then for the initiaL  steps towards
an economic union.
The ner.r situation of collective balance-of-palalents deficit
on curf,rent aount will  almost inevitably produce a different
raood. anong the merber governrnents.  .The nood. is  1ike1y to be
averse to the add.i'i;iona1  risk-iakjag attendant on the renoval of
still  raore barriers to the movenent of goods and noney across
tl:e national frontiers of the Con:rrnity. the key problen therefore
is hor.r to reduce tire risks of big d.eficits in the ovcrall
balance-of-oayroents of ne;aber couniries duling the period. ahead'.
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fl:e proposal io nobilize the collective cleciiir.rorihiness  of
ihe ni:re raenber states for the borror,ring of large aror:nis
of iunds, boih from the iiiCole Sast o:-1 procucers d.irectly
and fron inte:medi.aries handling ihe oil  producerst  surillus
in the Ertocunency marlcet, is  d.esigned to neet this end..
It  is worth obse:rring that the reason why this natter has
a new u:rgency in the nid-1lJOs is that the considerable d.is-
parities between the econornic perfo:nanqes  of menber countries,
in i;erns of productivity and control of d.oroestic demand, show
up nuch nore sharply in a period. when there is a strong bias
toward.s a balance-of-payrnents d.eficit than in a perJ.od in which
the bias is in the other d.irection. the d.ifference between
on the one hand Ge:many and Ho11and., with their expectati.on
of staying in the black on current bal-ance-of-papoents account
and. on the other hand., Sritain and" ftaly  which look atread to
an exfended.  period. of being deeply in the red is very rna.rked.
ind.eed.. The outlook for the weak balance-of-payments,  cor:ntries
is that their bomowilg capacity wilL be prog-ressively eroded..
tr\:lctions a.:rd. conoosition
The 3a1a^nce-of-Paynenis  Fu.nd. (al^r) wil-l be a collective agency
of the central banks of the nine couatries. since its  f\rnction
is io drar'r in fi.:nd.s fron ouisice the cornnr:nity, for red.istribution
within, ihe paid.-rp subscription by the sharehold.ers should be
ninircal; i'i; aighi be lirited,  on the Ii:res of ihe  World Ba"nk gpfd.
subscription, to 2 d/o of the capital. It  would. be paid. in dollars





ins'r,nments, and that after the first  phase ii  rvil1 engage
bY; furthgr .borrotvinqs'
actively in refinancing thesel fi-?ir?t t-iltt:nitlilces is it
to be envisaged. that paynents will  have to be made to cred'itors
outside the co-rnrounity, so that the central banksr gua,rantee
would. be activaied'?
two different tytrles of case nay be consid'ered' An oi1
producerwhohasinvested.inthe.Frrrrd'cashesinhisone-year
bond at roatr:rity and withdraws the noney in ord'er to spend'
it,  sayl in the }lid'dle East.  The second case is th'at of a
financial inte::ned-ial6rr say an American bank' wirich takes
its  rooney out, again at naturity, in order to rei:rvest it'
say in the United States. It  is to be assumed' that in the
fo:mer case -  the use of the money to purchase capital assets
in a non-\'Iestezn country - it  will  eventarallY return to
the western financial system, in the fo:rn of a d'eposit of
sorae kind with a barrk or finance house' Fne matter is
sinplified. because, as is knor'nn, the few countries r'ilribh
together orin the actual and' prospective oi1 surpluses have
confined their financial- operations to soree J0-5ointeznaiional  barrlcs'
lhe probability is therefore, at arry rate for the imrnsdislsfy
foreseeable f\rture ,  thai liquid. i\:nds r'rj.thdrar"n for the purposes
of sone capital trartsacbn elselrhere vril-I' aflev a not 'rery
longd.elayrtu:::i'tupa6ainrnthecircuitofiheJ0o:sob:gbeC-:s'
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lhe problen thexefore revolves round. the second. case -
a vrithdrar,ral fron the Conmunity banking'systen to another
part of the international financial circuit.  We assr:ne
for the present that the bankine consortir:m with the support
of central banks operatqs a perfect recycling mechanisn
within the Conurlnity banking system, which ensures that no
single bank is enba:erassecl in the concluct of its tnrslness
by sudd.en withdrawaLs of  oil producerst  surplus firnds
and their.transfer to another bank in the consortiun.  ,
tr\rrbher, it  is assr:med. that there are no tt1eaka6esr fr.om
the Connr:nity consortiun of barrks to borrowers outside
the conuunity systen - orr at arry rate, that such transfers
take place onJ.y with the speci.f5.c pemission of the central
banlcs. In principle therefore all capita-l srrms d.er5.ving
fron that part of the oiI surplus which finds its way
back into the Conrnr:nlty banking systen is avaiLable for
investnent in the 3PF.
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i'ihat is plainly reqr:-ired. is  soroe kind. of reciprocal cred'it
arranEenent  betveen the E\.rropean central barrks operating the
3PF and ihe US Fed.eral Reserrre Systen (and' one or tuo other
banking centres'like the Japanese) to sraooth out the effects
of sudden transfers of f\rnd.s. For this purrpose the existing
ilternational swap cre&it system neecls to be velSr considerably
enlarged..
If  at the same tfuoe there were an established narket for
the financial instnuents  issuecl by the 3HF'operating anong the US
big banks, there is no reason why a rtleakagert  caused' by the
transfer of oil  plodueelsr deposits fron Etrope to the Ilnited
States should. cause the central bankst guarantee to be brought
into uge. It  nigtrt have to be, of'courger if  for exa.nple IIS bank
liquidity  was r:nder pressure ald fr:nds were withdrav'n acloss
the Atlantic.  3ut this is  onJ.y to say that the E\:ropean
central banks will  have to manage their noneta.ry policy with
an eye on the conpetition of the United. States for international
fund.s. It  is obvious that if  European interest rates are
relativeLy Iow, they will  not in arry case attract the oiI
producersr d.eposits in the a.mor.lnts required.
I  arn assr:ming ill  the argr:nent set out above that the bulk
of the oi1 surplus firnds contjnues to cone jnio the international
financial systern as bank deposits or other seiai-liquid fo:=s.
Thus  it  is  the banks rrhich r+j'11 be responsible
for the Sreaier part of the invesinent in the fj-aancial instntnents
issued. by the 3PI'. These ba::lcs nay need. sone ki:ad' of gaanantee
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frora the central banks that as these d.eposits grow and
ape lent onr+ard.s to the 3PF, they r+ill- not be penalized
if  they overstep the limits of any nandatory assets/deposit
rati.o. (The problern d.oes not, I be3-ieve, arise in nost
countries with Eurocu:rency d.eposits. But it  night d.o
so, as the E\uocunency  ma"rket e>pands stiIl  f\:rther and.
attenpts a,re road.e to regulate it.)
The probLem of rrtransfomationrf.
Recent intlications a.re that oil producersr fund.s which
were initially  very strort-te:m are now increasingly being
enp1oyed in longer te:m financial. operations. If  this
process continues the problen of trensfo:ming extreneJ_y
f.iquid d.eposits into narket investnenls in BHF bond.s and.
the lilce wilL not be as acute in 1975 
""rA .1)16 a.s it  appears
in 1974. [he barrks w111 be able to d.o ntrch of the trans-
fo:nation on their own account.
However even if  the d.j.fficulty gtows less acute as the
oiI produce-rs-becoloe Dore sophisticated. d.nd. confid.ent in
nanaging_an.'investment portfolio, at least part of the probren
will a'l'nost certainly renain. This is because a substantial
proportion of these rapidly gror.ring funds is f-ikely to continue
to be helti jn a fairly liquid fot:m. The United States, Japan
ancl other cred.itr'rorthy  cor:ntries wilL be conleting for long te:m
lnvestoent f\-urds, and it  r.rouLd be u::realistic to suppose thai
the coosunity wiJ-l scoo! the poo1. I'loreover the less ceveropei.
countries, whose need.: is raost acute od[.rno"" ability to neet
/'trthl
iheirincreasedoilbillsthehealthyf\:nctioningofthe
inte:::national econoraic system in part, depends, cannot reaIly
belefttomakedoexc].usivelywithf\rrrd'sd.erived.fronthe
shortest end of' the capitaL narket' If  they are to be
allowed a share of the medir:m te:m f\:nds' it  foLLows that
the devel-oped countries, and' reet especia3'1y the Corom-uiity'
wi1l have to learn to 'nanagB with a Iarger proportion of
liquid f\mds than they would' no:maIly regard' as convenient'
In that case some arrarlgement will have to be devised
by the centfal bqnke responsibJ'e for the 3IF to cover the
operations of comercial  banks with an excegsive amount
of very short-ter:n oil producersr f\rndg' It will not
suffice to leave this problen to the operation of the
'narket, relying on the shartrr decl'jne in short-tem deposit
rates, which would occur in this situation' to co:erect tbe
propensity of sorne of the richest oiI producers to stay
excessively liquid'  Low rates of jnterest nay not produce
.therestrltrequiredrvhenthenarginaluti].ityofmoney
itseLfisextremely3'ow'l'lhatthecentralbarrksrnightdo




Once again the question erises about the circunsta'n'ces
jn which the jo5:rt gua'rantee of the central barks vould be
likeLy to be calLed' That wouLd happen,for examPle'if the
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!?I  hav:ng nad.e a tvro year 1oan to Frar:ce, found. .that it
t+as unable to di"spose of enough comnunity rtrreasurlr bilIs"
to neei its  conunitmenis to f,':rancer and .so had to call  on
national currency reserres. But it  is hard to see vl5r
such a contingency  should arise in the or&ina^:qr way,
assuming that interest rates are internati6narly competitive,
because the rooney market is  assr:med. to be supplied. with a
constant flow of new fr:nd.s d.erived. fron the surpluses
.  of  the oil- producers.  Assr:ning the existence of
an extensive cu.rzency  swap network and a neasure of coord.ination
of nonetaexr policy between the nain financiar centres (so
,approxinatel.y that they a€ree jn advancef,no* nuch international capital
each is to acquire over a period.), the only.circurnstances
in'which r  can foresee a calL on the collective guarantee
lrould. be one in uhich there were a severe rveakening of the
cii:rent balance-of-palments  account of the comnr.rnity vis-i-
vis the rest of the wor1d.. If  the nenber siates of the
Comunity persistently narked. up hearry d.efi.cits against
other non-oil producing countries, then the resul_t would
show up jn a loss of national cumency resewes and in a
d.ecline in the cred.itworthiness of the conur:nity. rn that
case 3PF bond.s and. short-te:m financial instnuenis  would.
not be refjnanced. in sufficient voh:ne through the capital
raarket.
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Si:e of i,'-e ir.:nci
lhe concept of an 'roi1 d.efieittt in a national balarce-
of-payaents account is not an r:narobiguous one. Although
it  is possible to,estinate the size of the aggregate surplds
of the oil  producers (i.e.  that part of their earnings uhich
wiLl not be spent on the purchase of good.s and senrices), it
is not possibS.e to calcuLate precisely what proportion of
the total is properly attributable as a deficit  jn the balance-
of-payaents of a.ny individr:al oiI-inporting country or gtoup
of corurtries. The best that can be d.one is to use the estinates
of the prospective j-ncrease in the aggregate d.eficit of the
Connr:n:ity which is  due to the net increase jn palnaents to the
oil  producing countries in the cu.rrent year/and. to work forvrard
from there.  The figure is  estjmated. to be around.2O billion
d.oLlars in 1)l!,.  Several Conn,r:aity  countries are successfu1ly
bo:rowing back, either directly or through interned.iaries in
the Eurocurzency market, a large parb of the sun required. to
neet their d.eficits.  ft  is hard. to say how nuch of the required.
sr.m it  wiLl be possible to bo:row in this way during the next
three to four years, but i'  .lrobably wouid. be pmdent for the
Comr:nity to think in te:ms of covering at leasi; half of the
prospective deficit  by collective  means -  say soroething of
the order-of 10 biLlion dollars a year.
This noney wii-L c1earIy be very unevenly d.istributed. a:rong
meinber countries. ft  is  1ikeLy to be heavily concenirated in
any given year on particular countries,  such as ftaly  diuing
the year 1974, whose general capacity to borrol in the iniep
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nationaL capi-i;a} na3ket has been reduced. for reasons wftich
nay have 1itt1e to C.o nith the oil d'eficit problern'
It  is to be obsenred that if  France and Italy rvere to
inprove their conpetitive positions sharply, so that they
developed. substantial trac.e surpLuses rvith Gemarryr this
r,rou1d. i"  iT  long n:n affect GernarSrr s ppesent irnrnatched
capacity to attract funds fron the internationa-]- capita3-
narket. The point that is being nade is sinply that a
reduction in the non-oiI balance-of-payuents surplus
of arry given country nay reduce its abiLiw - in cond"itions
of intense conpetition in the internationaL  capital narket -
to obtajn the capital f\:nds that it  needs to cover its oil
d.eficit.
The rnanag€nent of 3PF
fhe tr\:nd will  have the task of distributing the noney.at
its  disposal on the basis of sone cLear assessnent of national-
cIai.res, which is  designed. to ensure that the offsetting of oiL
deficits does not help to subsid.ise balancq-of-palnnents d'eficits
ofanore'fi:n-aaroentalcharacterorthoseduetoafailureof
overalld,enand'malagement.Thereisbound'hol,levertobean
elercent of judgnent in this process' It  is iherefore all  the
Eorenecessaqrthatthena]:agenentofthe3P?shouldbeendortec
wiih a considerable neasu=e o'f ind'epeni'ence'
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The 3?! should. be a o;uasi-autononous bo{y rvith a Supenrisory
Council consisting of the Sovernoxs of the nine central banks
or their representatives. It  voul{. be in effect an instruraept
of the }ionetary Corunittee of the EC.  Its board. of rnanagenent
night be appoiirted. jointly by the governors of central banl<s
and the rninisters of finance. I:c order to give its  operations
the flexibiLiff that is reguired, the constitution of the board
loight foLlow the earlier exanple of the European Payuents Union
a"nd. ad.opt the rrrle of majority voting.
The staff of the tr\urd. woul-d. be e:rpected. to be increasihgly
involved. in the policy problens cor:nected with the rnanagement
of the bal_ance-of-patrments  d.eficits of individual- menbef,
countrj.es. ldaehinery  would. have to be set up for the prompt
and accurate reporting of capital movenents which oight affect
the overaLl balance-of;palpents of any countty.
The 3P3 staff rvould. set cerfain perfo:mance criteria  for
national gpvernments and. engage in periodic consultations
on economic poJ.icy natters related to these.
As a roatter of principle, it  is  essential that the aC.d-itional
capital borrorved by the Conmulity countries during the period'
r+hen they lrill  necessarily be in overaLl deficit  on curyent
account should. be used in Larg: pa:ct to finance ad.ditional
lroductive investnents.  The strategic policy of ihe B?3 nust
be to enlarge the productive capacity of the corucr:niiy by a
sufficient  a'roount to allow it  to repay durinS: the 1900s the
s..rr4borror,red.  in the i97Os, a;rd to d.o so vrhile iaaintaining'uhe
continuing rise in the level of real incones ano consrr:ptiont-1
of the Con"nwrity.  The cond.ition for achieving this end is
that the unrequited. irnporis financed. by the noney derived
fron the BPF are not used to sustain a @u:rent Ieve1 of
-  consr:nption- higngr than that which lrEggge  been afforded.,
jn cond.itions of ful1'enplo1ment, if  the oil  producing cor:ntries
had. spent all  their foreign exchange earnings on aei&itional
imForts fron the industrial corrntries. the d.elay of some
years vhich r,rilI nor.r intenrene before thes'e additionaL purchases of iraportr
the oil oroducers. arenade by-;-3h-ciirl-d1-e-u-s-eTin  a systenatic way by the Commrnity
A
to raise its productive capacittri', in the fieLcl of enerry and
enerry i.nport-savh1 l  as welL as in oonventional export industries,
above the Level that it  would. have reached. in the 1980s without




the Airne of the Connunlty ln the 197Os
rt  ha.e been proposed bv Robert t'tarjolln that as an essentlal nert
etep ln 1te progress  tolra.rd,e E\ropean union the comunlty should create
aome new nlndependent declsion-naking capacityrr. [!be nain pu:ipose whlch
vould be ge:nred by such a move woultl be to eetablt'sh a bablt of Jotnt
pol.ttlcal aotlon r{hlch by-paseetl the ednlnietratlve  prooessed of nlne
separate governnente. It  l[ust howevel be recogDleed fron the etart that
there le 8n element of paratiox Ln the propoeal, el]rce lt  le pretllcated on
the ae$rsptlon that theee Bpv€xnnenta, on whoge conpJ-alsanoe the refom
depentls, vlLl be moved by the deeire to by-pasg thsnse}vee'  There v|ll  hove
to be 6orDe vel:r etrong motivos coEunon to then aL1, not!'ves whl'ch vllI  al'eo
appear conpelllng to the mass of tbe votere on vhom tho el'eotLou of these
Spvernnentsdepend,lnordertopmclucethetleglre.lresult'
The experience of-lilg 1o50s
In what followe I  eha.lL tqr to td,enttlV vhat such motivee nleht be
aurrns the period ahead. In order to tlo so I't I'g necegsary flret  of all
to consid.er the f\rndsxnental queetlon of the proxlnate alms of the Eblopean
cowtrnity ln the 197Oe and 1980e. Too often the argunent about the appmprlate
lnslru.r.,ents for conanon European polLcles assunes that becauee the ultlnate
gpaL of European union remaing what lt  alvatrre has been' the practlcal ob'iecte
of the enterlriee ln the 197Oa anti 1980s vllL not dlffer naterlal3'y fbon tboee
of the 19Ws antl 195os' 1(he onJ4 ctrangBs that are alloved for are l.n the
taotlcaL cttolce of technica'I devlces'
But to thtnk ln thtg way le to lgnore the fact that a cbangB ln tbe
objectlveoonditionevhlchlnfluencenatlonalantilnternatlona].polttlos
are llkely  to affect the operatlons of the connunlty ln two weyB' 8t'rett
sqch a cbange nay alter the order of Brloritiog of gpv€rnlnentg  a'nd of the
cltLzene vho elect then.' It  le cLea.r that the prrsrrlt of the longr'tem
a{ms of the comunity, for e:rample the effort to butlil up the authorlty of
certaln cotrnon tnetitutlons of the EC, hae to coropete for its  ghare of e
l{rn{ted poIltloa} lnput agabet otber dernande on tbe attentlon antl tlne of
gpvornnents,  Ln oJ"lcuoetsrcoee  vben tha oonpetltlon of ner ite6g11ds !e grovlrcg'
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The second. polnt ls thet changee ln the internatlonal envlronnent (by
vhlch f uean the vhole conspeohra of lnternatl.onal  relatlone, lnolu4lng
relatlona betrreen the euperpowers) ere 1lkeLy to funpose dlfferent con-
etralnte on the capaol'ty of publlc agenclee, national a.nd interinationalp
to achleve thelr obJecte. Thug ln a,n lnternatlonal olinate of rapl61y
erpand.tng tratle and, rncneaslng fteed,on of cepltal novenents, lt  nay be
ruuoh eaeLer for tha Comturlty to secuno the renoval of traile alod f,tnanolel
barllers a&ong: its nenber gtatee than lt  would be if  worlil trade lrere
faolng e ehara glow-dorvn and nany of the nember oorurtrLeg were rrrnnlng
lnto balang€rof-palments deficltg.
In faot' tt  ie pmbable that the erbrene}y fevourable con6itl.ong for
the oreetlon of the E\Bopean custons unlon ln the 1960e cneated an €rroneouo
lmpreeeLon about the role of nnconstralned  chol.ce of obJecg.vee and of
polltlcal vlll  exerclsett ln pursult of then by th9 Comunlty. llhe polat
tbat le worth streeelng le that the Comunlty ohose obJectlvee  lrhlch fttteil
ln vell vlth the wl'tter inte:rrational  eoonornlc antt polttlcaL env$roruaent of
the t1ne. llhe renoval of natlonal tariffe on induetrial gooile traded be-
breen the nenbers of the Cowstmtty tl*l not ln praotJ.ce  iropoee aqlr eerioue
conetralnte on the day to ait' conduot of buslneae by natlonal gove:rrnente.
In the econonlo oon&ltionE of the 1950ar wlth lnterratlonal trade lncreaslng
year by year by a uulttple of the expaneion of worltl ln6uetrla.l pmduct!.on,
and wlth the UnLted Stateg balance-of-paynents  persl.etently in deflclt, the
etl@lonal opportunltlee for lntra-Elrropeaa trad,e opened up by the ouetone
rurion hatl the effect of ralslng the LeveL of exporte lrr ooa&ltiona uben
the rleke aagocl'atetl rlth a hldrer lnport hdlI were seall. Apart fnom one
or hro brlef lnter:nrptiona, the balaace-of-pEFtents of 4  nenber oorprtries
was etrong and. their currency o"""".r"" stea.d,ily gro*irrgj'
ft  le aleo tnportant to note that the t-nternatlonal polltlcal contert
ln rhloh ths Comunlty erected lte cormon erter.nal tarlff  lras Eao,€ tevo'rabLe
by the gugtahed effort of the leadrng lnrtuetrlsl natlone durlng the 1960e
t *9n balance-of-paynents  dtfftcuLtles dial ocour, as for exanple Ln trbanoe la 1968t the ftcench dovernnent nas able to aot vtih epeetl to {npose r.nport re- strlctlons - aud then to :ssnove !h9r allpoet equally speeduvl--lt" irrrop""", Connieal'on  dlLtt e:qresa aone oonpleint about the nanner ln whlch Fralce eoted; but lt  le fall  to eay that the exlstence of the custons unlon dtd not Lnpose any alenlfloant constralnt on the oholoe of gbort-tem eoono^fo poffolea by the Frenoh goyetruneat.
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to roduce the 8eneral Level of tarlffg.  lflts aotue.l negptiatlone of ths
Dlllon Rounci and the KerrneQr  Ror:nd tn the GATI occupLed, ebout ha-lf, of
the decede of tbe 196Oe. Anil the result of theso exerclses was to reduoe
the inlrerant diecrlninatory  trade effeot exercleed by the Coiuunlty on
outelders. Tbus the lnternatlonal oliroate for the ECre opeclal sfforis
on behalf of lte  owa menberg was funproved by the fee1.lng that workl trade
bar:rlers were befuig reriucetl all  rorurd - at Leaet untll  the entl of the
Kenne{y Bound ,n 1967. The Comnrurlty appearett to be gnl"''i.ng: etrongly
vitb the LnterzlatloneL tlde -  a Llttle  ahead of the otber snimers"
It  la yorth oonparlng thie extrrerlence brlef,Ly wlth the fallure of the
efforts at financlal interrration vhlch occupletl the $orrumnltv frorl--1969
onrarele. One of the troublee nlth the Comturltyts  rnonetarlr  pLane wae ttrat
they falled to connect in any conetmctlve manner wi'i;h the ux'gent nesds of
lnternatlonal pol.lcy-naklng ln a perioil of ertendeal criels cauesil by the
vealcneee of the do}lar.  lloreover" tho plan tbr  a rapid. approaoh to nonetarXt
unlr..,nr antl the devices lntroduced to schlevs that e,nd, perretratod  deepLy
Lnto the conduct of domestio  economj.e and flrnanoiel Pol.toles of nienber
conntrLea and. threatened to lnpoee, dI  at oncoo 3 very conslilerablo con-
stralnt on the Isdependent  declelon-naklng power of nationaJ. governnents.
And thle happened at e tfune when eeveral of the Latter wer€ al"readJ' flniltng
the changed lnternatlonal financial. envlronrcen,t  ertrenely hartl to oope sLth.
.One of 11e rnaJor lessoner that should be drawn -fron the Conrunltyre fLrst
attenpt to arrlve et Econonla and*lonetarlr Unlonr by neano of the de":lcee
proposed J;1 i;he Werner Pl.an, ie that the broad.er lntexnatLoil.rl ens'lroruilent
ln whlch the Comrurttyre aLme hsve to be converbed. lntc joi-nt *etLon by the
ruerober stetes nugt never aggln bo tal<en for gtanted. Nor Liuat the nerober
goverillentg be aubJected to greater d.enande for the subjectlon of shorb-
ta:mo natlonal lnterest to longBn-tero purposee of Cnm'Frnity peltcy-malctrg
than oan be ghown 1,o Ds necessary in te::ms of concrete anii ol.early percelved
obJectlvee of poLltLcal a.nd econonlo polloy.  Monetartrr rurlon I la Wexner was
a technlcla.nrs echene; effectl.ve polltical  baoking for Lt was neLther sougbt
nor obtalned lnslite the nenber eountrLeg. PretlLotably,  when the tscbnlosl
requltsenents  oano lnto conll.lot vith netlonal polltloal. fuoperatlvear tbere
rra6 no oDo on the apot nho voul"dt Epoak up for the Coumunlty lntereet.
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llhe Conternpor^arn Internatlonal Contert
fhe preeent lnternatlonal,  envlxtnnent ls draetlcally tllfferent n!@
tbat of the 1960er snd the cauee of the chango le the enetsr crlgLs.
Ihle ls llkely to effect the whole course of econonlc pollcy tn the
Weetein lnilustrlal worLd ilurlng the r€et of thls decarle and, poasibly
durlng the openlngi yeaas of the nert.  lihe duretion of the effeot tlependa
tn part on the epeeil vlth vhich effectlve collective actlon 1g taken to
reduce. the ilependence of the advanced Intluatrlel countrl.es on an unoertaln
sourco of supply of energSr tn the Flldclle Eagt. Eut even on the noEt
favourable aesunptlone thl.e dependence wlll  contlnue rurtll the ea,rty 1960e,
vhl.ch prolably le,  ln any case, the .lrnrt of tbe tlne-aoele for the fom-
latlon of E\ropean Comunity pollclee.
The irnnetLiate effect of the clra.nge on Westem Arope is to impose con-
siderable reductions in the growth of real incomer This foLlows in part
from the sharp cleterioration in Auopets terms of trad.e with the oil  produoers.
Beyond thisr there ie the more profor:nd. effect of the neecl for a rmseive increage
in investment both in eubstitute  forms of enerry and in energr-saving  eguipment.
To the ertemt that this requirement is met speedlily - ag it  r:nd.oubted.ly  neerls to
be in ord.er to proiluce some !'d.emonstration effectil which might influence the prlce
of Arab oll  cluring the critical  years of the midclLe lllos  - it  w111 introduce a
significant d.ena^nd for aclditional savings. This agpin implies a out in real
disposable consumer income.
Ilowever, the most urgent need of all  is that the Westenn natione, when
cnibarking on these policies of saving a,nct adeptatf.on, should. avoicl the
temgtation to engage in a.ny form of competitive deflation, in order to
lmprove their intlivitlual bal.a"nce of pa;rments. This need sets the terns
of the new interrratlonal. politicaL contert in r*hich a^ny Conunrnity plans
for further integration in Western E\rrope nil.l have to operateo  We have
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moved from a regime of largely unrestg'ained aomposltlon for markets
among lndustrial natlons 1n the r9r.''0s" to a sltuatlon ln whtch the
tltiveness tsslbLe fon the of overcomi
a barance-of-pa:r'rnents  deflclt _has to be subjjrct to internatlonal
agreement.
r  say "has to bert, because tt  ls  arready clear that thc only
altennatlve to an internatlonal compact outlawing measures that woul-d
normally be taken in order to ell.mtnate a balance-of-payments  deflcit  -
such measures as currency devaLuatlon or the sharp deflatlon of demand
for all  forms of imports -  ls  a genetal retreat from the prescnt open
world system of lntcrnatlonal trade and flnande lnto a reglme of national
restrictions and beggar-$our-nclghbour pollcles.  The stakes are vlslbly
very htgh. That ts what makes lt  reasonable to suppose that in splte of
the unusual demands whlch the new situatlon wlll  make upon the capaclty
for colLaboratton among t'Jestern lndustrial countrles, a practical  response
w111 be forthcomins.
rt  ts worth pointLng out, moreover, that if  such a response is not
elicited,  and the erosion of the exlstlng open international- system of
the lndustrlal world follows, the context tn which thc Communlty wl1l
operate w111 once agaln be entireJ-y different from anythlng whlch it
iras experienced  before. rts  task will  then be to avold the splrit  of
sauve- qul peut  amonS; the member countrtes from r.evenslng such progress
towards a common manket as been achlved to date. Thls is  a scenarlo
willch r do not propose to exprore further in the present paper.
hhat need.s to be stressed is  that ln the clreumstanees whleh f  am postulatlng here the problem for lnternatlonal poIlcy-making among ad-
vanced lndustrlal countrles wlll  no longer be one of al}owlng market
forces to operate with as rittrc  restrictlon  as posslbre, subject to
certaln rules of the camc (l1ke IFN, antl-dumpl.ng, avoldance of quantltative
restrlctlons).  ft  w111 be a matte:r of agreetng on the upper and lower limlts
-Some exceptlon has to be made for  the case of Japan and for some other ttvoluntary export controrsrt applled by othen natlonse c.g. on European
steel- exponts to the United States.
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of a clellleratelv acceptetl balance--of-Dayaents deflclt on cunent
accountr entl then on the Dotuis of recycllng the capitel funda flowlng
lnto Uestern Eoney narkets (representtng: tbe rurepent Arab o11. aurplusee)
to boleter the neaervea of ioorntrLeE rhl.ob come under ealnolal.ly eeverrg
preBauno.
The CouuunLtvts dlstLnctive task
I bave done no nore tlra.n lndlcate in the nougheet poaalbi.e lray Borne
of the features of internati.onal  econonlo relatlons durlng the perlod
abeadp on the aeeunptlon thsrt the vaet balance-of-payments  daficLt'on
their'oll  accountg vhlch the Western lndugtrlal natlona non face Ls
nanageit cooperative1y.  llhere nay be tlJ.ea8reenent ebout tbe detalls of
tbs scenarLo. Ore polnt tha,t is lnporbant however le that an;r schene
for Comnnlty collaboratlon  whlch ls deelgnecl to nttlgate the effeote
of the o11 sltuetion on roernbet countriee wlLl have to take account of
the fact that collaboretlon  requLred of Hegterm nations, both outslae
and inelile the Comunlty w111 be on a ecal.e a,nd of a depth greater tlian
arlytningi that we have experlenoed, ln peacetime. For the purposes of the
pree€Dt a^rgunent I aesute that the rnlnLrsum reqrrlreaent le net.  ftre questlon
for the comulty ls then - ,rhat foms of oroeer pa^rtnerehlp,  iraplylng a
mole profowrtl ioLlaboratlon  ;tn the nana€pnent of the consequencee of ths
o11 pmblenr oould lt  nogt ugefrrlly adopt ln order to eafeguaril the lntelreets
of the peopLea vho belong to tt?
Ihe fo:m of the queation alrea(y deterulnea a Large part of the aagre!.
If  the Cmunlty has one charscteristlo  wlatch distln8ptshee lt  flon other
foms of aasocl.atlon  arnong weratexlr natlone, lt  te that tt  purporta to
ghaae nore of both the burclerrs antt the advantages accnrl^rtg to 1te nernber
countrl,ea. |lhat tleflnes the te:ms ln nhlch it  approacheg the problen
of the nana€euent of ecarce t€aourcee and balamce-of-payuents dtefloite
ln the tr€w er€,. Eut hon ln !,raatiee ie thls partlcular taek to be done?
fts nature oontrasts profourdly wlth the earlier experLenoe of the Conraunlty,
vhen lt  set out !9 rnqr{rnlee surplueee by the ronoval of :restrl,otlous on the
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Dovegent of gOoils, non€y and petaons. lfhls tt'tDe a'rormd lts naln oonoeln
niLl be to ninlml6e tho Eocial danase end econonlo harishl'p that v111 be
causeal by the efforl to edapt andl nenoultl tnduetrlal stnrctr8estln  a
perloil rhen the rate of grorth of reel tttepoeeble lncone vlII  be elg:
ntflcantlY reduoed.
stre flrEt potnt to be obsewed ts that even assuBlJ.l8 I hldt clegree
of Westem collaboratLon ln the nanaepnent of onr balanq€-ef-palmente
prob!.enee e.6. along the llnea of the lfitteveen propoeals  (Rone, January
1974), the fr[rtla that are llke]y to be nade evaLlable t]rroueb the recycllng
of short-term capl.tal w111 not be gufflolsrt to rueet ell the ueeare of weelcer
or mole rnrlncaable cormtrl.es. lJhat the comunlty menbers therefo:re roqlrllo
J.e a nrpplanotary llasouroe to hOlp then rnanagp thetr affelrs none effeotlve-
Iy ln connoll
It  1g propoeed, that thts ehould tale the fom of e nerf, andl greatly
enlnJ}gett Duopean Funalr nade up of the cqnencles Of nenber coqntrlee  and
of a Bortlon of tbelr international. reselr/€eo Its task woultl be to nana€s
the ftnanolal consequences  of the oll ba-1anoe-of-payoents  defl'ol'te of menber
countd.og ln ggoh I nalr as to mlnlnlse their effeot oa prodluotion and real
Lnconee. Ttre trtllril is l€felfed to ln rhat fOllows es the Balanoe-of-Pagnenta
nrna (arn).
ftre 3pF would, differ froo exLetlng or prevlouely conternplatecl  comunity
a8onclee ln the followlng partlculare. Flret of a1L1 lte lnltlal  gcale woulil
be uuch largor; the etalting eapltaL would heve to be upwa'rd'e of 10 bllllon
dollara. Slnce Lts essential fr[rction woultt be to provltle capltal firnds
to nalce good tbe tleficlts lnounetl on culrent balance-of-patrrnente eocount
restrltlng firon the aotlon of the o11 e:rportere, tbe Funil woultl have to beve
e prlnclple of .automatlc extrranslon hrilt  lnto I't.  llhls lnarks the eecond
rllfference, All the caloulatlong swigpgt that the conblnetl oll deficlt
on ourrent acaount of EC countries rt1I be Sreater tn 1975 tltsn ln 1974t
and that there 1g lLttLe llkellhood of any reihrctl'on tn 1976' fhue for
et Least three years the 3PF wllr neetl to bave the asgrrranco of an @99'
ln the 6apltal finrtle at lts illspoeal of a graatel anount tban tbe t'ultlel
cepltel aubeorlPtlon.
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Th1e leatls to th.s thJ.rd olraracterietlo lbnctlon of the 3PF, whtch la
to act as arr lnternedlary' for f\rndls drawn from outside the EC. ft  woulil
be enpowered to bo:rov f\rnclg dlrectly ft<rn Areb o11 pmducers or fion
flnancial lnetltutlone lr. the United. Stateg .antl elsethere nltb vhlch
such eurplus funtlg were deposl.ted.  r'c wouLri erso iesue tts own loan
etook for pubJ.lo subscrlptlon thlough the Euro-cumency narket,,
flhe fourth l\urctlon o:f rhe EPf wouLd be to prsovl.tle a clrenno1 for
cre{lte between one DC corrntrXr and another. lf}reee would be ln part
short-te:fl cretllte deeJ.gneil to snooth out abnrpt changee ln the flon
of fitnda to partlculer eorrntrLes.  lttre rl.sk that polltlca] frlotlons
nlght oause huge ehifts ftr accumrlated  Arab assetg lbon one flrranolal
centro to a.nother needs t<l be lngured. a8alnst by a greatly relnforoerl
mechanlsn for recycllng oJl noney. Brrt there ls ln etidltlon the cIea,r
prospect that there vill  be d.ifferences over the nert lJ  yezre tn the
capacity of inclivtdual neurbor countrles to cope wJ.th the baLance-of-
paynente effecte of the enelgr problem, fhese d.l.ffezrences nair resdt
llon the poeseeelon of morp or legs J.ndlgenoue supplJ.eg of coa.l, gas and,
North See o11, ae vell as fron nore general faotore of lncluetrla.l efflclency
aacl e:gort cornpetltLveness,.  llhue for example, botb Gemanyrs  and Brl.talnfs
balance-of-paynente deflcit on curront account nagr be :reletively s"roll la
tbe Late 197oe, - because Eritain has advantages  on the ftrst courrt and.
Germaqr on the second count. One of the purposeg of tbe DPF vouLd then be
to engure tbat other EC countries 1lke trlrance and ftaly had a prlor claln
on Srltieh ancl Cer:oaa fiErds reaultiing fron a^n overall baLance-of-paSments
srurylus (on conblnetl capital alral cunent acoouat) rhich theee oountrl,es
shoulal be ebl,e to achieve no:re readl.ry rn thege o!,mungtanoeg.
t /  Tirege s'uggeetions follow tho same lines ae those put fomard by M. G|sca1'tt
drEetaing in a.:reoent Lnibenrlew wlth EUROPA (prbltshed by The Timeo, Le Monda,
La starnpa and. Die llert).  se€ fhe Ti.mee, I'tarch 5, 1974. Bie proposal lrag
-that the E\rropea,n centralL bantce in cooperatlon or the Moneta4r CooperatLon
nrnd' ehould Lseue a.n rfamual. nediuro-sized loan of aome thousa^nd.s of lnll.llons of dol1ars", Ee thought that subocrlptlons to euch a loa.n ehould bs oonfLneal to the centra-l banke of 1;ho o11 p:soduclng countrlee. ft  seeng to ne that
oonothlng more lf.oxlblor dealgnod to appoaL to a varlety of lnveetorelLn-
olu&l.ng other lndlvldualer ond oonnerolaL tnstltutlons 1rr tho lltdtille Eist vltb ou:pLuo Aurde at therlr tllsposalr nf€lt  be oonelde:sed.
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I beiieve tnai in ecd.itio:r io i;ile s;lopean Funi for ihe adjusirent
oi baLance-of-paSa,cnts c.ist'urbencesr ihele is scope for a ::eru Dlropean
i:.vcstnen.,, fnd concerned lrith the financing bf lal5e scale capital
prc:?er-es (.) of en6rry saving; (t) for the CeveLopecni of altenrative
e::e3sr supplies in Europe. This wiLl not be describect in the present
!3?ex. it  is s;r"F1y nentioned. here because it  is seen as a cot3pLeiaentary
o:6a:ri.sation - again ldth a'Ia:te neasure of independ'ent nanagenent -
to the Sa1a.nce-of-Patrrnents !\urd' described above'
It  rculd be the financial conponent of a ilrropean in5'tiative correspo:rci-
i::3 to the united. states }1erry ProgSa:sne. The d,in of this progSanne voul-d
be, like iis  lnerica,n cor:nterpart, to aehieve a certai-:r stated' raeasure of
self-sufficiency  Jn enerry supplies of aLL kinds by the beginning of the
lg3Os.Asai:lasisnificantproblenjnsecuringresu]-tsquicklyirrEurope
:iay weLL tuin out to be that the financial resoUsces vhich could be nobiLised'
are not nade ava.ilable j.n the places 'nhere the potential for subste'ntial in-
c:eases 5.n eaergy sr:pplies exists. This is certainJ.y i:nre of tho Sritish
coal- industry for exanple. Ehere are other potential-  soirsces of supplyt
not all of then necessa$.Iy located within the'geographical bo'undaries of
the coi:ar:nityr r+irich could he3.p to reljeve liestern E\Eopers eneary problen
drringthecriticalyearsuptotheenclofthepresentdecace.
: *jhei denonstrailon of a European gna2:t" Tt is worth reneiobering that the d'enonstrail
to provision itself with substa.,ntlaL anor:nts of aLternative  eneIGy in i;he
long te:n is J'ilcely to have a sigaificant effect on the price of i'iid'dLe last
oil in the nid.dle and late 19?0s. [tre sca].e and effectiveness of ihe Er::opea:r
Investnent l\rnd proposecl here r,rould' be an {rnlortant elere:rt in bling:ng the
price of oiL charged. by OPEC d.own to its Io::e-ters! supDl--'r n'iice socne: :a'ticl
thair later.
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COi{i4lINITY  CCORIINAI'iOI{ OF EXCHANGE RATE POTICY
From a Comrnunity viewpoint i.ndependent and uncoor-
dinated floatj.ng of the currencies of member countries is
unacceptable. At the more technical level, it  greatly com-
plicates the operation of tire cornmon Agricultural  Policy
and it  creates severe distortions  in the finaneing of all
community activities.  Thus floating  has strained'  ve:ty
nearly tc breaking point,  eooperation  cn matters essentiai
to the functioning of the Community as we know it  to-day.
More generallyrintra-bommunity  exchange rate changes ha're
shifted. the bur"den of adjustment between member countries
in  a way that has :ften  been felt  by those not initiatirig
the changes to be r-nfair.  Floating has undermined the
limite<l and fy'aiL. ef forts  at coordination of short-term
policies  by mak-lng such efforts  look superf 1uous. Dis-
cussions c)n eeorroxliq. polic$ in'the  couneil of Ministers
and in  bhe colnmitf€'rji serving the Council in  these matters
are presenr,J-y .Jn!:ri5 and *nspecific even in  cases t^lhere
cornmunity financia"i support is  essential for  a member
country a;rci joint'  recorimendations would accordingly catr:J
weighb. ivlemhe'r' governments  fail  to give prior  notice
of  impor,.r,ant neli^r poJ-icy initiatives.  These attitudes  and
clisappoin.;ne:rls'in turn serve as arguments for  not cooperat-
ing on intra-  commr;n-j.t.:,' exchange rates.  Around 1970 it  was
a wideJ-y hetd cpinicn that  cl.oser cooperation in this  area
vrouLd trigger  a vi"l';uous spiral  of progress in  policy
ccordinaiion and rnonetary integratic.rn. The expe.ri-ences
sj.nee 1??2 Cen:o:':sirate that this  spiral  is  capable of
wcrkin-e t.r()-,,..ei'frl1i-i in  the opposite direction as monetary
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f'ra6rmentaLion  ttircug.r floating  and failures  of policy
C(,ij-rJ - i'.t  i :--." rrid  a)n each cther.
i,.. i - i..r lt,r. !.:: (liagnose this  unstabLe and alarm_
inp-. p',r,:rc-:s r'h;ari io  r;uggest how to break it.  yet there
ar"€ sroinc fac;o|s at rvork which nake un.qualifieci pessi-
misni unl^jarrariLed.
The first  is  il:at  those member countries whieh have
alloweil their  exchan6ge rates to float  rjownward,s  have come
to doubt s.eriously the advantages which further  devalua-
tion  thr'ough individr,ral floating  coutd. bring.  Devaluations
irr tlie four niember countries which are presently fl.oating -
nost notably Italy a^nd' the IJK-have accelerated. inflationar5r d.evelopments
directly through import prices a^nd. ind.irectly through
price expeclations.  To the extent that a dampening of
inflation  is  given in.creasing priority  in  domestic poliey,
downward float.lng will  have to be constrained.  Fr:rther-
morer'the contribution of devaluation to the reduction of
current account cieficits  has, to  say the least,  not been
spectacular;  such effects are in  any ease so slow in  com-
ing that they offer  little  eomfort in  crisis  situations.
The stabll-izlng cffects on thc capltal aecount e1 d.ownward floatlng
have also failed' to emerge, as exchange markets have tend.ed to extrapolate
recent trend.s rather than a temporary d.eviation from an equilibrir:m.
rt, shouirl not b.e' pretended that  these experiences,
.impcrteiit as th*y are, will  ind.uce the currencies presently
floating  io i'sturn tc  a previous orthodoxy of pegging or
to a regime irientical'"o  that practised by the five  members
that reriain in the ttsnaker!. Nor is  this  necessary; the
l^Ierner Pl.ar.'. anc cthe:" clocurnents which inspired the earlier
design.s wer$ {::onceived on the background. of far  greater
stabiii.ty  in ihe wcrlj  gurrcunding the community than
the trrrbulent rea1rt3, of igTZ-74.  present efforts  should
nct be' evaluated agai:rsb an overly ambitious background;
exehange i'ale coopera'bi.on in the second half  of the
1970 I s can be l.ess ri1g1_c than even the initial  stage of  the
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werner Plan and still  make the community appear as an
island of cohesion in  a world of instability.
The second factor which offers  some hope is  that
the criteria  for  exchange rate adjustmenbs conducive to
international equilibrium and the various available
mechanisms of intervention are  better und'erstood-
now than they were a few years back.  At the ievel  of
principles,  the work done in  l9T2-74 at'the  International
Monetary Fund on the Reform of the International Monetary
system has elarified  a number of issues.  Part of the
subsequent comments discuss to what extent the proposed
reform could apply to regional exchange rate cooperation
such as that of the European Community; it  will  be
argued that  some of the proposed. criteria  and procedures
could usefully be applied to  intra-European exchange
rates and to the doll ar exchange rate.
T'he third  and decisive factor is  the push of events.
The realization  that the common element in  current pro-
blems is  very large encourages a reeval-uation of the
risks  inherent in  ttgoing it  alonerr.. If  most member coun-
tries  are faced with massive eurrent deficits  the like-
lihocc of any one counbry being able to get away with
actions which shift  part of the deficit  to other members
without provoking retaliatory  measures from them is
diminish.ing apprec.i-a.bly, Actions .taken jointly,  though
difficutt  to..arri.ve a'l,  are more 1ikel-y to have the
desired effects.  Coordinated actions in  a wider group
of countries, including in particular  the United States'
do not appear real istic.  The united states seems des-
tined to be preoccupieC for  some bime with domestie economic
issues and is  well  p1-aced bo act accordingly; other coun-
tries  offer  no real alternative  to  intl'a-community  coopera-
tion.  Ti-ris does not i;np1y tha|  all  problems ean be re-
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Soit,ed at the regional Levell none of the major ones
inflation,  exterrral- aeficits,  energy supplies and re-
eycirng - can. Bi"i.t commun;ty coordination is an essen-
tiai  stepping stone. for making an effective start for
atbacking aLl of them.
In the exchange rate field  the need is to find a
conpromise t,etween ind.ividual floating and the rigidity
of pegging a la werner. The compromise has to be found
in operationa) criieria  for exchange rate adjustments
inside t,he Community  and vis b vis the dollar and SDR,
the emerging international num6raire. The following
three sections comment briefly  on long- and short-term
criteria  and on their implication's for domestic monetary
management in member countries.
Longer-be:rm criteria  for  the
approPriatsrl?ss  of  ex.change r
.  The operational provisions for  the management of
floating(1). stipuiate  that the rnternationaL Monetary
Fund should exeercise.supervision so that a floating
crrrgeney dces not t'tri6ve outside what the Fund conSiderS
to br: ihe range of reasonable estimates of the medium-
tev.,.n it .,r3IIt for  that  exchange rate to an extent the Fund
eon:-:i,-,fs ii.rely  to be irarmful to .the interests  of 
'
ilem.rei.:,. . .rr  fhe *ssential  element is  the medium-term
r:()r:n f r.: rates.  A few years ago a confident answer would
(t)  Atrriex 4 t.r Out:-lne cf Reform, International ,ltlirgjl  ''i  t,.!  l:'kv-f,jt"  Y'',  "  '^t
Monetary lu@ne  Board of
Goverirors on Reform of tire International
Ivlonetary S,vstem anci Felateii Issues, June l-9714'
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probably have been given to doubts about the feasibility
of arriving  at  such a norm and the language chosen would
have been less guarded. The exchange rate adjustments
embodied in the Smithsonian Agreemepts of December l-9'lt
vrere fairly  closely in  line  with what international
agencies -  the OECp and the  IIIF -  had calculated to be
required to bring the current accounts (adjusbed for
cycJ.iea1 differences in activity  of the main countries )
into  approxirnate balance over a J-year period, i.e.  by
late  1974, The basis for  these estimates was. the
responsiveness  of foreign trade in  th6se economies to
changes in relative  prices adjusted for effective  ex-
change rates as they were estimateC frorn models of worLd
trade over the previous 10 to 1l  years
The confidence in  such pr.ocedu::es has been severely
shattered by the events of recent years.  Speculacive
capital  flows, fed by the marketfs misapprehensions
about the length of the time 1a15s involved in  balance
.of  payments adjustrnents, had washed away the Smithsonian
Aqreement in  littLe  more than a vear (and sterli.nErs to both Jhat antL to the rrsn€J<err
adherence hn 6 months), well before divergent inflation
rut""  and, above all,  oil  price increases played havoc
with the medium-term outlook for  countriesr external
position.  Nevertheless, the international community
and the European Community in particular,  can i1I  afford
to discard a-'l-I of the elements of rationality  which made
their short-livec] appearance in international exchange
rate cc,operation irr 1.970-7:-..
The ;"";  essential step is  for  the community to
review critj.cally  nember countries I balance-of-payments
prospects for  the medium term; 1978, which has been the
focal year :n l-ast winterts work on the irnplications of







reference. The forecasts should (i)  asstrme normal high
capacity utilization  in the member eeonomies; (ii)  lnoorporatc
cgtlnatoe of eoet and prlco trcnd.s ana (fil.) be bascdl,
on eument exchange rate constellations; they should be
made internally conslgtent. The forecasts are likely  to
diverge from the aims of individual countriesr and the
crucial phase j.n the Communityts review will  be taken
up by discussions of (1) how the aims can be made mutually
consistent and eollectively realistic,  and (2) how the
remaining imbalances could be either financed by a re-
cyctr-ing mechanism (poSsibly also by movements in reserves)
or eliminated by different demand.management  policies a,nd' f,or
exchange rate ad.justments. These discussions therefore
tla up vcry close1y wlth the nedir:ptc:m-rcoycllng  faoilitiesg
the fornulatlon
of aims wiLl de
ness of rectr1c1ino.  Most memben countries -  and the
Community as a whole - will  be faced with large current
deficits  in the late 1970rs; the simple assunption of
1970-71, viz. that most countries would aim to be at
least in basic balance over the medium term so that one
could proceecl to estimate an equilibriurn constellation
of rates is inappropriate. What is  reguired is J itrag-
ment on a set of rates which, given the concerted external
aims and active demand nanagement policies, would tend to
push external positions close to aims.
It  is  important to underll.ne that alL referenees '
in the above to e>:ehange rates are to effectivee i.e.
trade-weighted rat,es. Once a con^sensus has been reached
on the adiustments in effective rates whieh appear to
.1 to an important extent on the smooth-
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be r.equirecl of member coun'"ries individually  the basis
for  a review of intra-Community rates is  available.  If
the strueture of fcreign trade of member countries were
approximately sirnilar,  the implications for  intra-
Community rates would be straightforward.  In fact,  they
are sufficiently  different  to  create serious pr"oblems for
a joint  floab even in  cases where the need for  eIrfective
rate adjustments is  of the same order of magnituo"(1).
The fact  that joint  Community movements vis-b-vis  the
rest of the world, ancl the dollar  in particular,  have
rather different  imp'lications for  member countries has
not been sufficiently  stressed.  Thus the :..973-weakening
of the dollar  was more important to the Lhited Kingdom
with her large dollar  area trade than to other meinbers
and the joint  upward float  of the snake currencies dur-
ing much of the year would have implied an effective  re-
valuation of sterling  on such a scale that the strain
would probably ha're become intolerable  if  the UK had
stilI  cooperateo in  the snake. Sinilar comments appLy to
the recent perlod. of a weakening ctollar. W a xeversal of this
reasorring, a-peri.od of rising strength of i;he d.ollar arrd. fixed.
intra-Cornmun:lty rates will en-tail a larger effective depreciation
of sterling'tha.n of other menber currencies.
(1)  Assume that the Comnunity eonsists of two equally
large groups of members, A, which does two-thirds
of its  trade vrith the .dollar area and the remai-n-
ing third  insjde the Community, and B, the trade nrnnr'nri^ils of which ar"e the reverse.  Assune !,r  vt.,vr  urv,
furtlier  that both groups are faced with proSpects
of deficits  L.y IgTg rnaking a depreciation in
effectj.ve exchenge ;'ate terms of  10 per eent seern
advisable.  If  bhe Ccnr-munj.ty by a joint  float
manages to dr,.preciate a]I  its  currencies by 20 per
cent vis  3. vis  ihe dollar  (rest of the world),
Group A vri11 effeciively  have devalued by more
. than IJ per ceni and should tend bo move beyond
target whil-e Croirp B will  effectively  have de-
valued by less than'1 per cent and is  likeIy  to
find  itself  short of tarqet.
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The translation of effective rate change requi.re-
ments into community action both externally and in-
ternall;r is  emphasized here, because it  has, despite
its  obviousness, only rarely been faced explicitly.
Yet it  seems very important, peirticularly if  one wants
to reintegrate the present floatlng cu*encles into cornrnunity
monetary cooperation. The crucial step is to restore
exchange rate adjustment as a prime matter for community
review and consultation; this should in itserf  tend to
minimize intra-community changes. The point is not to
elirninate such changes though this shoutd b€ retained as
a distant aim. By starting from apparently required
changes in effective rates and developing the implica-'
tions for intra-community rates from there, recommenda-
tions wourd' become more persuasive. At the same time,
.members with a structure of foreign economic relation-
ships untypical in a conmunity context nay feel assured
that their problems are taken into account as legitimate
grounds for not observing intra-community rate stabirity.
For these reasons the procedure seems more sbtisfactory
than the more traditional approach of starting from an Itaveragert community viewpoinL and assuming internalry
rigid. rates.
The abo'e argument further suggests that it  would
faciiitate  discus.sion of exchange rate issues to formulate
explieit oommunity policies vis H, vis the dollar and the
sDR" The notion of a itcommunity revel of the doLlar'
laeks precision in the absence of a well-defined basket
of member cur*encies marcing up an authonized unit of
acCOUnt. Such a unit,  se:rrtng initia}ly  as a nea;1s of  settlenent
antt gradually also as a med.ir:m of .intervention, ls  proposed. as
a useflrl etep for a number of reasons in the Grouprs report. As
long as it  exists only as a uni.t of accountp intervention  a6ainst
the collar  would ha'ue to  take place in  one of  the national
currencies and rul"es of thumb would have to be d.eveloped
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for such interventions. A band of permissible variation
against the dollan would be set up, aubject to revislon
on an annual, possibly semi-annual, basis; the band - of
approxirnately the width of 4l per cent contained in the
Srnithsonian Agneement - would move gradually towards the
leveL inplied for the dollan by the nedium-term norn for
effective nates. The band would be made public to give
guidance to exchange markets. Revisions wouLd be nade
in annual or semi-annual. steps of about half the width
of the band to pnevent sharp discontinuities in rate
changes. tfhenever some member curuency tends to break
thnough this crawJ.ing bandr BaI becauge of large capital
flows across the At1antic, the authorities gf that
cumency would intervene on behalf of the Cornmunity. (1)
To sunnariae thie review of J.onger-term cniteria,
the nain stepa would be to
(f)  eetimate and make consigtent the pnospects
for cycl.ically-adjuated annual balances at
existing exchange rates and likely  trcnds ln
rclatlvc prloor of tredrtbrcgoodr  feir r tergot Dcdod
about tbrcc yclrs hcnoc;
(2')  neview and make eonpatible the overall baLance
of paymenta aisre of member aountries for the
same tanget period;
(t)  decide on the implications for effective ex-
change rate adjustnenta  ovcr tbrt pr{.od,;
(4)  nr,b pravtaloa for an cobengr rrto
policy fon the next L2 (or 6) nonths
in the form of (a) a band of pennissibl-e varia-
tion fon the dolLan and (b) intra-Comnunity
adjustnents; and
(1)  The Conmunity natune of euch Lntenventione nigbt
be underlined by a scheme for sharing any exchange
risk among membens. Interventions in dollars would
be reported to  E[cF; the Fnnd itseF need only be
a book-keeping agencY.  .









Short-term man ment of  exchange markets.
While the  previous section has dealt with the
longer-term framework for  conmunity exchange rate policy
ttre following conments apply to day-to-day or  nonth-to-
nonth management. Without going into  the technical com-
r'l )
plexities  of intervention syste.ms at all  adequately'-"
the main issues may be reviewed by surveying in  which
respects the 'remain|ng exchange rate cooperation between
five  members -  the so-ealled mini-snake  could be im-
proved so as to  serve aS a model for  all  member Currencies'
on ihe whole the experiences of the mini-snake have
been surprisirrgly favourable.  It  has proved possible to
operate the arrangements  with rather minimal interventions
in  Community currencies despite marked dif,ferenees in  the
balance-of-payments prospects, inflation  rates and policies
of the participants.  1'hough this  is  no doubt in part  due
to temporary and accidental factors weakening the Deutschernarkt
notably the foreign exoha^nge losses reported by sone Geman barrks, there
ban be little  dloubt that the ninisnake has had. a cafuning effect on excba:rge
narkets which hag benefiteci at least the snaller participarrtF.  Ttre lcrowlecl'ge
that virtually qnlinited. resoulces were arrailable to support incliviclual
currencies has und.oubted.ly been an inportant stabilizing factor.
The present width of bhe intra-Community band of
?-I/4  per cent was designed in early I|TZ to  achieve
syr,rmetry in  the potential  variability  over time of  any
rt\ \r/  For a cai"eful review see Helmut 1^t. l'layer rrThe
Anatony of  of ficial  Exchange-P,ate  Inte:'ventionsrt,
Frincetcn Essays i-n Tr:ternaf;ional- Finance ]{r:. l-04, rum
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member currency vis-}.-vis the dollar and other nernber currenCies' Aa
long as the g.ol-lar is floating and has ceased. to be the intenrention ourrencyt
the present wid.th has no clain in logic. It  is,  however, proposed in the
previous section that a crawling tunnel for the d'o1lar is  an inporta'nt ele-
nent in a longer-term stratery for conmunity exchange rates.  If  such a tunnel
reappears, the intra-comnunity snake should once nore be adjustecl' to half
*he wid.th of the tLotlar ba,rrd. But even if  it  cloes not, it  is not easy to
justify  a snake much. wider than the present one. Its  stabilizlng effect on
exchasge narkets would. be d.lLuted. as the risk of sharp shifts in the rslative
position of currencies insiile the snake increased. Wlth the authoritles connit-
tetl to a no intewention policy insid.e the snake such shifts could gather
nornentun  and. foster d-estabilizing  speculation'
since the possibility of sharp fluctuations is  alreaftr non-nelligible in the
pxesent arrangements it  rnight be envisagect to supplernent them by nrleg on
narinr:n d.ay-to-day  novementsr say one half per cent at' nost, of ar5r two
menber cumencies r€Iatlve to one another. Thus the authorities of a4lr cuFency
tend.ing to appreclate retrati.ve to some other nenber currenoy by nore than the
rnaximum would und.ertake to support that other curl'encyi alternatively, though
less in a conrnunity spirit,  these stabilizing effects c9u1d be aqhievecl  by
setting limits to d.aily fluctuations in dollar rates (in principle half the
wldth of the desired- intra-Conrnunity linits)'
If  claily changes were linltett to the above maxinum there would still
be the possibility that they rniglrt cunulate to an indesirable extent overt
say, one month. To prevent euch movenents from occurring one night adopt
intewention rates of the sirnple type suggested. in the Grouprs report; €o$e
by limiting the charrge in the cross rate between two nember currencies to the
differente in inflation rates (mesurecl prinarily by ln6ices for tracleable
good.s) between them.
A further inprovement in the functioningof intra-Comnunity arranpments
would be to abandon the principle that settlements of d'ebt should' be made
in proportions  ..
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corresponding to the composition of reserve assets of
the debtor. Once the Community  has a policy on the
dollar rate, settlements in dollars should become more
acceptablel and at a minimum gold'would have to be
formal}y removdd from the settlement ruJes os long as
its  monetary position is uncertain, as has now been recognizecl.
by the renoval of golcl fron tra^nsactions with the IMF.
Intra-Community  intervention rules would no
doubt be simpler if  they could center on a European unit
of account.
Ilowever. as long assome member currencies
are fS.oating independently, the value of the basket of
currencies bhat go into the unit of account will  be
subject to considerable fluctuations, complicating
interventions and settlements. If  all  currencies
adhere !o a snake of modest width, the composite inter-
vention currency becomes more feasible, but at the same
tine legg inportant. Howevcr, there arc advrnteges, mainly of a
psychological kind, in  authorizing a unit  of account
whi.ch may justify  its  adoption at a stage where it  is
technically premature  .
These and other matters relating  to the function-
ing of the snake and the prospects for  enlarging it  to
encompass the French fi"anc and other eurreneies presently
f ioating  have long been und.er discussion in  the Council
of Ministers, the Committee of Central Bank Governors
and the Monetary Committee. .The technicaL. problems,
though difficult,  seem manageable.
Implications for d.oroestic monetaqr ma4g@L
It  has long been recognized that coordination of
exchange rate policy imposes constraints on the use of
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national monetary policies.  Divergent policies anong member
countries woul-d give rise to large capital flows which
lead to instability  in their  international reserves and
are like1y to undermine the structure of exehange rates.
closer exchangu. rate cooperation therefore implies that
the parti.cipanis refrain from formulating and pressing
independent targets for their  monetary policies.
The simplest prescription wourd be for countries
to gear their monetary policies primarily to i-corlcctively
ag:rccd ain for thei.r extcrnal balancc. Sincc
it  was seen to be a prerequisite for the successful
operation of exchange rate coordination that member
countries external aims were mutually eonsistent, such
astrongprcgoriptLon  woul.tL bc gtabiLizing. hrt a^s would
clearly go too far;  several member countries, Germany
and France amongst others, have found monetary policy
to be too useful for domestic purposes to warrant its
gearing to exterr:al objectives only.  The authority for
mone.tary policy may in the long run be transferred to
the community level, but this  is not for the near future.
Fortunately something less ambitious seems to be
sufficient,  .at least for  complementing the type of ex-
change rage coordination enVisaged here, which retains
some scope for adjusting rates.  Abovc a1l, there is  a
need for exchange of information prior to any major
shifts  in a memb6r countryts monetar"y stance , pncfcrrbry
for Joint consultatLone  on thc nonctary hrilgatg of indivitlual ooun-
trics; in its abgcncc a perlod of cleetabillzlng and. conpctitlvc
mseaurcs is llkcly to foller. tfhen countrics intcreot stffalftcrntly
rith ce,ch othcr tt ls cascntial for caoh cbuntry to hsvc e good
irlca.ebout'rhet the othcrr rrc plenning to tto endrlndicd,, nhrt tbcy




It  ig tempting to look for slmple ml.ee that countrics rould. bc
asked. to conforn to, Bay approxlnatcly parallel grorth ratca in thc nonctar;r
base or broadcr aggregatcs such as the mone.{..9*pplX. Attenpts in thc pastt
notably in thc fall  of L972, of bringing noncy eupply grorth ratcg ln linc
wcre not gucccgsfirl,  Though such attcnpts would no cloubt hevc had hclpful
offcots, thcy nere rightly considcrcd. too necha.nical. A ginilar fatc rould
probably ovGrconc attcnpts to-clay of introducing slniler nrlcs of bchaviour.
Sonc mcnbcr countrics cLthcr clo not takc their nonay supply tcriously as a
nain detcrrnina^nt of thcir internal or cxternal posltion or fincl thcngclvcs
unablc to control thc nonctarXr aggrcgatcs ovGT shortcr pcriod.s ofr sry 3 to
5 nonths. Onc nay rcgrct this strtc of affairs -  and. therc arc goocl Founds
for cnphasizing thc rolc of nonctar;r factors - blrt it  has to bc takcn lnto
account.
Thig lcavcs e:qr preecriptlons rathGr vaguc.l{ork te only bcgLnning  on
thc poseibllltlcs of harmonizing moncta,ry instruncntg. Ea.rmorrl.zetlon in thtc
Bcnse sccng to go bcyontl what is requirccl for assurlng that policy cffccts
- thc thnrst of nonetar;r policy - rto out of line. In tbc ncartrbilc sons
undcrtta,ncling  on rcfr&.ining fron conplctc stcrlllzetlon of thc crtcrrrel
inpact on thc noncta^ry basc ancl d.oncetic rnonctar3r aggrcgatcs scGns thc nost
constnrctlvc  etcp; a proposal along thcse lincs le arguccl norc ftrlly ln
thc Link bctnccn Internal Monetary Pollcics and a crcdLbl.c latrarE\ropGsJr
Srcha.ngc Ratc Systcn (Anncx K, pago 133).
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